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Voting Rights, Private Benefits, and Takeovers

Author: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.
Publisher: Ann Arbor, Mich. : Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2002.
Series: ICPSR (Series), 1252.
Edition/Format:   Computer file : EnglishView all editions and formats
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
This article analyzes the effects that institutional design of a firm has on the allocation of control over the firm's assets. The efficient allocation of control is a necessary condition for the optimal allocation of resources. Dynamic efficiency in resource allocation presupposes that control over firms will change hands when a given allocation becomes suboptimal. Typically, changes in control are brought about  Read more...
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Details

Material Type: Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.
OCLC Number: 61146139
Notes: Title from ICPSR DDI metadata of 2004-10-30.
Details: Mode of access: Intranet.
Series Title: ICPSR (Series), 1252.
Responsibility: Frank A. Schmid.

Abstract:

This article analyzes the effects that institutional design of a firm has on the allocation of control over the firm's assets. The efficient allocation of control is a necessary condition for the optimal allocation of resources. Dynamic efficiency in resource allocation presupposes that control over firms will change hands when a given allocation becomes suboptimal. Typically, changes in control are brought about through (successful) tender offers or block trades. With regard to takeovers, a firm may have two types of value to consider: First, there is the public value of the firm, which is the market value of the firm's securities. Second, there may be a private value of the firm. The private value is the benefit an investor enjoys from exercising control over the firm. Private control benefits are most significant for entrepreneurial start-ups, for established family-owned businesses, and for organizations in which personal investors also pursue non-pecuniary goals, such as media groups or professional sports organizations. Of the legal arrangements identified in the finance literature, the most significant for wealth maximization in takeovers are the one share-one vote principle, majority rule, and mandatory tender offers. The authors analyze the implications of these three institutional arrangements in a simple textbook takeover model. The model helps in understanding the optimal design of a legal environment in which the market for corporate control promotes efficient allocation of capital ... Cf.: http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR01252.

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