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Persson, Torsten

Works: 154 works in 975 publications in 3 languages and 9,849 library holdings
Genres: Conference papers and proceedings  Biography  Cross-cultural studies 
Roles: Author, Editor, Other, Contributor, Honoree
Publication Timeline
Publications about Torsten Persson
Publications by Torsten Persson
Most widely held works by Torsten Persson
Monetary and fiscal policy by Torsten Persson( file )
33 editions published between 1994 and 1995 in English and held by 1,758 libraries worldwide
How will the private sector react to different government policies? What policies will produce the most desirable outcomes? The two volumes of Monetary and Fiscal Policy bring together major contributions to a new theory of macroeconomic policy that analyzes which policies are credible or politically feasible -- topics that are central to the practical policy debate but that traditional theory cannot address. This volume examines problems of policy credibility caused by incentives to deviate from announced policy
Monetary and fiscal policy by Torsten Persson( file )
13 editions published in 1994 in English and held by 1,315 libraries worldwide
How will the private sector react to different government policies? What policies will produce the most desirable outcomes? The two volumes of Monetary and Fiscal Policy bring together major contributions to a new theory of macroeconomic policy that analyzes which policies are credible or politically feasible -- topics that are central to the practical policy debate but that traditional theory cannot address. This volume examines problems of policy credibility caused by incentives to deviate from announced policy
The economic effects of constitutions by Torsten Persson( file )
2 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 1,247 libraries worldwide
The authors of The Economic Effects of Constitutions use econometric tools to study what they call the "missing link" between constitutional systems and economic policy; the book is an uncompromisingly empirical sequel to their previous theoretical analysis of economic policy. Taking recent theoretical work as a point of departure, they ask which theoretical findings are supported and which are contradicted by the facts. The results are based on comparisons of political institutions across countries or time, in a large sample of contemporary democracies. They find that presidential/parliamentary and majoritarian/proportional dichotomies influence several economic variables: presidential regimes induce smaller public sectors, and proportional elections lead to greater and less targeted government spending and larger budget deficits. Moreover, the details of the electoral system (such as district magnitude and ballot structure) influence corruption and structural policies toward economic growth. Persson and Tabellini's goal is to draw conclusions about the causal effects of constitutions on policy outcomes. But since constitutions are not randomly assigned to countries, how the constitutional system was selected in the first place must be taken into account. This raises challenging methodological problems, which are addressed in the book. The study is therefore important not only in its findings but also in establishing a methodology for empirical analysis in the field of comparative politics
Pillars of prosperity : the political economics of development clusters by Timothy Besley( file )
16 editions published between 2011 and 2017 in English and held by 668 libraries worldwide
"Little else is required to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things." So wrote Adam Smith a quarter of a millennium ago. Using the tools of modern political economics and combining economic theory with a bird's-eye view of the data, this book reinterprets Smith's pillars of prosperity to explain the existence of development clusters--places that tend to combine effective state institutions, the absence of political violence, and high per-capita incomes. To achieve peace, the authors stress the avoidance of repressive government and civil conflict. Easy taxes, they argue, refers not to low taxes, but a tax system with widespread compliance that collects taxes at a reasonable cost from a broad base, like income. And a tolerable administration of justice is about legal infrastructure that can support the enforcement of contracts and property rights in line with the rule of law. The authors show that countries tend to enjoy all three pillars of prosperity when they have evolved cohesive political institutions that promote common interests, guaranteeing the provision of public goods. In line with much historical research, international conflict has also been an important force behind effective states by fostering common interests. The absence of common interests and/or cohesive political institutions can explain the existence of very different development clusters in fragile states that are plagued by poverty, violence, and weak state capacity. -- Book Description
Political economics : explaining economic policy by Torsten Persson( Book )
25 editions published between 2000 and 2005 in English and German and held by 641 libraries worldwide
Políticas redistributivas; Políticas comparativas; Políticas dinámicas; Políticas monetarias
Advances in economics and econometrics : theory and applications, ninth World Congress by Econometric Society( Book )
57 editions published between 2005 and 2007 in English and held by 446 libraries worldwide
This is the first of three volumes containing edited versions of papers and a commentary presented at invited symposium sessions of the Ninth World Congress of the Econometric Society, held in London in August 2005. The papers summarise and interpret key developments, and they discuss future directions for a wide variety of topics in economics and econometrics. The papers cover both theory and applications. Written by leading specialists in their fields, these volumes provide a unique survey of progress in the discipline
Economic sciences, 1981-1990 : the Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) prize in economic sciences in memory of Alfred Nobel ( Book )
14 editions published between 1992 and 1997 in English and held by 200 libraries worldwide
Se presentan los estudios y biografías de los ganadores de los premios nobeles de 1981 a 1990, como son James Tobin, George J. Stigler, Gerard Debreu, Richard Stone, Franco Modigliani, James M. Buchanan, etc
Economic sciences, 1996-2000 ( Book )
16 editions published between 1997 and 2006 in English and Chinese and held by 186 libraries worldwide
A collection of the Nobel lectures delivered by the prizewinners in the economic sciences, together with their biographies, portraits and the presentation speeches at the award ceremonies for the period 1996-2000. Each lecture is based on the work for which the laureate was awarded the prize
