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Arnott, Richard

Works: 207 works in 537 publications in 3 languages and 4,132 library holdings
Genres: Conference papers and proceedings 
Roles: Author, Editor, Other
Classifications: HT321, 330.91732
Publication Timeline
Publications about Richard Arnott
Publications by Richard Arnott
Most widely held works by Richard Arnott
A companion to urban economics by Richard Arnott( Book )
25 editions published between 2005 and 2013 in English and Undetermined and held by 513 libraries worldwide
Provides a state-of-the-art overview of this field, communicating its intellectual richness through a diverse portfolio of authors and topics. Unique in both its rigor and international treatment. An ideal supplementary textbook in upper-level undergraduate urban economics courses, or in master's level and professional courses, providing students with the necessary foundation to tackle more advanced topics in urban economics. Contains contributions from the world's leading urban economists
Public economics : selected papers by William Vickrey by William S Vickrey( Book )
26 editions published between 1994 and 1999 in 4 languages and held by 415 libraries worldwide
William Vickrey is established as one of the truly important figures in contemporary economics. During a long and distinguished career he published several books and some 140 papers scattered over many journals. This book offers a thoughtful selection from these papers, organised so as to bring out the broad scope, and also the unity, of his work. Vickrey had the unique distinction of having contributed, often seminally and always operationally, to all major branches of public economics. The papers collected here cover Social Choice and Allocation Mechanisms, Taxation, Pricing in Public Utilities and in Urban Transportation, Urban Economics and Macroeconomic Policies. Each topic is introduced by on of the four editors, and the book is completed with a full annotated bibliography of Vickrey's work. For the first time, we have convenient access to a set of important, creative and stimulating contributions, which have helped shape the modern field of public economics. This is a fascinating overview of the field and of the lifetime work of a great economist
Economics for an imperfect world : essays in honor of Joseph E. Stiglitz by Joseph E Stiglitz( Book )
10 editions published in 2003 in English and Undetermined and held by 353 libraries worldwide
The focus of Joseph Stiglitz's work in economics throughout his long and distinguished career has been on the real world, with all of its imperfections
Alleviating urban traffic congestion by Richard Arnott( Book )
9 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 306 libraries worldwide
Microscopic models, rather than macroscopic ones that are too simplified and too aggregated, they argue, will lead to the analysis of a wider and more creative range of policies, at least some of which should work well and be politically acceptable."--Jacket
Regional and urban economics ( Book )
20 editions published between 1996 and 2013 in English and Undetermined and held by 96 libraries worldwide
The property tax as a tax on value : deadweight loss by Richard Arnott( Book )
12 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 56 libraries worldwide
Consider an atomistic developer who decides when and at what density to develop his land, under a property tax system characterized by three time-invariant tax rates: the tax rate on pre-development land value, the tax rate on post-development residual site value, and the tax rate on structure. Arnott (2002) identified the subset of property value tax systems which are neutral. This paper investigates the relative efficiency of four idealized, non-neutral property value tax systems (Canadian property tax system, simple property tax system, residual site value tax system, and differentiated property tax system) under the assumption of a constant rental growth rate
Information and economic efficiency by Richard Arnott( Book )
12 editions published between 1993 and 1995 in English and held by 52 libraries worldwide
Is an economy with adverse selection, moral hazard, or an incomplete set of risk markets "constrained" Pareto efficient? There are two sets of papers addressing this question, one asserting that, under seemingly quite general conditions, the economy is constrained Pareto efficient, the other (to which we have contributed) that it is not. In this paper, we delineate the differences in assumptions between the two sets of papers, and under our assumptions present an intuitive proof of the Pareto inefficiency of market equilibrium with moral hazard and identify what it is that the government can do that the market cannot
Rent control and options for decontrol in Ontario by Richard Arnott( Book )
3 editions published in 1981 in English and held by 50 libraries worldwide
Rent control : the international experience : the fifth John Deutsch Roundtable on Economic Policy : proceedings of a conference held at Queen's University, 31 August-4 September 1987 by John Deutsch Round Table on Economic Policy( Book )
4 editions published between 1987 and 1988 in English and held by 50 libraries worldwide
The welfare economics of moral hazard by Richard Arnott( Book )
