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Kremer, Michael 1964-

Overview
Works: 100 works in 596 publications in 1 language and 4,654 library holdings
Roles: Author
Classifications: HB1, 362.1782091724
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about Michael Kremer
Publications by Michael Kremer
Most widely held works about Michael Kremer
 
Most widely held works by Michael Kremer
Strong medicine : creating incentives for pharmaceutical research on neglected diseases by Michael Kremer( Book )
13 editions published between 2004 and 2016 in English and held by 355 libraries worldwide
"Vaccines offer the best hope for controlling diseases and could dramatically improve health in poor countries. But developers have little incentive to undertake the costly and risky research needed to develop vaccines. This is partly because the potential consumers are poor, but also because governments drive down prices." "In Strong Medicine, Michael Kremer and Rachel Glennerster offer an innovative yet simple solution to this worldwide problem: "Pull" programs to stimulate research. Here's how such programs would work. Funding agencies would commit to purchase viable vaccines if and when they were developed. This would create the incentives for vaccine developers to produce usable products for these neglected diseases. Private firms, rather than funding agencies, would pick which research strategies to pursue. After purchasing the vaccine, funders could distribute it at little or no cost to the afflicted countries."--Jacket
Creating markets for new vaccines by Michael Kremer( Book )
36 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 143 libraries worldwide
Several programs have been proposed to improve incentives for research on vaccines for malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV, and to help increase accessibility of vaccines once they are developed. For these programs to spur research, potential vaccine developers must believe that the sponsor will not renege on the commitment once research costs have been sunk. Given appropriate legal language, the key determinant of credibility will be eligibility and pricing rules, rather than whether funds are physically placed in separate accounts. Requiring candidate vaccines to meet basic technical requirements would help ensure that funds were spent only on effective vaccines. Requiring developing countries to contribute co-payments would help ensure that they felt that the vaccines were useful given the conditions in their countries. Purchases under a vaccine purchase program could be the conditions in their countries. Purchases under a vaccine purchase program could be governed by a market exclusivity provision similar to that in the U.S. Orphan Drug Act. A program could start by offering a modest price and increasing it if it proved inadequate to spur research. If donors pledge approximately $250 million per year for each vaccine for ten years, vaccine purchases would cost approximately $10 per year of life saved. No funds would be spent or pledges called unless a vaccine were developed
Making markets for vaccines : ideas to action : report of the Center for Global Development working group ( Book )
4 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 141 libraries worldwide
Incentives to learn by Michael Kremer( Book )
22 editions published between 2004 and 2012 in English and Undetermined and held by 101 libraries worldwide
"The authors report results from a randomized evaluation of a merit scholarship program for adolescent girls in Kenya. Girls who scored well on academic exams received a cash grant and had school fees paid. Girls eligible for the scholarship showed significant gains in academic examination scores (average gain 0.15 standard deviations). There was considerable sample attrition and no significant program impact in the smaller of the two program districts, but in the other district girls showed large gains (average gain 0.22-0.27 standard deviations), and these gains persisted one full year following the competition. There is also evidence of positive program externalities on learning-boys (who were ineligible for the awards) also showed sizable average test gains. Both student and teacher school attendance increased in the program schools. "--World Bank web site
Patent buy-outs : a mechanism for encouraging innovation by Michael Kremer( Book )
15 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and held by 88 libraries worldwide
In 1839, the French government purchased the patent on the Daguerreotype process and placed it in the public domain. This paper examines a mechanism under which governments would use an auction to estimate the private value of patents and then offer to buy out patents at this private value, times a fixed markup. The markup would correspond to the estimated typical ratio of the social and private values of inventions -- perhaps two. Most patents purchased would be placed in the public domain, but in order to induce bidders to reveal their valuations patents would be sold to the highest bidder. Such patent buy-outs could eliminate monopoly price distortions and incentives for wasteful reverse engineering, while raising private incentives for original research closer to their social value. However, patent buy-outs are potentially vulnerable to collusion. Patent buy-outs may be particularly appropriate for pharmaceuticals
Elephants by Michael Kremer( Book )
17 editions published between 1996 and 2000 in English and held by 86 libraries worldwide