The size and scope of government : comparative politics with rational politicians by Torsten Persson( Book )
22 editions published between 1998 and 1999 in English and held by 154 libraries worldwide
We try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics, relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system. A Downsian model of electoral competition and forward-looking voting indicates that majoritarian -- as opposed to proportional -- elections increase competition between parties by focusing it into some key marginal districts. This leads to less public goods, less rents for politicians, more redistribution and larger government. A model of legislative bargaining and backward-looking voting indicates that presidential -- as opposed to parliamentary -- regimes increase competition between both politicians and voters. This leads to less public goods, less rents for politicians redistribution, and smaller government. We confront these predictions with cross-country data from around 1990, controlling for economic and social determinants of government spending. We find strong and robust support for the prediction that the size of government is smaller under presidential regimes, and weaker support for the prediction that majoritarian elections are associated with less public goods
Debt, cash flow and inflation incentives : a Swedish example by Mats Persson( Book )
25 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 152 libraries worldwide
The fiscal gains from, and hence the political incentives to, an increase in inflation rate of ten percentage points may be substantial: with Swedish data from 1994, these gains would have been an annual real flow of 3-4 percent of GDP, or a capitalized value of nearly 100 percent of GDP. They would mainly have arisen from the nominalistic features of the tax and transfer systems rather than from the traditional sources: seignorage and real depreciation of the public debt. The welfare costs of such an inflation increase would have been even larger, however, and would thus have reduced net welfare. Possible institutional reforms, aimed at making the political costs of inflation more equal to the social costs, are presented and discussed
Electoral rules and corruption by Torsten Persson( Book )
28 editions published in 2001 in English and Undetermined and held by 144 libraries worldwide
Is corruption systematically related to electoral rules? A number of studies have tried to uncover economic and social determinants of corruption but, as far as we know, nobody has yet empirically investigated how electoral systems iné0141uence corruption. We try to address this lacuna in the literature, by relating corruption to dierent features of the electoral system in a sample from the late nineties encompassing more than 80 (developed and developing) democracies. Our empirical results are based on traditional regression methods, as well as non-parametric estimators. The evidence is consistent with the theoretical models reviewed in the paper. Holding constant a variety of economic and social variables, we find that larger voting districts - and thus lower barriers to entry - are associated with less corruption, whereas larger shares of candidates elected from party lists - and thus less individual accountability - are associated with more corruption. Altogether, proportional elections are associated with more corruption, since voting over party lists is the dominant effect, while the district magnitude effect is less robust
Political economics and public finance by Torsten Persson( Book )
20 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 142 libraries worldwide
Observed fiscal policy varies greatly across time and countries. How can we explain this variation across time and countries? This paper surveys the recent literature that has tried to answer this question. We adopt a unified approach in portraying public policy as the equilibrium outcome of an explicitly specified political process. We divide the material into three parts. In Part I, we focus on median-voter equilibria that apply to policy issues where disagreement between voters is likely to be one-dimensional. We thus study the general redistributive programs which are typical of the modern welfare state: redistribution between rich and poor, young and old, employed and unemployed, resident of different regions, and labor and capital. In Part II we study special interest politics. Here the policy problem is multi-dimensional and we focus on specific political mechanisms: we study legislative bargaining, lobbying, and electoral competition, as well as the possible interactions between these different forms of political activity. Finally, Part III deals with a set of questions that can be brought under the label of comparative politics. Here we deal with policy choice under alternative political constitutions; we model the rationale for separation of powers and contrast the stylized features of congressional and parliamentary political systems, focusing on their implications for rent extraction by politicians, redistribution and public goods provision
Monetary cohabitation in Europe by Torsten Persson( Book )
22 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 136 libraries worldwide
How can monetary policy in stage III of European Monetary Union be coordinated between the ìns' and the òuts'? This paper compares alternative institutional mechanisms, and concludes that a generalized system of inflation targets at the European level has several merits. It strengthens domestic credibility of monetary policy. It rules out deliberate attempts to gain competitiveness through devaluations. It forces monetary policy to respond automatically to various macroeconomic shocks which is stabilizing for the real exchange rate. It distributes these shocks symmetrically across countries. On the basis of a simple theoretical model of policy coordination, the paper shows that a system of inflation targets approximates an optimal policy of international cooperation. Preliminary empirical evidence supports these theoretical results
How do electoral rules shape party structures, government coalitions, and economic policies? by Torsten Persson( Book )
23 editions published between 2002 and 2004 in English and held by 129 libraries worldwide
We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coalitions and fiscal policies are endogenously determined. The model predicts that, relative to proportional elections, majoritarian elections reduce government spending because they reduce party fragmentation and, therefore, the incidence of coalition governments. Party fragmentation can persist under majoritarian rule if party supporters are unevenly distributed across electoral districts. Economic and political data, from up to 50 post-war parliamentary democracies, strongly support our joint predictions from the electoral rule, to the party system, to the type of government, and to government spending
