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Why cryptography should not rely on physical attack complexity

Author: Juliane Krämer
Publisher: Singapore : Springer, 2015.
Series: T-labs series in telecommunication services.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
This book presents two practical physical attacks. It shows how attackers can reveal the secret key of symmetric as well as asymmetric cryptographic algorithms based on these attacks, and presents countermeasures on the software and the hardware level that can help to prevent them in the future. Though their theory has been known for several years now, since neither attack has yet been successfully implemented in  Read more...
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Genre/Form: Electronic books
Additional Physical Format: Print version:
Krämer, Juliane.
Why cryptography should not rely on physical attack complexity.
Singapore : Springer, 2015
(OCoLC)913767722
Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Juliane Krämer
ISBN: 9789812877871 9812877878
OCLC Number: 920519624
Description: 1 online resource (xxi, 122 pages) : illustrations (some color).
Contents: Introduction --
Mathematical and Cryptological Background --
Photonic Emission Analysis --
The Photonic Side Channel --
Higher-Order Fault Attacks against Pairing Computations --
Future Work and Conclusion.
Series Title: T-labs series in telecommunication services.
Responsibility: Juliane Krämer.

Abstract:

Due to the need for at least two independent precise faults in a single pairing computation, it has not been taken seriously either.Based on these two attacks, the book demonstrates that the  Read more...

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