Existing models of open-access resources are applicable to non-storable resources, such as fish. Many open-access resources, however, are used to produce storable goods. Elephants, rhinos, and tigers are three prominent examples. Anticipated future scarcity of these resources will increase current prices, and current poaching. This implies that, for given initial conditions, there may be rational expectations equilibria leading both to extinction and to survival. Governments may be able to eliminate extinction equilibria by promising to implement tough anti-poaching measures if the population falls below a threshold. Alternatively, they, or private agents, may be able to eliminate extinction equilibria by accumulating a sufficient stockpile of the storable good
Wage inequality and segregation by skill by Michael Kremer( Book )
16 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 77 libraries worldwide
Evidence from the US, Britain, and France suggests that recent growth in wage inequality has been accompanied by greater segregation of high- and low-skill workers into separate firms. A model in which workers of different skill-levels are imperfect substitutes can simultaneously account for these increases in segregation and inequality either through technological change, or, more parsimoniously, through observed changes in the skill-distribution
Does favorable tax-treatment of housing reduce equipment investment? by Ben Broadbent( Book )
13 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 77 libraries worldwide
It is often argued that low tax rates on owner-occupied housing divert investment from equipment. This paper demonstrates that if people are heterogeneous in their propensity to save, and if there are constraints on borrowing, favorable tax treatment of owner-occupied housing up to a certain value increases equipment investment. This is because low housing taxes encourage renters to become owner-occupiers, and this leads existing owner-occupiers to shift their portfolio of other assets from rental housing to equipment
How much does sorting increase inequality? by Michael Kremer( Book )
14 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 75 libraries worldwide
Social commentators from William Julius Wilson to Charles Murray have argued that increased sorting of people into internally homogeneous" neighborhoods, schools, and marriages is spurring long-run inequality. Cali- bration of a formal model suggests that these fears are misplaced. In order to increase the steady-state standard deviation of education by one percent, the correlation between neighbors' education would have to double, or the correlation between spouses' education would have to increase by one-third. In fact, both correlations have declined slightly over the past few decades. Sorting has somewhat more significant effects on intergenerational mobility than on inequality."
Can having fewer partners increase prevalence of AIDS? by Michael Kremer( Book )
12 editions published in 1994 in English and held by 69 libraries worldwide
Under asymmetric information about sexual history, sexual activity creates externalities. Abstinence by those with few partners perversely increases the average probability of HIV infection in the pool of available partners. Since this increases prevalence among the high activity people who disproportionately influence the disease's future spread, it may increase long-run prevalence. Preliminary calculations using standard epidemiological models and survey data on sexual activity suggest that most people have few enough partners that further reductions would increase steady-state prevalence. To the extent the results prove robust, they suggest that public health messages will be more likely to reduce steady-state prevalence and create positive externalities if they stress condom use rather than abstinence
Outside funding of community organizations : benefiting or displacing the poor? by Mary Kay Gugerty( Book )
16 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 68 libraries worldwide
In response to the widespread consensus on the importance of social capital, and to concerns about the scarcity of institutions giving voice to disadvantaged groups, some donors have begun programs designed to strengthen indigenous community organizations. We use a prospective, randomized evaluation to examine a development program explicitly targeted at building social capital among rural women's groups in western Kenya. The program increased turnover among group members. It increased entry into group membership and leadership by younger, more educated women, by women employed in the formal sector, and by men. The analysis suggests that providing development assistance to indigenous community organizations of the disadvantaged may change the very characteristics of these organizations that made them attractive to outside funders
Young workers, old workers, and convergence by Michael Kremer( Book )
13 editions published in 1994 in English and held by 68 libraries worldwide
Abstract: The human capital of young and old workers are imperfect substitutes both in production and in on-the-job training. This helps explain why capital does not flow from rich to poor countries, causing instantaneous convergence of per capita output. If each generation chooses its human capital optimally given that of the previous and succeeding generations, human capital follows a unique rational- expectations path. For moderate substitutability, human capital within each sector oscillates relative to that in other sectors, but aggregate human capital converges to the steady state monotonically, at rates consistent with those observed empirically
