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Mirman, Leonard J.

Overview
Works: 25 works in 48 publications in 1 language and 425 library holdings
Roles: Editor
Classifications: SH334, 333.956
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about Leonard J Mirman
Publications by Leonard J Mirman
Most widely held works by Leonard J Mirman
Essays in the economics of renewable resources ( Book )
9 editions published in 1982 in English and held by 344 libraries worldwide
Stochastic equilibrium problems in economics and game theory ( Book )
1 edition published in 2002 in English and held by 18 libraries worldwide
Dynamic externalities and policy coordination by Manjira Datta( Book )
7 editions published between 1995 and 1996 in English and held by 12 libraries worldwide
Financial intermediation and entry deterrence by Neelam Jain( Book )
3 editions published between 2000 and 2001 in English and held by 9 libraries worldwide
Diagonality of cost allocation prices by Leonard J Mirman( Book )
2 editions published in 1983 in English and held by 7 libraries worldwide
Strategic information manipulation in duopolies by Leonard J Mirman( Book )
3 editions published between 1991 and 1992 in English and held by 6 libraries worldwide
Prices for homogenous cost functions by Leonard J Mirman( Book )
1 edition published in 1983 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in distorted dynamic economies with capital and labor by Manjira Datta( Book )
2 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Duopoly signal jamming by Leonard J Mirman( Book )
3 editions published in 1992 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Investment in a monopoly with Bayesian learning by Christos Koulovatianos( Computer File )
2 editions published between 2006 and 2011 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
The simple diagrammatics of price signaling quality by Leonard J Mirman( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Monotone methods for markovian equilibrium in dynamic economies ( Book )
1 edition published in 2002 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Robust insurance mechanisms and the shadow prices of information constraints by I. V Evstigneev( Book )
1 edition published in 1994 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Some stability results for Markovian economic semigroups ( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Noisy signaling monopoly by Leonard J Mirman( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Markovian equilibrium in infinite horizon economies with incomplete markets and public policy ( Book )
1 edition published in 2005 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Optimal growth and uncertainty : learning ( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Information transmission in dynamic Bayesian duopoly models by Maria Amparo Urbano( Computer File )
1 edition published in 1989 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
In economic models in which agents are asymmetrically informed about the structural parameters of the economy the acquisition or manipulation of information plays a crucial role. The incentive to affect the flow of information is especially important in models in which choice variables, and hence market variables, generate information used for future decisions. In this paper we study two different reasons why agents might change their (myopically) optimal decisions when they take account of the informational content of their decisions. The first is when informed agents manipulate the informational content of observed market variables through their own decisions in order to influence the learning of uninformed agents. The second is when uninformed agents "experiment" in order to influence the flow of information on which their own future decisions are based. This thesis presents two models in which both of these possibilities are present. We consider for both models a duopolistic market characterized by a linear stochastic demand function with an unknown parameter. The information about demand is asymmetric. It is assumed that there is one informed firm and one uninformed firm. The informed firm knows the expected value of the demand parameter and the uninformed firm has subjective probability distribution over the possible values of the mean of the unknown parameter. We solve the two-period model duopoly model as a dynamic game of incomplete information. Firms choose their output level in the first period based upon their priors and their understanding of how information is used to update their priors. After the first period firms, having observed the market signals, use this information to update their priors on the unknown parameter. The solution concept we employ is the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (sequential equilibrium) of Harsanyi (H) and study the properties of a separating equilibrium. The essential difference between the models is in the information structure of them. In the second model, only prices are observed. In the first model, both prices and quantities are observed; however, output is random
The signaling role of prices : Cournot by Wassim Daher( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2009 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Strategic information manipulation in duopolies by Leonard J Mirman( file )
1 edition published in 1991 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
 
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Alternative Names
Mirman, L. J.
Languages
English (43)
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