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Spencer, Barbara J.

Works: 44 works in 235 publications in 1 language and 1,310 library holdings
Genres: History 
Roles: Author, Honoree
Classifications: HB1, 330.072
Publication Timeline
Publications about Barbara J Spencer
Publications by Barbara J Spencer
Most widely held works by Barbara J Spencer
High-cost domestic joint ventures and international competition : do domestic firms gain? by Ruth Shulamit Raubitschek( Book )
13 editions published in 1994 in English and held by 71 libraries worldwide
Abstract: This paper develops the idea that when markets are imperfectly competitive, final producers may gain from a joint venture that produces part of their input requirements even though marginal cost exceeds the input's market price. Production by the joint venture lowers the market price of the input and this can raise profits sufficiently from final product sales to make the joint venture worthwhile. Also, use of a joint venture internalizes the positive externality from a lower input price. These results are motivated by a setting in which domestic firms are dependent on foreign oligopolistic suppliers for a key input
Rent-shifting export subsidies with an imported intermediate product by Jota Ishikawa( Book )
13 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 67 libraries worldwide
This paper argues that export subsidies aimed at shifting rents from foreign to domestic producers of a final good may also serve to shift rents to foreign firms supplying an intermediate good, weakening the incentive for the subsidy. By contrast, assuming Cournot competition for both the final and intermediate goods, this second layer of rent-shifting between final and intermediate good firms can strengthen the argument for an export subsidy if intermediate good firms are domestic. The domestic welfare implications of alternative rent-shifting policies (a production subsidy and an import tariff) at the intermediate good stage are also considered
Keiretsu and relationship-specific investment : a barrier to trade? by Barbara J Spencer( Book )
12 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 63 libraries worldwide
This paper develops a model of informal procurement within Japanese keiretsu so as to consider effects on intermediate-good imports, such as auto parts. Parts-suppliers make relationship-specific investments that benefit the auto-maker and prices are determined by bargaining after investment has been sunk. Although this investment raises efficiency, it limits the range of imports to less important parts such as tail pipes and it is possible that no parts are imported, despite lower foreign production costs. Lack of information concerning investment rents combined with counterintuitive effects on imports and Japanese production costs could create unwarranted perceptions of a trade barrier
Quota licenses for imported capital equipment : could bureaucrats ever do better than the market? by Barbara J Spencer( Book )
14 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 62 libraries worldwide
Despite valid criticisms, many developing countries have issued non-transferable import licenses to a limited number of final-good producers so as to restrict imports of an input capital equipment. This paper demonstrates that for a given import quota, such licensing restrictions can actually increase domestic production of both the input and the final product, but at the cost of reduced quota rents. Under pure competition, domestic welfare falls relative to the use of marketable quota licenses, but if foreigners would get the quota rents, or if external economies cause decreasing costs, then bureaucratic allocation can dominate
Strategic trade policy with endogenous choice of quality and asymmetric costs by Dongsheng Zhou( Book )
14 editions published between 1999 and 2000 in English and held by 55 libraries worldwide
Abstract: This paper examines the strategic trade policy incentives for investment policies towards quality improvements in a vertically differentiated exporting industry. Firms first compete in qualities and then export to a third country market based on Bertrand or Cournot competition. Optimal policies are asymmetric across the two producing countries. Under Bertrand competition, the low-quality country subsidizes investment to raise export quality, while the high-quality country imposes a tax so as to reduce the quality of its already high quality exports. Under Cournot competition, the results are reversed with a tax in the low-quality country and a subsidy in the high-quality country
Keiretsu and relationship-specific investment : implications for market-opening trade policy by Larry D Qiu( Book )
12 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 52 libraries worldwide
Abstract: This paper considers the implications of relationship-specific investment within keiretsu for policies aimed at opening the Japanese market for intermediate goods, such as auto parts. Both VIEs applied to parts and VERs restricting Japanese exports of autos cause the keiretsu to import a wider range of parts, but of a relatively unimportant type, such as seat covers. Since keiretsu investment and output fall, the total value of U.S. parts exports may actually fall. For a given value of these exports, a VIE is less costly for U.S. consumers and Japanese producers, but a VER is preferred by U.S. automakers
Vertical networks and U.S. auto parts exports : is Japan different? by Keith Head( Book )
12 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 48 libraries worldwide
This paper develops a model in which upstream network insiders' conduct relationship specific investment that induces the downstream firm to transact within networks. The scale of destination-country production and part-specific measures of the importance of network relationships and engineering costs are used to explain the pattern of U.S. auto parts exports. Our results support the prediction that large scale promotes relationship-specific investment and reduces imports. Also, while Japan is a large parts importer, the composition of its imports is shifted away from parts where vertical keiretsu are prominent. Nations hosting U.S.-owned automakers import more U.S. parts