15 editions published between 1982 and 1991 in English and held by 43 libraries worldwide
Abstract: subsequent sections focuses on a particular market failure
An integrated model of downtown parking and traffic congestion by Richard Arnott( Book )
10 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 40 libraries worldwide
This paper presents a downtown parking model that integrates traffic congestion and saturated on-street parking. We assume that the stock of cars cruising for parking adds to traffic congestion. Two major results come out from the model, one of which is robust. The robust one is that, whether or not the amount of on-street parking is optimal, it is efficient to raise the on-street parking fee to the point where cruising for parking is eliminated without parking becoming unsaturated. The other is that, if the parking fee is fixed at a sub-optimal level, it is second-best optimal to increase the amount of curbside allocated to parking until cruising for parking is eliminated without parking becoming unsaturated
Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets with moral hazard by Richard Arnott( Book )
7 editions published between 1987 and 1991 in English and held by 34 libraries worldwide
This paper examines the existence and nature of competitive equilibrium with moral hazard. The more insurance an individual has, the less care will he take. Consequently, insurance firms attempt to restrict their clients' aggregate insurance purchases. If individuals' aggregate insurance purchases are observable, each firm will ration the amount of insurance its clients can purchase and insist that they purchase no insurance from other firms. This paper focuses on the alternative situation where firms cannot observe their clients' aggregate insurance purchases. We show that firms will still attempt to restrict their clients' aggregate purchases, but now they must do so indirectly. One possibility is that all firms sell only policies with a sufficiently large amount of coverage that individuals choose to purchase insurance from only one firm. Another possibility is that each firm offers a latent policy in addition to its regular policy. Latent policies are not purchased in equilibrium, but serve to restrict entry. If an entering firm offers a supplementary policy, an individual will purchase not only this policy plus his previous policy but also the latent policy. The latent policy is designed so that the individual reduces effort by enough to render any entering policy unprofitable
Price equilibrium, efficiency, and decentralizability in insurance markets by Richard Arnott( Book )
8 editions published in 1991 in English and held by 34 libraries worldwide
In this paper, we investigate the descriptive and normative properties of competitive equilibrium with moral hazard when firms offer "price contracts" which allow clients to purchase as much insurance as they wish at the quoted prices. We show that a price equilibrium always exists and is one of three types: i) zero profit price equilibrium - zero profit, zero effort, full insurance ii) positive profit price equilibrium - positive profit, positive effort, partial insurance iii) zero insurance price equilibrium - zero insurance, zero profit, positive effort. We also demonstrate circumstances under which the linear taxation of price insurance allows decentralization of the social optimum (conditional on the unobservability of effort), and when it, does not, whether it is at least utility-improving
Implicit contracts, labor mobility and unemployment by Richard Arnott( Book )
11 editions published between 1983 and 1990 in English and held by 30 libraries worldwide
Firms' inability to monitor their employees' search effort forces a tradeoff between risk-bearing and incentive considerations when designing employment-related insurance. Since the provision of insurance against firm-specific shocks adversely affects workers' incentives to find better jobs, the optimal contract provides only partial insurance: it prescribes low (high) wages and under (over) employment to encourage workers to leave (stay) at low (high) productivity firms; and it employs quits and layoffs as alternative means of inducing separations at low productivity firms, with the mix depending upon the relative efficiency of the on- and off-the-job search technologies. Our analysis of implicit contracts with asymmetric search information establishes that any consistent explanation for worksharing, layoffs, severance pay, quits and unemployment must focus on questions of labor mobility
Randomization with asymmetric information by Richard Arnott( Book )
8 editions published between 1987 and 1988 in English and held by 29 libraries worldwide
It is by now well-known that, in the presence of moral hazard or adverse selection, randomization of insurance premia and benefits may be Pareto efficient. This paper: i) provides a typology of the various forms that randomization may take; ii) derives necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the desirability of these various forms of randomization; iii) obtains some simple characterization theorems of the efficient random policies; iv) gives some intuition behind the results; and v) considers why randomization appears to occur less often in practice than the theory suggests it should
