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|All Authors / Contributors:||
青木, 昌彦 (1938-) ; Masahiko Aoki
|Description:||xi, 467 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.|
|Contents:||1. What Are Institutions? How Should We Approach Them? 1.1. Three Views of Institutions in a Game-Theoretic Perspective. 1.2. Aspects of Institutions: Shared Beliefs, Summary Representations of Equilibrium, and Endogenous Rules of the Game. 1.3. Organization of the Book --
2. Customary Property Rights and Community Norms. 2.1. Customary Property Rights as a Self-organizing System. 2.2. Community Norms as a Self-enforcing Solution to the Commons Problem. App. History versus Ecology as a Determinant of a Norm: The Case of Yi Korea --
3. Private-Ordered Governance of Trade, Contracts, and Markets. 3.1. Traders' Norms. 3.2. Cultural Beliefs and Self-enforcing Employment Contracts. 3.3. Private Third-Party Governance: The Law Merchant.
|Series Title:||Comparative institutional analysis, 2.|
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