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Willy Brandt and Ostpolitik

Author: NATIONAL WAR COLL WASHINGTON DC.
Publisher: Ft. Belvoir Defense Technical Information Center JAN 1976.
Edition/Format:   eBook : EnglishView all editions and formats
Database:WorldCat
Summary:
In the immediate post-war period, many in the West believed (correctly) that the Soviet empire was inherently unstable and expected (incorrectly) that Western technological superiority would quickly triumph over the Communist East. This view was shaken as the Soviet Union apparently caught up with and began to challenge the West in areas such as space. Emerging superpower status allowed Moscow to tighten control  Read more...
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Material Type: Internet resource
Document Type: Internet Resource
All Authors / Contributors: NATIONAL WAR COLL WASHINGTON DC.
OCLC Number: 64440446
Description: 14 p.

Abstract:

In the immediate post-war period, many in the West believed (correctly) that the Soviet empire was inherently unstable and expected (incorrectly) that Western technological superiority would quickly triumph over the Communist East. This view was shaken as the Soviet Union apparently caught up with and began to challenge the West in areas such as space. Emerging superpower status allowed Moscow to tighten control over its satellite states. Willy Brandt cites his first-hand observation of the 1961 building of the Berlin Wall as the act which ended his illusions over U.S. willingness to challenge unilateral Soviet acts in Moscow-dominated territory. By the late 1960s, the stage was set for detente (which required perceived near-equality to be operational). For detente to succeed, the West would have to accept an ideologically divided Europe for the foreseeable future. For the German nation, this meant a divided country, locked in separate spheres of influence and in two military alliances. In practical terms, it also made Germany the most likely future European battlefield, as NATO and Warsaw Pact troops faced each other across the inner German frontier.

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Linked Data


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