Integrating behavioral choice into epidemiological models of AIDS by Michael Kremer( Book )
14 editions published between 1995 and 1996 in English and held by 68 libraries worldwide
Increased HIV risk creates incentives for people with low sexual activity to reduce their activity, but may make high-activity people fatalistic, leading them to reduce their activity only slightly, or actually increase it. If high-activity people reduce their activity by a smaller proportion than low-activity people, the composition of the pool of available partners will worsen, creating positive feedbacks, and possibly multiple steady state levels of prevalence. The timing of public health efforts may affect long-run HIV prevalence
Why are worker cooperatives so rare? by Michael Kremer( Book )
12 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 64 libraries worldwide
This paper argues that worker cooperatives are prone to redistribution among members, and that this redistribution distorts incentives. I assume that employment contracts are incomplete. In the model cooperative members pay in a capital contribution to purchase equipment. They then receive shocks to ability. Each worker's (observable) output depends on ability and on effort, neither of which can be observed separately. After ability is realized, members vote on a wage schedule as a function of output. If the median member has less than average ability, the cooperative will vote for a redistributive schedule, dulling incentives. Whereas workers in firms owned by outside shareholders would quit if the firm redistributed away from them, cooperative members will be reluctant to leave, since this entails forfeiting the dividends on their capital contribution. The model can explain why cooperatives typically have egalitarian wage policies
Worms : education and health externalities in Kenya by Edward Miguel( Book )
14 editions published between 2001 and 2004 in English and held by 63 libraries worldwide
Intestinal helminths - including hookworm, roundworm, schistosomiasis, and whipworm - infect more than one-quarter of the world's population. A randomized evaluation of a project in Kenya suggests that school-based mass treatment with deworming drugs reduced school absenteeism in treatment schools by one quarter; gains are especially large among the youngest children. Deworming is found to be cheaper than alternative ways of boosting school participation. By reducing disease transmission, deworming creates substantial externality health and school participation benefits among untreated children in the treatment schools and among children in neighboring schools. These externalities are large enough to justify fully subsidizing treatment. We do not find evidence that deworming improves academic test scores. Existing experimental studies, in which treatment is randomized among individuals in the same school, find small and insignificant deworming treatment effects on education; however, these studies underestimate true treatment effects if deworming creates positive externalities for the control group and reduces treatment group attrition
Globalization and international public finance by Michael Kremer( Book )
13 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 62 libraries worldwide
This paper examines the effect of reduced transaction costs in the international trading of assets on the ability of governments to issue debt. We examine a model in which governments care about the welfare of their citizens, and thus are more inclined to default if a large proportion of their debt is held by foreigners. Reductions in transaction costs make it easier for domestic citizens to share risk by selling debt to foreigners. This may increase tendencies for governments to default, and thus raise their cost of credit and reduce welfare. We find that even in the absence of transaction costs, home bias in placement of government debt may persist, because in the presence of default risk the return on government debt is correlated with the tax burden required to pay the debt. Asset inequality may reduce this home bias, and by increasing foreign ownership, increase incentives for default. Finally, if foreign creditors are less risk averse than domestic creditors, there may be one equilibrium in which domestic creditors hold the asset and default risk is low, and another in which foreign creditors hold the asset and default risk is high
Income distribution dynamics with endogenous fertility by Michael Kremer( Book )
12 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 60 libraries worldwide
Developing countries with highly unequal income distributions, such as Brazil or South Africa, face an uphill battle in reducing inequality. Educated workers in these countries have a much lower birthrate than uneducated workers. Assuming children of educated workers are more likely to become educated, this tends to increase the proportion of unskilled workers, reducing their wages, and thus their opportunity cost of having children, creating a vicious cycle. A model incorporating this effect generates multiple steady-state levels of inequality, suggesting that in some circumstances, temporarily increasing access to educational opportunities could permanently reduce inequality. Empirical evidence suggests that the fertility differential between the educated and uneducated is greater in less equal countries, consistent with the model
Odious debt by Michael Kremer( Book )
13 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 55 libraries worldwide
