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Trading votes for votes : a decentralized matching algorithm

Author: Alessandra Casella; Thomas R Palfrey; National Bureau of Economic Research,
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2015.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 21645.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
Vote-trading is common practice in committees and group decision-making. Yet we know very little about its properties. Inspired by the similarity between the logic of sequential rounds of pairwise vote-trading and matching algorithms, we explore three central questions that have parallels in the matching literature: (1) Does a stable allocation of votes always exists? (2) Is it reachable through a decentralized  Read more...
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Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Alessandra Casella; Thomas R Palfrey; National Bureau of Economic Research,
OCLC Number: 925548237
Notes: "October 2015"
Description: 1 online resource (55 pages) : illustrations.
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 21645.
Responsibility: Alessandra Casella, Thomas Palfrey.

Abstract:

Vote-trading is common practice in committees and group decision-making. Yet we know very little about its properties. Inspired by the similarity between the logic of sequential rounds of pairwise vote-trading and matching algorithms, we explore three central questions that have parallels in the matching literature: (1) Does a stable allocation of votes always exists? (2) Is it reachable through a decentralized algorithm? (3) What welfare properties does it possess? We prove that a stable allocation exists and is always reached in a finite number of trades, for any number of voters and issues, for any separable preferences, and for any rule on how trades are prioritized. Its welfare properties however are guaranteed to be desirable only under specific conditions. A laboratory experiment confirms that stability has predictive power on the vote allocation achieved via sequential pairwise trades, but lends only weak support to the dynamic algorithm itself.

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