Is inequality harmful for growth? : theory and evidence by Torsten Persson( Book )
25 editions published between 1991 and 1993 in English and held by 127 libraries worldwide
Is inequality harmful for growth? We suggest that it is. To summarize our main argument: in a society where distributional conflict is more important, political decisions are more likely to produce economic policies that allow private individuals to appropriate less of the returns to growth promoting activities, such as accumulation of capital and productive knowledge. In the paper we first formulate a theoretical model that formally captures this idea. The model has a politico-economic equilibrium, which determines a sequence of growth rates depending on structural parameters, political institutions, and initial conditions. We then confront the testable empirical implications with two sets of data. A first data set pools historical evidence-which goes back to the mid 19th century-from the US and eight European countries. A second data set contains post-war evidence from a broad cross-section of developed and less developed countries. In both samples we find a statistically significant and quantitatively important negative relation between inequality and growth. After a comprehensive sensitivity analysis, we conclude that our findings are not distorted by measurement error, reverse causation, hetroskedasticity, or other econometric problems
Time consistency of fiscal and monetary policy : a solution by Mats Persson( Book )
21 editions published between 1985 and 2005 in English and held by 117 libraries worldwide
"This paper demonstrates how time consistency of the Ramsey policy - the optimal fiscal and monetary policy under commitment - can be achieved. Each government should leave its successor with a unique maturity structure for the nominal and indexed debt, such that the marginal benefit of a surprise inflation exactly balances the marginal cost. Unlike in earlier papers on the topic, the result holds for quite a general Ramsey policy, including timevarying polices with positive inflation and positive nominal interest rates. We compare our results with those in Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1987), Calvo and Obstfeld (1990), and Alvarez, Kehoe, and Neumeyer (2004)"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Democracy and development : the devil in the details by Torsten Persson( file )
23 editions published in 2006 in English and German and held by 109 libraries worldwide
Does democracy promote economic development? We review recent attempts to address this question, which exploit the within-country variation associated with historical transitions in and out of democracy. The answer is positive, but depends - in a subtle way - on the details of democratic reforms. First, democratizations and economic liberalizations in isolation each induce growth accelerations, but countries liberalizing their economy before extending political rights do better than those carrying out the opposite sequence. Second, different forms of democratic government and different electoral systems lead to different fiscal trade policies: this might explain why new presidential democracies grow faster than new parliamentary democracies. Third, it is important to distinguish between expected and actual political reforms: expectations of regime change have an independent effect on growth, and taking expectations into account helps identify a stronger growth effect of democracy
Forms of democracy, policy and economic development by Torsten Persson( Book )
18 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 106 libraries worldwide
The paper combines insights from the recent research programs on constitutions and economic policy, and on history, institutions and growth. Drawing on cross-sectional as well as panel data, it presents new empirical results showing that the form of democracy (rather than democracy vs. non-democracy) has important consequences for the adoption of structural polices that promote long-run economic performance. Reforms into parliamentary (as opposed to presidential), proportional (as opposed to majoritarian) and permanent (as opposed to temporary) democracy appear to produce the most growth-promoting policies
Political competition and economic performance : theory and evidence from the United States by Timothy Besley( file )
16 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 106 libraries worldwide
One of the most cherished propositions in economics is that market competition by and large raises consumer welfare. But whether political competition has similarly virtuous consequences is far less discussed. This paper formulates a model to explain why political competition may enhance economic performance and uses the United States as a testing ground for the model's implications. It finds statistically robust evidence that political competition has quantitatively important effects on state income growth, state policies, and the quality of Governors
Do political institutions shape economic policy? by Torsten Persson( Book )
12 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 104 libraries worldwide
Do political institutions shape economic policy? I argue that this question should naturally appeal to economists. Moreover, the answer is in the affirmative, both in theory and in practice. In particular, recent theoretical work predicts systematic eects of electoral rules and political regimes on the size and composition of government spending. And results from ongoing empirical work indicate that such eect are indeed present in international panel data. Some empirical results are consistent with theoretical predictions: presidential regimes have smaller governments and countries with majoritarian elections have smaller welfare-state programs and less corruption. Other results present puzzles for future research: the adjustment to economic events is clearly institution-dependent, as is the timing and nature of the electoral cycle
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Alternative Names
Persson, T. 1954-
Persson, Tryggve
Torsten Persson economista sueco
Torsten Persson économiste suédois
Torsten Persson schwedischer Ökonom
Torsten Persson svensk ekonom
Torsten Persson svensk økonom
Torsten Persson Swedish economist
Torsten Persson Zweeds econoom
تورستن بيرسون عالم اقتصاد سويدي
English (426)
Chinese (2)
German (2)
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