Fees and surcharging in automatic teller machine networks : non-bank ATM providers versus large banks by Elizabeth W Croft( Book )
11 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 44 libraries worldwide
Abstract: This paper develops a spacial model of ATM networks to explore the implications for banks and non-banks of interchange fees, foreign fees and surcharges applied to transactions by customers at other than an own-bank ATM. Surcharging raises the price (foreign fee plus surcharge) paid by customers above the joint profit-maximizing level achieved by setting the interchange fee at marginal cost and not surcharging. Similar size banks would agree not to surcharge, but such an agreement is typically not possible between a bank and a non-bank. A high cost of teller transactions modifies the tendency towards high ATM fees
Trade adjustment assistance : welfare and incentive effects of payments to displaced workers by James A Brander( Book )
7 editions published between 1989 and 1993 in English and held by 39 libraries worldwide
Abstract: and solve for the optimal level of assistance for each program. Finally, we
International outsourcing and incomplete contracts by Barbara J Spencer( Book )
10 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 35 libraries worldwide
International outsourcing to lower cost countries such as China and India can best be understood through the enrichment of trade models to include concepts from industrial organization and contract theory that explain the vertical organization of production. The combination of trade with the choice of organizational form represents an important new area for both theoretical and empirical research. This survey paper provides a perspective on this new literature so as to gain insights into the forces driving international outsourcing. The paper focuses on relationship-specific investment, incomplete contracts, and also search and matching, as fundamental concepts that explain outsourcing decisions
Vertical foreclosure and international trade policy by Barbara J Spencer( Book )
9 editions published between 1989 and 1991 in English and held by 33 libraries worldwide
We examine conditions under which a low cost vertically integrated manufacturer has an incentive to export an intermediate product to its higher cost (vertically integrated) rival rather than to vertically foreclose, fully cutting off supplies. The nature of supply conditions in the importing country, the size of an import tariff on the final good and optimal policy by the exporting country are all shown to be important for this decision. The exporting country may gain by taxing exports of the final (Cournot) product even though, under Cournot competition, an export subsidy is optimal in the absence of a market for intermediates. In this case, optimal policy also requires an export tax on intermediates, but the higher tax on final goods serves to divert sales to the more profitable market for intermediates increasing the extent of vertical supply. It is optimal to tax the export of both goods or to subsidize the export of both goods. It is never optimal to tax one and subsidize the other
Contractual versus generic outsourcing : the role of proximity by Robert C Feenstra( Book )
9 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 31 libraries worldwide
We explore the relationship between proximity of buyers and sellers and the organizational form of outsourcing. Outsourcing can be "contractual" in which suppliers undertake specific investments or involve "generic" market transactions. Proximity expands the variety of products sourced through contracts abroad rather than at home, but the range of generic imports is unchanged. A higher-quality foreign workforce raises the variety of contractual trade, but at the expense of generics. We confirm these predictions using data for ordinary versus processing exports from Chinese provinces to destination markets and also the predictions of an extended model that allows for multinational production
Trade and protection in vertically related markets by Barbara J Spencer( Book )
7 editions published between 1989 and 1991 in English and held by 31 libraries worldwide
Abstract: supplier for a key intermediate product when both firms are Cournot competitors
Capital subsidies and countervailing duties in oligopolistic industries by Barbara J Spencer( Book )
7 editions published in 1988 in English and held by 30 libraries worldwide
Under GATT, countries are allowed to impose countervailing duties to offset foreign subsidies. However GATT rules limit the amount of duty to the amount of the subsidy. This paper examines a generalized model of imperfect competition with capital subsidies and shows the conditions under which a countervailing duty will offset the effect of the subsidy on exports. Also, conditions are specified under which exports will increase despite the imposition of the maximum tariff under GATT. In addition, the paper considers whether profit shifting motives for a subsidy still exist even when this maximum duty is anticipated
International R & D rivalry and industrial strategy by Barbara J Spencer( Book )
9 editions published in 1983 in English and held by 18 libraries worldwide
This paper presents a theory of government intervention which provides an explanation for "industrial strategy" policies such as R&D or export subsidies in imperfectly competitive international markets. Each producing country has an incentive to try to capture a greater share of rent-earning industries using subsidies, but the subsidy-ridden international equilibrium is jointly suboptimal. The equilibrium in the strategic game involving firms and governments is modelled as a three stage subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The assumption that the government is the first player in this game allows it to influence equilibrium industry outcomes by altering the set of credible actions open to firms
Trevor Swan and the neoclassical growth model by Robert W Dimand( Book )
9 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 17 libraries worldwide
