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Why tie a product consumers do not use?

著者: Dennis W Carlton; Joshua Gans; Michael Waldman; National Bureau of Economic Research.
出版: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007.
シリーズ: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 13339.
エディション/フォーマット:   電子書籍 : Document : Englishすべてのエディションとフォーマットを見る
データベース:WorldCat
概要:
This paper provides a new explanation for tying that is not based on any of the standard explanations -- efficiency, price discrimination, and exclusion. Our analysis shows how a monopolist sometimes has an incentive to tie a complementary good to its monopolized good in order to transfer profits from a rival producer of the complementary product to the monopolist. This occurs even when consumers -- who have the  続きを読む
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資料の種類: Document, インターネット資料
ドキュメントの種類: インターネットリソース, コンピューターファイル
すべての著者/寄与者: Dennis W Carlton; Joshua Gans; Michael Waldman; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC No.: 166326460
物理形態: 1 online resource (1 v.)
シリーズタイトル: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 13339.
責任者: Dennis W. Carlton, Joshua S. Gans, Michael Waldman.

概要:

This paper provides a new explanation for tying that is not based on any of the standard explanations -- efficiency, price discrimination, and exclusion. Our analysis shows how a monopolist sometimes has an incentive to tie a complementary good to its monopolized good in order to transfer profits from a rival producer of the complementary product to the monopolist. This occurs even when consumers -- who have the option to use the monopolist's complementary good -- do not use it. The tie is profitable because it alters the subsequent pricing game between the monopolist and the rival in a manner favorable to the monopolist. We show that this form of tying is socially inefficient, but interestingly can arise only when the tie is socially efficient in the absence of the rival producer. We relate this inefficient form of tying to several actual examples and explore its antitrust implications.

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