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Why firms adopt antitakeover arrangements

Author: Lucian A Bebchuk; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, ©2003.
Series: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 10190.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : EnglishView all editions and formats
Summary:
"Firms going public have increasingly been incorporating antitakeover provisions in their IPO charters, while shareholders of existing companies have increasingly been voting in opposition to such charter provisions. This paper identifies possible explanations for this empirical pattern. Specifically, I analyze explanations based on (1) the role of antitakeover arrangements in encouraging founders to break up their  Read more...
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Details

Material Type: Document, Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Lucian A Bebchuk; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC Number: 54666591
Notes: "December 2003."
Description: 1 online resource (29 pages).
Series Title: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 10190.
Responsibility: Lucian Arye Bebchuk.

Abstract:

"Firms going public have increasingly been incorporating antitakeover provisions in their IPO charters, while shareholders of existing companies have increasingly been voting in opposition to such charter provisions. This paper identifies possible explanations for this empirical pattern. Specifically, I analyze explanations based on (1) the role of antitakeover arrangements in encouraging founders to break up their initial control blocks, (2) efficient private benefits of control, (3) agency problems among pre-IPO shareholders, (4) agency problems between pre-IPO shareholders and their IPO lawyers, (5) asymmetric information between founders and public investors about the firm's future growth prospects, and (6) bounded attention and imperfect pricing at the IPO stage"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

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