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Why tie a product consumers do not use?

저자: Dennis W Carlton; Joshua Gans; Michael Waldman; National Bureau of Economic Research.
출판사: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007.
시리즈: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 13339.
판/형식:   전자도서 : 문서 : 영어모든 판과 형식 보기
데이터베이스:WorldCat
요약:
This paper provides a new explanation for tying that is not based on any of the standard explanations -- efficiency, price discrimination, and exclusion. Our analysis shows how a monopolist sometimes has an incentive to tie a complementary good to its monopolized good in order to transfer profits from a rival producer of the complementary product to the monopolist. This occurs even when consumers -- who have the  더 읽기…
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자료 유형: 문서, 인터넷 자료
문서 형식: 인터넷 자원, 컴퓨터 파일
모든 저자 / 참여자: Dennis W Carlton; Joshua Gans; Michael Waldman; National Bureau of Economic Research.
OCLC 번호: 166326460
설명: 1 online resource (1 v.)
일련 제목: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 13339.
책임: Dennis W. Carlton, Joshua S. Gans, Michael Waldman.

초록:

This paper provides a new explanation for tying that is not based on any of the standard explanations -- efficiency, price discrimination, and exclusion. Our analysis shows how a monopolist sometimes has an incentive to tie a complementary good to its monopolized good in order to transfer profits from a rival producer of the complementary product to the monopolist. This occurs even when consumers -- who have the option to use the monopolist's complementary good -- do not use it. The tie is profitable because it alters the subsequent pricing game between the monopolist and the rival in a manner favorable to the monopolist. We show that this form of tying is socially inefficient, but interestingly can arise only when the tie is socially efficient in the absence of the rival producer. We relate this inefficient form of tying to several actual examples and explore its antitrust implications.

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