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Which banks choose deposit insurance? : evidence of adverse selection and moral hazard in a voluntary insurance system Preview this item
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Which banks choose deposit insurance? : evidence of adverse selection and moral hazard in a voluntary insurance system

Author: David C Wheelock; Subal C Kumbhaker; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Publisher: St. Louis, MO. : Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 1991.
Series: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.; Working paper series
Edition/Format:   Book : EnglishView all editions and formats
Database:WorldCat
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Document Type: Book
All Authors / Contributors: David C Wheelock; Subal C Kumbhaker; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
OCLC Number: 24509021
Notes: Draft: Septmber, 1991.
Description: 16, [4] leaves : ill. ; 28 cm.
Series Title: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.; Working paper series
Other Titles: Evidence of adverse selection and moral hazard in a voluntary insurance system
Responsibility: David C. Wheelock and Subal C. Kumbhaker.

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