Time runs out in CBI

Forward p.V - The Authors p.VI - Preface p.VII
Pt. ONE : Opening the Road to China
I. New Commanders in a Split Theater p.3
II. Wedemeyer Begins His Work in China p.46
III. Beginning the Fall Campaign in North Burma p.77
IV. Breaking the Blockade of China p.114
V. The Crest of the Flood in China p.142
Pt. TWO: Plans and Preparations for Opening a Port in China
VI. The MARS Force and the Burma Road p.183
VII. Victory in BUrma Frees Troops for China p.206
VIII. Finding a Way to Advise and Assist p.231
IX. Meeting the First Test in China p.262
X. Role of the India-Burma Base p.291
XI. Preparing a Drive to the China Coast p.330
XII. The End of Wedemeyer's Experiment p.368
Bibliographical Note p.473 - Glossary - Code names - Basic military map symbols - Index 491 - Charts 1. - Tables - Maps 1. - Illustrations

< Time Runs Out in CBI is a history of the two U.S. theaters into which China-Burma-India was split when Stilwell was recalled, one (India-Burma) commanded by Lt. Gen. Daniel I. Sultan, the other (China) by Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wede-meyer. This volume continues and completes the story of the north Burma campaign, recounts the operations of Chinese-American forces along the Salween River, and describes the logistical ef-forts of General Sultan's command. The story of General Wedemeyer's attempt to provide the Chinese with an army that they could support and also powerful enough to guarantee China's freedom is the core of this book. By the end of July 1945 Wedemeyer had given thirteen weeks' training to eleven Chinese Nationalist di-visions and had started twenty-two more on their first training cycle. To this total, five battle-tested divisions fresh from the Burma campaign could be added. The beginnings of a Chinese Services of Supply to support these 30-odd divisions were at hand, and service schools were functioning. But before this force could advance to the coast, Japan surrendered and time ran out in CBI. The book ends with the Japanese surrender. Key topics: 1. Strategy (planning) (I, Chs. II, V, VII-X; II, Chs. I, II, X; III, Part II). 2. Lend-lease (see indexes of all three vol-umes). 3. Conducting a theater SOS (I, Chs. II, VI; II, Chs. III, VII; III, Ch. I, and Part II). 4. U.S. policy toward China (I, Chs. I, II, V, IX; II, Ch. II, and Part III; III, Chs. I, XI). 5. Line of communications problems (I, Chs. VI, VIII, IX; II, Ch. VII; III, Chs. VII, X, XI). 6. Command problems-Allied (I, Chs. III, IV, VIII, IX; II, Chs. II, V, VI11, X, XII; III, Chs. I, V, VIII). 7. Volunteer air forces (I, Chs. I-IV). 8. Local procurement by an SOS directed to "live off the land" (I, Ch. VI; II, Ch. VII; III, Part II). 9. Organizing a theater of operations (I, Chs. II, III, V, X; III, Ch. I). 10. Stilwell's programs for China (I, Chs. III, IV, V, VII, IX, X; II, Chs. I, II). 11. Wedemeyer's programs for China (III, Part II). 12. Stilwell's exercise of command and diplo-matic functions (I and II); Wedemeyer's exercise (III, Part II). 13. Campaigning in Burma (see indexes of all three volumes). 14. Chinese training centers (see indexes of all three volumes). 15. Engineering problems (see index entries in all three volumes on roads, airfields, and construction). 16. Airlift to China and supply by air in Burma (see indexes to all three volumes). 17. Strategic air operations based on India and China (see indexes to all three volumes). > - Analytical description from: US Army in WW II : Reader’s guide. – 1992