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Rabin, Matthew 1963-

Overview
Works: 59 works in 152 publications in 1 language and 840 library holdings
Roles: Author, Editor
Classifications: HB74.P8, 330.019
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about Matthew Rabin
Publications by Matthew Rabin
Most widely held works by Matthew Rabin
Advances in behavioral economics by Colin Camerer( Book )
16 editions published between 2003 and 2008 in English and held by 483 libraries worldwide
Twenty years ago, behavioral economics did not exist as a field. Most economists were deeply skeptical--even antagonistic--toward the idea of importing insights from psychology into their field. Today, behavioral economics has become virtually mainstream. It is well represented in prominent journals and top economics departments, and behavioral economists, including several contributors to this volume, have garnered some of the most prestigious awards in the profession. This book assembles the most important papers on behavioral economics published since around 1990. Among the 25 articles are m
Loss aversion in a consumption/savings model by David Bowman( Book )
8 editions published between 1993 and 1998 in English and held by 19 libraries worldwide
Narrow bracketing and dominated choices by Matthew Rabin( file )
2 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 16 libraries worldwide
The gambler's and hot-hand fallacies : theory and applications by Matthew Rabin( Book )
5 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 15 libraries worldwide
Rational and naive herding by Erik Eyster( Book )
3 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 8 libraries worldwide
In social-learning environments, we investigate implications of the assumption that people naively believe that each previous person's action reflects solely that person's private information, leading them to systematically imitate all predecessors even in the many circumstances where rational agents do not. Naive herders inadvertently over-weight early movers' private signals by neglecting that interim herders' actions also embed these signals. They herd with positive probability on incorrect actions across a broad array of rich-information settings where rational players never do, and--because they become fully confident even when wrong--can be harmed on average by observing others
Psychology and economics by Matthew Rabin( Book )
5 editions published between 1997 and 2002 in English and held by 6 libraries worldwide
A model of reference-dependent preferences by Botond Kőszegi( Book )
3 editions published between 2002 and 2004 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Deviations, dynamics and equilibrium refinements by Matthew Rabin( Book )
2 editions published in 1993 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Social preferences : some simple tests and a new model by Gary Charness( Book )
6 editions published between 1999 and 2000 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Financial markets where traders neglect the informational content of prices by Erik Eyster( Book )
8 editions published in 2015 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
We present a model of a financial market where some traders are "cursed" when choosing how much to invest in a risky asset, failing to fully take into account what prices convey about others' private information. Cursed traders put more weight on their private signals than rational traders. But because they neglect that the price encodes other traders' information, prices depend less on private signals and more on public signals than rational-expectation-equilibrium (REE) prices. Markets comprised entirely of cursed traders generate more trade than those comprised entirely of rationals; mixed markets can generate even more trade, as rationals employ momentum-trading strategies to exploit cursed traders. We contrast our results to other models of departures from REE and show that per-trader volume with cursed traders increases when the market becomes large, while natural forms of overconfidence predict that volume should converge to zero
Expressed preferences and behavior in experimental games by Gary Charness( Book )
3 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Choice and procrastination by Ted O'Donoghue( Book )
3 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Risky behavior among youths : some issues from behavioral economics by Ted O'Donoghue( Book )
3 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Doing it now or later by Ted O'Donoghue( Book )
3 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Diminishing marginal utility of wealth cannot explain risk aversion by Matthew Rabin( Book )
3 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Projection bias in predicting future utility by George Loewenstein( Book )
3 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Incorporating fairness into game theory by Matthew Rabin( Book )
4 editions published between 1991 and 1992 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Risk aversion and expected-utility theory : a calibration theorem by Matthew Rabin( Book )
4 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Moral preferences, moral constraints, and self-serving biases by Matthew Rabin( Book )
2 editions published in 1995 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Bargaining structure, fairness and efficiency by Matthew Rabin( Book )
4 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
 
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Alternative Names
Matthew Rabin Amerikaans econoom
Matthew Rabin amerikansk ekonom
Matthew Rabin amerikansk økonom
Matthew Rabin économiste américain
Matthew Rabin US-amerikanischer Wirtschaftswissenschaftler
Rabin, M.
Рабин, Мэттью
מת'יו רבין
马修·拉宾
Languages
English (90)
Covers
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