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Toward reunion in philosophy.

Author: Morton White
Publisher: New York, Atheneum, 1963.
Series: Atheneum paperbacks, 38.
Edition/Format:   Print book : EnglishView all editions and formats
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Document Type: Book
All Authors / Contributors: Morton White
OCLC Number: 1180873
Description: 304 pages 19 cm
Contents: Part I; What is --
Chapter 1; From existence to decision --
The argument --
The age of meanings --
The age of words --
The two Russells --
The age of decision --
Philosophy as a unified discipline --
Chapter 2; the existence of meanings --
The semantics of Mill --
The confusions of Russell --
The structure of Russell's argument for universals --
The structure of Frege's argument --
Epistemology and semantics --
The failure of the epistemological argument for meanings --
Chapter 3; The existence of physical objects --
Three views on the existence of physical objects --
Russell's skepticism --
The theory of descriptions and the theory of proper names --
Two uses of the theory of proper names: neutral and belligerent --
Why the Platonic meaning fares better than the thing-in-itself --
The validity of a Russell-like criticism of Moore's proof --
Why Moore's proof is unconvincing --
The conclusion of this chapter and the last --
Chapter IV; The use of "exists" --
Three views on the use of "exists" --
Duovocalism: the doctrine that "exists" has two uses --
Forestalling a possible misunderstanding --
An alternative approach to some uses of "exists" --
The multivocalism of Ryle --
How Ryle might dispense with multivocalism --
Conclusion --
Chapter5; Categories and postulates --
Are the existential statements of philosophers "analytic?" --
Some elementary logical notions --
Quine and ontology --
"Analytic" is not enough --
The universe of discourse is not enough --
Carnap, ontology and analyticity --
The categorial and the noncategorial: a dubious distinction --
Chapter 6; metaphysics and the criterion of meaning --
Are the existential statements of logic meaningless? --
Postulation and the criterion of meaning --
Logical positivism and metaphysics --
The criterion of meaning, rational language and "rational reconstruction" --
The decision to make certain expressions meaningless --
Summary of conclusions on existence --
Part II; What must be --
Chapter 7; A pre-positivistic view of the a priori --
A priori knowledge and the existence of universals --
Ordinary a priori statements not about attributes --
Understanding the subject matter of statements --
Logic and the synthetic a priori --
Recent discussions of analyticity --
Are all logical truths analytic? --
Chapter 8; The analytic and the synthetic --
The analytic and the a priori --
Platonism and positivism --
Analyticity and natural language --
The view that identity of meaning is more fundamental than synonymy --
The ascent to language --
What has been shown and what hasn't --
Chapter 9; Artificial rescue efforts --
'Analytic' is a philosopher's word --
Conventionalism, synonymy and Platonism --
Conventionalism, nominal definitions and semantical rules --
The social contract, the linguistic contract, and performatory phrases --
Semantical rules: a way out? --
A parallel in the philosophy of law --
Part III; what should be. Chapter 10; The naturalistic fallacy and the nature of goodness --
From existence to decision --
Moore's ethical views and his philosophical method --
Ethics and analysis --
The naturalistic fallacy --
The same fallacy outside of ethics --
The simplicity of goodness --
The attempt at providing the indefinability of goodness --
The attempt examined further --
Is goodness a non-natural attribute? --
Goodness as an intrinsic, non-descriptive attribute --
Conclusions --
Chapter 11; Semantics and ethical discourse --
Moore and the ethics of logical positivism --
Three positivist tenets on ethical naturalism --
The concentration of an ordinary language --
A logical difficulty in the positivist criticism of naturalism --
Enter emotive meaning --
Chapter 12; Belief, performance and justification --
Belief and attitude --
Disagreement in belief and disagreement in attitude --
A useful specification --
Some relations between the two kinds of disagreement --
Performance and justification --
Three types of linguistic performance --
Chapter 13; Ethical argument --
From Moore to Aristotle: does ethics require a special mode of argument? --
What are the premises and conclusions of ethical argument? --
The moral agent as his own moral critic --
Deciding that and deciding to --
The relevance of ordinary language --
'Is' and 'ought' --
Prescribing and describing --
Against the view that ethics requires a special mode of argument --
Conclusion --
Part IV; What is, what must be, what should be --
Chapter 14; Ethics, science and logic --
Moral principles and scientific laws --
Rules --
Ethics, science and logic --
The old ethics and the new --
The real trouble lies in the notion of meaning --
Chapter 15; The right to believe --
Recapitulation --
The general significance of ethical reasoning --
Agreements and differences with pragmatism --
Neo-pragmatism --
Beyond pragmatism --
Chapter 16; Beyond positivism and pragmatism --
Philosophy is partly normative --
Ethics and science --
No positivism, no pragmatism --
The meaning of science and ethics: more semantic dust --
The a priori and the a posteriori: a concession withdrawn --
Chapter 17; How do we go from where? --
Clearing the ground --
The finite character of the logistic thesis --
The universal character of Moore's anti-naturalism --
The link between universalism and intensionalism --
Description, performance and evaluation in philosoph.
Series Title: Atheneum paperbacks, 38.
Responsibility: [Cambridge] Harvard University Press [c1956].

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