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Why tie a product consumers do not use?

Autore: Dennis W Carlton; Joshua Gans; Michael Waldman; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Editore: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007.
Serie: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 13339.
Edizione/Formato:   eBook : Document : EnglishVedi tutte le edizioni e i formati
Banca dati:WorldCat
Sommario:
This paper provides a new explanation for tying that is not based on any of the standard explanations -- efficiency, price discrimination, and exclusion. Our analysis shows how a monopolist sometimes has an incentive to tie a complementary good to its monopolized good in order to transfer profits from a rival producer of the complementary product to the monopolist. This occurs even when consumers -- who have the  Per saperne di più…
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Dettagli

Informazioni aggiuntive sul formato: (OCoLC)173521328
Tipo materiale: Document, Risorsa internet
Tipo documento: Internet Resource, Computer File
Tutti gli autori / Collaboratori: Dennis W Carlton; Joshua Gans; Michael Waldman; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Numero OCLC: 166326460
Note di riproduzione: Electronic reproduction. [S.l.] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2011. MiAaHDL
Descrizione: 1 online resource (1 v.)
Dettagli: Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
Titolo della serie: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 13339.
Responsabilità: Dennis W. Carlton, Joshua S. Gans, Michael Waldman.

Abstract:

This paper provides a new explanation for tying that is not based on any of the standard explanations -- efficiency, price discrimination, and exclusion. Our analysis shows how a monopolist sometimes has an incentive to tie a complementary good to its monopolized good in order to transfer profits from a rival producer of the complementary product to the monopolist. This occurs even when consumers -- who have the option to use the monopolist's complementary good -- do not use it. The tie is profitable because it alters the subsequent pricing game between the monopolist and the rival in a manner favorable to the monopolist. We show that this form of tying is socially inefficient, but interestingly can arise only when the tie is socially efficient in the absence of the rival producer. We relate this inefficient form of tying to several actual examples and explore its antitrust implications.

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