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Svensson, Lars E. O.

Works: 292 works in 2,017 publications in 1 language and 9,322 library holdings
Roles: Author, Editor, Other, Honoree
Publication Timeline
Publications about Lars E. O Svensson
Publications by Lars E. O Svensson
Most widely held works by Lars E. O Svensson
Inflation targets by Workshop on Inflation Targets( Book )
11 editions published in 1995 in English and held by 281 libraries worldwide
Inflation forecast targeting : implementing and monitoring inflation targets by Lars E. O Svensson( Book )
29 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and held by 129 libraries worldwide
Inflation targeting is shown to imply inflation forecast targeting: the central bank's inflation forecast becomes an explicit intermediate target. Inflation forecast targeting simplifies both implementation and monitoring of monetary policy. The weight on output stabilization determines how quickly the inflation forecast is adjusted towards the inflation target. Money growth or exchange rate targeting is generally inferior to inflation targeting and leads to higher inflation variability. Commitment to commitment to
Money and inflation in the euro area : a case for monetary indicators? by Stefan Gerlach( Book )
32 editions published between 2000 and 2002 in English and held by 113 libraries worldwide
This paper studies the relationship between inflation, output, money and interest rates in the euro area, using data spanning 1980 2000. The P model is shown to have considerable empirical support. Thus, the price gap' or, equivalently, the real money gap' (the gap between current real balances and long-run equilibrium real balances), has substantial predictive power for future inflation. The real money gap contains more information about future inflation than the output gap and the Eurosystem's money-growth indicator (the gap between current M3 growth and a reference value). The results suggest that the Eurosystem's money-growth indicator is an inferior indicator of future inflation
Optimal inflation targets, "conservative" central banks, and linear inflation contracts by Lars E. O Svensson( Book )
27 editions published between 1995 and 1997 in English and held by 102 libraries worldwide
Inflation target regimes (like those of New Zealand, Canada, U.K., Sweden and Finland) are interpreted as having explicit inflation targets and implicit output/unemployment targets. Without output-unemployment persistence delegation of monetary policy to a discretionary instrument-independent central bank with an optimal inflation target can eliminate the discretionary inflation bias, mimic the optimal linear inflation contract suggested by Walsh and extended by Persson and Tabellini, and achieve the equilibrium corresponding to an optimal rule with commitment. Thus an ìnflation target- conservative' central bank with an inflation target equal to the socially best inflation rate less any inflation bias dominates a Rogoff weight-conservative central bank with increased weight on inflation stabilizatiojn, which suboptimally increases output/unemployment variability. With output/ unemployment persistence, a constant inflation target is equivalent to a constant linear inflation contract. They can both eliminate the average inflation bias but not the state-contingent part of the inflation bias. Inflation variability is too high, and output variability too low, compared to the equilibrium corresponding to an optimal rule. An optimal state- contingent inflation target can remove all inflation bias, but in contrast to an optimal state-contingent linear inflation contract it still leaves inflation variability too high. Delegation with an optimal state-contingent inflation target to a Rogoff eight-conservative' central bank can then achieve the equilibrium corresponding to an optimal rule. Inflation targets may on average be exceeded, and they may have imperfect credibility, but they may usefully reduce inflation, and they appear much easier to implement
Does the P* model provide any rationale for monetary targeting? by Lars E. O Svensson( Book )
25 editions published between 1999 and 2000 in English and held by 100 libraries worldwide
The so-called P model is frequently used or referred to in discussions of monetary targeting. This gives the impression that the P model might provide some rationale for monetary targeting or for the monetary reference value used by the Eurosystem. The P model implies that inflation is determined by the level of and changes in the 'money gap' (the deviation of current real balances from their long-run equilibrium level), and hence that the real money gap is an important indicator for future inflation. Nevertheless, the P model does not seem to provide any rationale for either a Bundesbank-style money-growth target or a Eurosystem-style money-growth indicator
Alternative Names
Lars E. O. Svensson economista sueco
Lars E.O. Svensson économiste suédois
Lars E. O. Svensson schwedischer Wirtschaftswissenschaftler
Lars E.O. Svensson svensk nationalekonom
Lars E. O. Svensson Swedish economist
Lars E. O. Svensson Zweeds econoom
Svensson, L. 1947-
Svensson, L. E.
Svensson, L. E. O. 1947-
Svensson, Lars 1947-
Svensson, Lars E.
Svensson, Lars E. 1947-
Svensson, Lars Erik Oscar 1947-
Svensson, Lars Erik Oskar 1947-
スベンソン, ラルス E O
English (124)
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