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Menezes, Flavio M.

Overview
Works: 33 works in 92 publications in 2 languages and 1,249 library holdings
Roles: Author
Classifications: HF5476, 381.170151
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about Flavio M Menezes
Publications by Flavio M Menezes
Most widely held works by Flavio M Menezes
An introduction to auction theory by Flavio M Menezes( Book )
25 editions published between 2004 and 2008 in English and held by 248 libraries worldwide
The practical importance of auction theory is widely recognized. This is an introduction to the basic theory of auction that provided the insights for the design of auctions such as the sale of spectrum for mobiles telecommunications and the sale of former government-owned companies around the globe
Discrete public goods with incomplete information by Flavio M Menezes( Book )
10 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 15 libraries worldwide
Sequential auctions with continuation costs by Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans( Book )
4 editions published in 1993 in English and held by 13 libraries worldwide
Existence of equilibria in treasury bill auctions by Flavio M Menezes( Book )
3 editions published in 1994 in English and held by 12 libraries worldwide
Auctions of identical objects with single-unit demands : a survey by Flavio M Menezes( Book )
5 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 12 libraries worldwide
Simultaneous pooled auctions by Flavio M Menezes( Book )
4 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 11 libraries worldwide
Ascending-price multiple-object auctions by Flavio M Menezes( Book )
3 editions published in 1993 in English and held by 11 libraries worldwide
Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions by Flavio M Menezes( Book )
4 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 10 libraries worldwide
EPA emission permits auctions by Jeff Kline( Book )
3 editions published in 1995 in English and held by 9 libraries worldwide
Sustainable clubs under variable participation by Flavio M Menezes( Book )
3 editions published in 1995 in English and held by 9 libraries worldwide
Auctions and corruption : how to compensate the auctioneer by Chris Jones( Book )
3 editions published in 1995 in English and held by 8 libraries worldwide
Porque favorecer firmas nacionais? by Flavio M Menezes( Book )
2 editions published in 2000 in Portuguese and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Este artigo investiga os efeitos da existência de uma margem de preferência para empresas domésticas em compras do governo, demonstrando que uma política de favorecimento de empresas domésticas pode ser ótima, no sentido de maximizar o benefício esperado pelo governo. Isto ocorre quando a probabilidade de que a firma doméstica conclua o projeto é maior do que a probabilidade de que a firma estrangeira o faça. O artigo caracteriza o comportamento das firmas doméstica e estrangeira em equilíbrio quando o mecanismo utilizado é um processo de licitação onde o ganhador é aquele com a oferta mais barata. Neste caso, calcula numericamente o valor ótimo da margem de preferência para a empresa doméstica para valores distintos dos parâmetros do modelo
Endogenous transactions costs in multi-seller model by Flavio M Menezes( Book )
2 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
A simple analysis of the U.S. emission permits auctions by Jeffrey J Kline( Book )
1 edition published in 1999 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
A model of seller holdout by Flavio M Menezes( Book )
2 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Corruption and auctions by Flavio M Menezes( Book )
1 edition published in 2001 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Good and bad consistency in regulatory decisions by Flavio M Menezes( file )
1 edition published in 2008 in English and held by 0 libraries worldwide
"We examine sources of consistent regulatory decisions in a model where regulators respond to mixed incentives, including career concerns. In the reference case, regulators act as "public servants" who strive to make the socially optimal decision, given limited information and the opportunity to observe the prior decision of another regulator. Adding career concerns, such as a desire to avoid controversy or to implement a future employer's preferred policy, tends to reduce the degree of differentiation in sequentially taken decisions, hence increasing consistency. Thus, it is possible to observe that the self-interested career concerns of regulators give rise to consistency in regulatory decision-making. This type of consistency might lead to substantial deviations from optimal regulatory policies"--Abstract
Consistent regulation of infrastructure businesses by Flavio M Menezes( file )
1 edition published in 2008 in English and held by 0 libraries worldwide
"This paper examines some important economic aspects associated with the notion that consistency in the regulation of infrastructure businesses is a desirable feature. It makes two important points. First, it is not easy to measure consistency. In particular, one cannot simply point to different regulatory parameters as evidence of inconsistent regulatory policy. Second, even if one does observe consistency emerging from decisions made by different regulators, it does not necessarily mean that this consistency is desirable. It might be the result, at least partially, of career concerns of regulators"--Abstract
Price regulation and investment : a real options approach by Fernando T Camacho( file )
1 edition published in 2008 in English and held by 0 libraries worldwide
"This paper examines a three-period model of an investment decision in a network industry characterized by demand uncertainty, economies of scale and sunk costs. In the absence of regulation we identify the market conditions under which a monopolist decides to invest early as well as the underlying overall welfare output. In a regulated environment, we first consider a monopolist facing no downstream competition but subject to a price cap on the downstream retail (final good) market. We identify the welfare-maximising regulated prices using the unregulated market output as a benchmark. In particular, we show that the optimal regulation depends on market conditions (that is, the nature of demand) and there are three possible outcomes: (i) price regulation does not improve welfare; (ii) regulated prices include an option to delay value and provide a positive payoff to the firm; and (iii) regulated prices yield a zero payoff to the firm. Second, we consider a vertically integrated network provider that is required to provide access to downstream competitors. We show that when the regulator has only one instrument, namely the access price, an option-to-delay pricing rule generates (weakly) higher welfare than the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR), except under very specific conditions"--Abstract
An empirical investigation of the mergers decision process in Australia by Robert Breunig( file )
1 edition published in 2008 in English and held by 0 libraries worldwide
"In this paper we examine a database assembled from an Australian public register of 553 merger decisions taken between March 2004 and July 2008. Mergers may be accepted without public assessment, accepted in conjunction with publication of a Public Competition Assessment, or rejected. We estimate an ordered probit model, using these three possible outcomes, with the objective of gaining better insight into the regulator's decision-making process. Our two major findings are: (i) the existence of entry barriers and the existence of undertakings are highly correlated with the regulator's decision to closely scrutinise a merger proposal; and (ii) if we compare two decisions, one which does not mention entry barriers (or import competition) with a decision that does mention entry barriers (or import competition), then the latter is significantly more likely to be opposed than the former"--Abstract
 
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Languages
English (77)
Portuguese (2)
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