Tower of Babel : the evidence against the new creationism

Robert Pennock's "Tower of Babel" is a book that explores the philosophy of science and the philosophical foundations of creationism. Pennock's focus is the difference between metaphysical naturalism, which posits that the observable world is basically all that there is, and methodological naturalism, which is the operating principle that observable natural phenomena have natural causes. The first is a philosophical position that cannot be proven by scientific investigation. The second is a necessary precondition for scientific investigation.

Phillip Johnson, Alvin Plantinga and others, who are leading a new generation of creationists, have argued that even methodological naturalism is an atheistic philosophy that a priori excludes from science a possible range of explanations where observable natural phenomena are caused by supernatural entities, such as God or the devil. Pennock's rebuttal is at first difficult to follow and not persuasive, but as the explanation develops and cases are explored, the point is driven home.

Pennock's point is that he defines the supernatural as fundamentally unknowable. If an agent is not able to be predicted, then any phenomenon whatsoever can be explained by the introduction of arbitrary supernatural agents. If we posit a supernatural agent, but then claim that we understand and can describe that agent's motives for action, then the agent ceases to be, by Pennock's definition, supernatural. He describes this situation as "naturalizing the supernatural." He says, well, if you naturalize God, then you could introduce God as a causal agent into a scientific hypothesis, but then you are not introducing a supernatural explanation, because you have naturalized the agent in question.

Personally, I do not care for Pennock's vocabulary. I am sure that it comes out of a long philosophical tradition, and I am sure that he has excellent reasons for using it, but it can easily confuse. I would prefer to say, "You can introduce what many people consider a supernatural agent as long as you then hypothsize why the agent acted and what the agent did." That rephrasing would weaken the force of the mantra of modern creationist philosophy.

The examples help a great deal in making the point. Pennock compares the realms of science and the law. If courts allowed supernatural explanations, then you could claim that you did not intend to commit the crime, you were under a witch's spell. Or the devil made you do it. Or that you had actually been magically transported to hell while the crime was being committed, and a devil took your shape and committed the crime instead of you. If anyone asks for evidence, you can say that it was supernatural and not observable. Spiritualists and mediums could become expert witnesses.

The practice of naturalizing the supernatural can be seen in the earlier history of biology and natural history. Because pre-Darwinian biologists hypothesized that God would perfectly create each species to fill a niche in the ecosystem, the hypothesis was testable. Darwin and other biogeographers tested it and established that it was false. Earlier still, natural historians hypothesized that God would not permit a species to become extinct. That naturalized a supernatural entity, and it too was established to be false.

Pennock shows how Phillip Johnson dances around the issue of stating exactly what the supernatural agents he supports did and why. The reason is because every time people have committed, the hypotheses were testable and rejected. Instead, Johnson plays coy, claiming that traditional science is unfair. But clearly, Johnson sees his God as a knowable entity. So Pennock points out that Johnson is not a Supernaturalist, but a super Naturalist, trying to naturalize the supernatural, thereby becoming what he condemns. Johnson's dilemma lies at the heart of the philosophical troubles for creationism and Intelligent Design.

Additionally, the book gives excellent rebuttals to some of the arguments and analogies used by Michael Behe, one of the few ID proponents to have a Ph.D. in a biological field.