Abstract: Some argue that sovereign debt incurred without the consent of the people and not for their benefit, such as that of apartheid South Africa, should be considered odious and not transferable to successor governments. We argue that an institution that truthfully announced whether regimes are odious could create an equilibrium in which successor governments suffer no reputational loss from failure to repay odious debt and hence creditors curtail odious lending. Equilibria with odious lending could be eliminated by amending creditor country laws to prevent seizure of assets for failure to repay odious debt and restricting foreign assistance to countries not repaying odious debt. Shutting down the borrowing capacity of illegitimate regimes can be viewed as a form of economic sanction and has two advantages over most sanctions: it helps rather than hurts the population, and it does not create incentives for evasion by third parties. However, an institution empowered to assess regimes might falsely term debt odious if it favored debtors, and if creditors anticipate this, they would not make loans to legitimate governments. An institution empowered only to declare future lending to a particular government odious would have greater incentives to judge truthfully. A similar approach could be used to reduce moral hazard associated with World Bank and IMF loans
The illusion of sustainability by Michael Kremer( Book )
10 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 53 libraries worldwide
The history of foreign development assistance is one of movement away from addressing immediate needs and toward focusing on the underlying causes of poverty. A recent manifestation is the move towards sustainability,' which stresses community mobilization, education, and cost-recovery. This stands in contrast to the traditional economic analysis of development projects, with its focus on providing public goods and correcting externalities. We examine evidence from randomized evaluations on strategies for combating intestinal worms, which affect one in four people worldwide. Providing medicine to treat worms was extremely cost effective, although medicine must be provided twice per year indefinitely to keep children worm-free. An effort to promote sustainability by educating Kenyan schoolchildren on worm prevention was ineffective, and a mobilization' intervention from psychology failed to boost deworming drug take-up. Take-up was highly sensitive to drug cost: a small increase in cost led to an 80 percent reduction in take-up (relative to free treatment). The results suggest that, in the context we examine, the pursuit of sustainability may be an illusion, and that in the short-run, at least, external subsidies will remain necessary
Economic transformation, population growth and the long-run world income distribution by Marcos Chamon( Book )
20 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 46 libraries worldwide
This paper considers the long-run evolution of the world economy in a model where countries' opportunities to develop depend on their trade with advanced economies. As developing countries become advanced, they further improve trade opportunities for the remaining developing countries. Whether or not the world economy converges to widespread prosperity depends on the population growth differential between developing and advanced economies, the rate at which countries develop, and potentially on initial conditions. A calibration using historical data suggests that the long-run prospects for lagging developing regions, such as Africa, likely hinge on the sufficiently rapid development of China and India
 
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Associated Subjects
AIDS (Disease) Capital market--Econometric models Communicable diseases in children--Prevention Community development--Finance Community organization Debts, Public--Econometric models Demographic transition--Econometric models Developing countries Drugs Drugs--Research--Economic aspects Economic assistance Economic development Economic development projects Education--Economic aspects Equality--Economic aspects Equilibrium (Economics) Fertility, Human--Economic aspects--Econometric models Girls--Education Girls--Scholarships, fellowships, etc Helminthiasis Home ownership--Econometric models Human capital--Mathematical models Income distribution--Econometric models Industrial equipment--Econometric models Kenya Labor supply--Effect of education on--Econometric models Non-governmental organizations Parasitic diseases--Prevention Patents--Government policy Pharmaceutical industry Pharmacy--Research--Economic aspects Producer cooperatives Public domain (Copyright law) Rewards and punishments in education Saving and investment--Econometric models School attendance School children--Health and hygiene School children--Medical care Skilled labor--Econometric models Sustainable development Transaction costs--Econometric models United States Unskilled labor--Econometric models Vaccines industry Vaccines industry--Government policy Wage differentials--Econometric models Wage payment systems--Mathematical models Women in rural development Women--Social conditions Worms as carriers of disease
Alternative Names
Kremer, Michael R. 1964-
Kremer, Michael Robert 1964-
Michael Kremer American economist
Michael Kremer Amerikaans econoom
Michael Kremer amerikansk ekonom
Michael Kremer amerikansk økonom
Michael Kremer US-amerikanischer Ökonom
Languages
English (300)
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