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Why tie a product consumers do not use?

Autor: Dennis W Carlton; Joshua Gans; Michael Waldman; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Editora: Cambridge, Mass. : National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007.
Séries: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 13339.
Edição/Formato   e-book : Documento : InglêsVer todas as edições e formatos
Base de Dados:WorldCat
Resumo:
This paper provides a new explanation for tying that is not based on any of the standard explanations -- efficiency, price discrimination, and exclusion. Our analysis shows how a monopolist sometimes has an incentive to tie a complementary good to its monopolized good in order to transfer profits from a rival producer of the complementary product to the monopolist. This occurs even when consumers -- who have the  Ler mais...
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Detalhes

Formato Físico Adicional: (OCoLC)173521328
Tipo de Material: Documento, Recurso Internet
Tipo de Documento: Recurso Internet, Arquivo de Computador
Todos os Autores / Contribuintes: Dennis W Carlton; Joshua Gans; Michael Waldman; National Bureau of Economic Research.
Número OCLC: 166326460
Notas de Reprodução: Electronic reproduction. [S.l.] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2011. MiAaHDL
Descrição: 1 online resource (1 v.)
Detalhes: Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
Título da Série: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research), no. 13339.
Responsabilidade: Dennis W. Carlton, Joshua S. Gans, Michael Waldman.

Resumo:

This paper provides a new explanation for tying that is not based on any of the standard explanations -- efficiency, price discrimination, and exclusion. Our analysis shows how a monopolist sometimes has an incentive to tie a complementary good to its monopolized good in order to transfer profits from a rival producer of the complementary product to the monopolist. This occurs even when consumers -- who have the option to use the monopolist's complementary good -- do not use it. The tie is profitable because it alters the subsequent pricing game between the monopolist and the rival in a manner favorable to the monopolist. We show that this form of tying is socially inefficient, but interestingly can arise only when the tie is socially efficient in the absence of the rival producer. We relate this inefficient form of tying to several actual examples and explore its antitrust implications.

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