The basic analytics of moral hazard by Richard Arnott( Book )
9 editions published between 1987 and 1990 in English and held by 29 libraries worldwide
This paper develops the basic analytics of moral hazard, for the two-outcome case where either a fixed damage accident occurs or it does not. The analysis focuses on the relationship between the insurance premium paid and the insurance benefits received in the event of an accident, and is conducted in benefit-premium space. The central message of the paper is that even when the underlying functions, the expected utility function and the function relating the accident probability to accident-prevention effort, are extremely well-behaved, the indifference curves and feasibility set (the set of insurance contracts which at least break even) are not-indifference curves need not be convex and feasibility sets never are; price-and income- consumption lines may be discontinuous; and effort is not in general a monotonic or continuous function of the parameters of the insurance policies provided. Part I of this paper establishes these results, while Part II discusses sane of their implications. The bad behavior of indifference curves and the feasibility set profoundly affects the nature and existence of a competitive equilibrium. We illustrate this, though we do not provide a thorough analysis. We also show that our canonical model of an insurance market with moral hazard can be reinterpreted to provide a model of loans with bankruptcy, or of work incentives
Dysfunctional non-market institutions and the market by Richard Arnott( Book )
6 editions published in 1988 in English and held by 27 libraries worldwide
There is a widespread belief that when significant market failure occurs, there are strong incentives for non-market institutions to develop which go at least part of the way to remedying the deficiency. We demonstrate that this functionalist position is not in general valid. In particular, we examine a situation where insurance is characterized by moral hazard. We show that when market insurance is provided, supplementary mutual assistance between family and friends (unobservable to market insurers) -- a form of non-market institution -- will occur and may be harmful. This example suggests that non-market institutions can arise spontaneously even though they are dysfunctional
When are anonymous congestion charges consistent with marginal cost pricing? by Richard Arnott( Book )
6 editions published in 1994 in English and held by 22 libraries worldwide
There are constraints on pricing congestible facilities. First, if heterogeneous users are observationally indistinguishable, then congestion charges must be anonymous. Second, the time variation of congestion charges may be constrained. Do these constraints undermine the feasibility of marginal cost pricing, and hence the applicability of the first-best theory of congestible facilities? We show that if heterogeneous users behave identically when using the congestible facility and if the time variation of congestion charges is unconstrained, then marginal cost pricing is feasible with anonymous congestion charges. If, however, the time variation of congestion charges is constrained, optimal pricing with anonymous congestion charges entails Ramsey pricing
The Ramsey problem for congestible facilities by Richard Arnott( Book )
9 editions published between 1990 and 1994 in English and held by 17 libraries worldwide
In recent years, a new set of models drawing on Vickrey [1969] has been developed to analyze the economics of congestible facilities. These models are structural in that they derive the cost function from consumers' time-of-use decisions and the congestion technology. Standard models, in contrast, simply assume the general form of the cost function. We apply the new approach to analyze the Ramsey problem for a congestible facility, and show that the solution generally entails cost inefficiency. Standard models have failed to reveal this result because they treat the cost function as completely determined by technology
Moral hazard and optimal commodity taxation by Richard Arnott( Book )
9 editions published between 1983 and 1986 in English and held by 15 libraries worldwide
The central result of this paper is that when moral hazard ispresent, competitive equilibrium is almost always (constrained) inefficient. Moral hazard causes shadow prices to deviate from market prices. To remedy this market failure, the government could introduce differential commodity taxation. Moral hazard causes people to take too little care to prevent accidents. The corresponding dead-weight loss can be reduced by subsidizing (taxing) those goods the consumption of which encourages (discourages) accident avoidance.At the (constrained) optimum, the sum of the deadweight losses as-sociated with moral hazard, on the one hand, and differential commodity taxation, on the other, is minimized
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Alternative Names
Arnott, R.
Arnott, R. 1949-
Arnott, R. J. 1949-
Arnott, Richard J.
Arnott, Richard J. 1949-
Arnott, Richard James
Arnott, Richard James 1949-
English (210)
Spanish (1)
French (1)
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