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Suwankiri, Benjarong

Works: 6 works in 48 publications in 1 language and 1,882 library holdings
Roles: Author
Publication Timeline
Publications about Benjarong Suwankiri
Publications by Benjarong Suwankiri
Most widely held works by Benjarong Suwankiri
Migration and the welfare state : political-economy policy formation by Assaf Razin( Book )
13 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 252 libraries worldwide
Nobel laureate economist Milton Friedman once noted that free immigration cannot coexist with a welfare state. A welfare state with open borders might turn into a haven for poor immigrants, which would place such a fiscal burden on the state that native-born voters would support less-generous benefits or restricted immigration, or both. And yet a welfare state with an aging population might welcome young skilled immigrants. The preferences of the native-born population toward migration depend on the skill and age composition of the immigrants, and migration policies in a political-economy framework may be tailored accordingly. This book examines how social benefits-immigrations political economy conflicts are resolved, with an empirical application to data from Europe and the developed countries, integrating elements from population, international, public, and political economics into a unified static and dynamic framework. Using a static analytical framework to examine intra-generational distribution, the authors first focus on the skill composition of migrants in both free and restricted immigration policy regimes, drawing on empirical research from EU-15 and non-EU-15 states. The authors then offer theoretical analyses of similar issues in dynamic overlapping generations settings, studying not only intragenerational but also intergenerational aspects, including old-young dependency ratios and skilled-unskilled conflicts. Finally, they examine overall gains from or costs of migration in both host and source countries and the race to the bottom argument of tax competition between states in the presence of free migration
Migration and the welfare state : dynamic political-economy theory by Assaf Razin( Book )
16 editions published between 2009 and 2010 in English and held by 38 libraries worldwide
Milton Friedman, the Nobel-prize laureate economist, had it right: "It's just obvious that you can't have free immigration and a welfare state." That is, national welfare states can almost never coexist with the free movement of labor. This fact underscores the relevance of the analysis in this paper, which is a part of a forthcoming book on migration and the welfare state. It focuses on the demographic, and economic, fundamentals behind policy-restricted migration, and the policy-restricted generosity of the welfare state
The welfare state and the skill mix of migration : dynamic policy formation by Assaf Razin( Book )
8 editions published between 2009 and 2010 in English and held by 14 libraries worldwide
An NBER digest for this paper is available. The paper develops a dynamic politico-economic model featuring three groups of voters: skilled workers, unskilled workers, and retirees. The model features both inter- and intra-generational redistribution, resembling a welfare state. The skilled workers are net contributors to the welfare state whereas the unskilled workers and old retirees are net beneficiaries. When the skilled cohort grows rapidly, it may be necessary to bring in unskilled migrants to counter balance the expanding size of the skilled group. The native-born young, whether skilled or unskilled, benefit from letting in migrants of all skill types, because their high birth rates can help increase the tax base in the next period. In this respect, skilled migrants help the welfare state more than unskilled migrants, to the extent that the offspring resemble their parents with respect to skill. On the other hand, more migrants in the present will strengthen the political power of the young in the next period who, relatively to the old, are less keen on the generosity of the welfare state. In this respect, unskilled migrants pose less of a threat to the generosity of the welfare state then skilled migrants
The Welfare State and Migration a Dynamic Analysis of Political Coalitions by Assaf Razin( Book )
9 editions published between 2014 and 2015 in English and held by 10 libraries worldwide
We develop a dynamic political-economic theory of welfare state and immigration policies, featuring three distinct voting groups: skilled workers, unskilled workers, and old retirees. The essence of inter- and intra-generational redistribution of a typical welfare system is captured with a proportional tax on labor income to finance a transfer in a balanced-budget manner. We characterize political-economic equilibrium policy rules consisting of the tax rate, the skill composition of migrants, and the total number of migrants. When none of these groups enjoy a majority (50 percent of the voters or more), political coalitions will form. With overlapping generations and policy-determined influx of immigrants, the formation of the political coalitions changes over time. These future changes are taken into account when policies are shaped. The paper characterizes the evolution of the political coalitions that implement welfare state and migration policies
Migration and the welfare state dynamic political-economy theory by Assaf Razin( file )
1 edition published in 2010 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
We model an overlapping-generations economy with two skill levels: skilled and unskilled. The welfare-state is modeled simply by a proportional tax on labor income to finance a demogrant in a balanced-budget manner. Therefore, some (the unskilled workers and old retirees) are net beneficiaries from the welfare state and others (the skilled workers) are net contributors to it. Migration policies are set to determine the total migration volume and its skill composition.We characterize subgame-perfect Markov political-economic equilibria consisting of the tax rate (which determines the demogrant), skill composition and the total number of migrants. We distinguish between two voting behaviors: sincere and strategic voting
Three Essays In Dynamic Political Economy : Migration, Welfare State, And Poverty by Benjarong Suwankiri( Book )
1 edition published in 2009 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
All observed government policies must pass through a political process. In many macroeconomic settings, the implemented policies affect the economy not only during the current period, but also the future path of the economy. In this dissertation, I investigate policies pertaining to immigration, redistribution, and poverty reduction. In the first chapter, I study how politics jointly determine the economy's redistribution and immigration policies. I develop a dynamic political economy model featuring three groups of voters: skilled workers, unskilled workers, and retirees. The model also features both inter- and intra-generational redistribution, resembling a welfare state. To analyze multi-group political economy equilibria, I extend the class of dynamic political games featuring Subgame-perfect Markov as its equilibrium concept. The analysis allows for strategic voting behavior, where voters may vote for a candidate not directly representing their group. Because the policy preference of the unskilled workers is the most intermediate, other groups may choose to side with this policy choice in order to avoid their least preferred candidate. For the unskilled workers, inequality plays a key role in determining the degree of redistribution. Therefore, immigration ultimately affects the generosity of the welfare state by altering the level of inequality in the economy. The objectives of the second chapter are twofold. First, the chapter tries to understand the relationship between immigration and asset prices. The analysis reveals that the asset price responds positively to immigration. The immigration's influence goes through four channels: increasing saving, increasing marginal product of capital, decreasing marginal cost of investment, and raising population growth rate. After the preceding analysis, I study how different cohorts will harness these benefits through political interactions. This exercise reveals that the young cohort may have a strategic motive to influence the identity of the decisive voter in the next period to ensure the highest return on their savings in retirement. In addition, the model also predicts that the uncertainty in the population growth rate of the immigrants will lower these immigration quotas. The last chapter moves away from international policy arena and focuses domestically on escaping a poverty trap. Prior studies conclude that redistribution is a futile policy against this vicious cycle of poverty. I revisit this line of literature and show contrary to this conclusion that redistribution can help the economy escape the poverty trap. I characterize a necessary sequence of lump-sum taxes and transfers and show that this scheme will move the economy out of the poverty trap in finite time regardless of the economy's initial distribution of wealth. Unfortunately, I also show that neither basic democracy nor dictatorship can take the economy there with this policy scheme. The rationale for this is the following. The proposed escape route from poverty requires an economic input from the richer group. However, the shift in the decisive political influence during the path of development, from the hands of the poor to the hands of the rich, will put an end to this pro-poor policy scheme. (Abstract)
English (48)
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