Trevor Swan independently developed the neoclassical growth model, publishing Swan (1956) ten months later than Solow (1956), but analyzing technical progress before Solow (1957). These independent contributions are sometimes recognized by reference to the "Solow-Swan growth model", but more commonly reference is made only to the "Solow growth model". This paper examines the history of Swan's development of the growth model, the similarities and differences between the approaches of Swan and Solow and the reasons why Swan's contribution has been overshadowed. We draw on unpublished work to show that in 1950, Swan had set out a number of the basic ideas of his growth model in a verbal format. In 1956, Swan published only a simplified version of his model based on a Cobb-Douglas production function. Swan's original and more general model (circulated in July 1956), was published only posthumously in 2002. This reluctance to publish was consistent with his perhaps counterproductive modesty and perfectionism. His well known paper, "Longer run problems of the Balance of Payments" was circulated in 1955, eight years before publication in 1963. His pioneering work in 1945, developing the first macroeconomic model of the Australian economy, was published posthumously in 1989
Trade warfare : tariffs and cartels by James A Brander( Book )
5 editions published between 1983 and 1984 in English and Undetermined and held by 13 libraries worldwide
National governments have incentives to intervene in international markets, particularly in encouraging export cartels and in imposing tariffs on imports from imperfectly competitive foreign firms. Although the optimal response to foreign monopoly is usually a tariff, a specific subsidy will be optimal if demand is very convex, as with constant elasticity demand. If ad valorem tariffs or subsidies are considered, a subsidy is optimal if the elasticity of demand increases as consumption increases. The critical conditions in both ad valorern and specific cases hold generally for Cournot ologopoly. Noncooperative international policy equilibrium will be characterized by export cartels and rent-extracting tariffs
Export subsidies and international market share rivalry by James A Brander( Book )
6 editions published between 1984 and 1985 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Countries often perceive themselves as being in competition with each other for profitable international markets. In such a world export subsidies can appear as attractive policy tools, from a national point of view, because they improve the relative position of a domestic firm in noncooperative rivalries with foreign firms, enabling it to expand its market share and earn greater profits. In effect, subsidies change the initial conditions of the game that firms play. The terms of trade move against the subsidizing country, but its welfare can increase because, under imperfect competition, price exceeds the marginal cost of exports. International noncooperative equilibriumis characterized by such subsidies on the part of exporting nations, even though they are jointly suboptimal
Endogenous Horizontal Product Differentiation under Bertrand and Cournot Competition Revisiting the Bertrand Paradox by James A Brander( Book )
5 editions published in 2015 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
This paper provides a new and simple model of endogenous horizontal product differentiation based on a standard demand structure derived from quadratic utility. One objective of the paper is to explain the "empirical Bertrand paradox"--The failure to observe homogeneous product Bertrand oligopoly, while homogeneous product Cournot oligopoly has significant empirical relevance. In our model firms invest in product differentiation if differentiation investments are sufficiently effective (i.e. if differentiation is not too costly). The threshold level of differentiation effectiveness needed to induce such investments is an order of magnitude less for Bertrand firms than for Cournot firms. Thus there is a wide range over which Bertrand firms differentiate their products but Cournot firms do not. If Cournot firms do choose to differentiate their products, corresponding Bertrand firms always differentiate more. We also establish the important insight that if product differentiation is endogenous Bertrand firms may charge higher prices and earn higher profits than corresponding Cournot firms, in contrast to the general presumption that Bertrand behavior is more competitive than Cournot behavior. Interestingly, consumer surplus increases with differentiation in the Cournot model but, due to sharply increasing prices, decreases with differentiation in the Bertrand model
Intra-industry trade with Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly : the role of endogenous horizontal product differentiation by James A Brander( Book )
5 editions published in 2015 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
This paper investigates the effect of endogenous horizontal product differentiation on trade patterns and the gains from trade under Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly. Firms differentiate their products to mitigate competition, but only if the investment required is not too high. Investment in product differentiation takes place in a much wider range of cases and results in a greater difference between products under Bertrand than Cournot competition. In our model, trade in homogeneous products never takes place under Bertrand competition: Bertrand firms export only if they differentiate their products. Cournot firms may trade in either homogeneous or differentiated products. If there is trade, consumers tend to be better off with Bertrand than Cournot competition due to greater product differentiation and more aggressive pricing, but higher levels of investment can raise Bertrand profit above Cournot profit and also above the monopoly profit at autarky when investment costs are sufficiently low
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Alternative Names
Barbara J. Spencer canadisk økonom
Barbara J. Spencer economista australiana
Barbara J. Spencer kanadensisk ekonom
Barbara J. Spencer kanadisk økonom
Barbara Spencer
Barbara Spencer australisch-kanadische Wirtschaftswissenschaftlerin und Hochschullehrerin
Barbara Spencer Canadees econome
Spencer, B. J.
Spencer, Barbara
English (188)
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