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Terror in the balance : security, liberty, and the courts

Author: Eric A Posner; Adrian Vermeule
Publisher: New York : Oxford University Press, 2007.
Edition/Format:   Book : EnglishView all editions and formats
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
In the wake of 9/11, the United States government has relied on a number of aggressive security measures to protect the nation. From domestic wiretapping without warrants to the surveillance of Muslim and Arab Americans and the coercive interrogation of suspected terrorists, the Bush administration's policies have attracted much controversy and been decried as outrageous violations of domestic and international law.  Read more...
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Additional Physical Format: Online version:
Posner, Eric A.
Terror in the balance.
New York : Oxford University Press, 2007
(OCoLC)608162634
Online version:
Posner, Eric A.
Terror in the balance.
New York : Oxford University Press, 2007
(OCoLC)609351542
Material Type: Internet resource
Document Type: Book, Internet Resource
All Authors / Contributors: Eric A Posner; Adrian Vermeule
ISBN: 9780195310252 019531025X
OCLC Number: 64592156
Description: 319 p. ; 25 cm.
Contents: The tradeoff thesis --
The panic theory --
The democratic failure theory --
The Ratchet theory, and other long-run effects --
Institutional alternatives to judicial deference --
Coercive interrogation --
Speech, due process, and political trials --
Military force.
Responsibility: Eric A. Posner, Adrian Vermeule.
More information:

Abstract:

In the wake of 9/11, the United States government has relied on a number of aggressive security measures to protect the nation. From domestic wiretapping without warrants to the surveillance of Muslim and Arab Americans and the coercive interrogation of suspected terrorists, the Bush administration's policies have attracted much controversy and been decried as outrageous violations of domestic and international law. In Terror in the Balance , Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule argue that the legal and institutional basis of this critique is wrong. When governments strive to increase national security they should be given wide latitude to adjust policy and liberties in the time of emergency and war. Deference to the executive during emergencies, Posner and Vermeule contend, is necessary and powers must be made available to the executive when the increase in security justifies the corresponding losses from the decrease in liberty. Further, when the executive is compelled to implement controversial methods of protecting its citizens such as discrimination against aliens or censorship of hate speech, the judiciary should not interfere on constitutional grounds except in unusual circumstances. Courts and legislators are institutionally incapable of second guessing security policy, and trying to enforce ordinary law during times of emergency shackles government when it most needs flexibility. American constitutional law and international law do not provide reasons for courts or legislators to depart from their historical posture of deference to the executive during national emergencies. - Publisher.

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"Admirably clear and free of technical jargon, this is a relentlessly rational dissection of a topic confused by overstatement, opportunistic political posturing and just plain lack of common sense. Read more...

 
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