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Marion, Nancy Peregrim

Overview
Works: 57 works in 264 publications in 1 language and 2,271 library holdings
Genres: Case studies 
Roles: Honoree
Classifications: H62.5.U5, 174
Publication Timeline
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Publications about Nancy Peregrim Marion
Publications by Nancy Peregrim Marion
Most widely held works by Nancy Peregrim Marion
Getting shut out of the international capital markets it doesn't take much by Robert P Flood( file )
5 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 188 libraries worldwide
We use a simple model of international lending to show that an emerging market borrower who might default can be shut out of international capital markets without warning. A modest haircut on obligations, for example, can shut down lending
International risk sharing during the globalization era by Robert P Flood( Computer File )
8 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 185 libraries worldwide
Though theory suggests financial globalization should improve international risk sharing, empirical support has been limited. We develop a simple welfare-based measure that captures how far countries are from the ideal of perfect risk sharing. We then take it to data and find international risk sharing has, indeed, improved during globalization. Improved risk sharing comes mostly from the convergence in rates of consumption growth among countries rather than from synchronization of consumption at the business cycle frequency. Our finding explains why many existing measures fail to detect improved risk sharing-they focus only on risk sharing at the business cycle frequency
Outcomes-based conditionality its role and optimal design by Anna Ivanova( file )
3 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 177 libraries worldwide
The paper employs a principal-agent framework to analyze the role and design of outcomes-based conditionality in the presence of market frictions and domestic opposition. The results suggest that outcomes-based conditionality is a good option for the IMF when opposition to reforms is relatively weak and when the IMF loan is unsubsidized. The only role conditionality ends up playing in this case is that of an efficiency tool. The benefits of outcomes-based conditionality in the presence of strong opposition are less clear, and using this conditionality as an incentive tool would require that IMF financing be subsidized
Productivity growth, technological convergence, R & D, trade and labor markets evidence from the French manufacturing sector by Tehmina S Khan( file )
3 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 167 libraries worldwide
Total factor productivity (TFP) of 14 manufacturing sectors in France has kept up with that of the United States during 1980-2002 and remained well above that of the United Kingdom. Estimates using a dynamic panel equilibrium correction model indicate that sectors further behind the technological frontier experience faster productivity growth and that spending on research and development and trade with technologically advanced economies positively influences TFP growth, but not the speed of convergence. Conversely, TFP growth is negatively related to some key labor market variables, namely the replacement ratio and the ratio of the minimum wage to the median wage
Perspectives on the recent currency crisis literature by Robert P Flood( Book )
24 editions published between 1998 and 2001 in English and Undetermined and held by 127 libraries worldwide
In the 1990s, currency crises in Europe, Mexico and Southeast Asia have drawn worldwide attention to speculative attacks on government-controlled exchange rates. To improve our understanding of these events, researchers have undertaken new theoretical and empirical work. In this paper, we provide some perspective on this work and relate it to earlier research in the area. Then we derive the optimal commitment to a fixed exchange rate and propose a common framework for analyzing currency crises that draws from both the early first-generation work and the more recent second-generation approach. The cross-generational framework stresses the important role of speculators and also recognizes that the government's commitment to a fixed exchange rate is constrained by other policy goals. In the final section we study the crisis prediction literature and find that some crises may be particularly difficult to predict using currently popular methods
Speculative attacks : fundamentals and self-fulfilling prophecies by Robert P Flood( Book )
11 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 86 libraries worldwide
We develop a modified understand better the 1994 Mexican peso crisis as well as aspects of the European currency crises in 1992-93. We introduce the assumption that the speculative attack is sterilized by the domestic monetary authority, we incorporate a stochastic risk premium, and we allow for some price stickiness. The modified model shows that macroeconomic policies inconsistent in the longer run with a fixed exchange rate can push the economy inevitably towards a currency crisis, but it also demonstrates how a government currently following consistent macroeconomic policies can suddenly face a speculative attack triggered by a large shift in speculative opinion. However, the ability of a sudden shift in speculative opinion to trigger an attack is bounded by the position of fundamentals. Thus an attack does not require a later change in policies to make it profitable
Explaining the duration of exchange-rate pegs by Michael W Klein( Book )
12 editions published between 1993 and 1994 in English and held by 83 libraries worldwide
This paper is a theoretical and empirical investigation into the duration of exchange-rate pegs. The theoretical model considers a policy-maker who must trade off the economic costs of real exchange- rate misalignment against the political cost of realignment. The optimal time to spend on a peg is derived and factors that influence peg duration are identified. The predictions of the model are tested using logit analysis with a data set of exchange-rate pegs for sixteen Latin American countries and Jamaica during the 1957-1991 period. We find that the real exchange rate is a significant determinant of the likelihood of a devaluation. Structural variables, such as the openness of the economy and its geographical trade concentration, also significantly affect the likelihood of a devaluation. Finally, political events that change the political cost of realignment, such as regular and irregular executive transfers, are empirically important determinants of the likelihood of a devaluation
Volatility and the investment response by Joshua Aizenman( Book )
10 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 81 libraries worldwide
We use the World Bank decomposition of aggregate investment shares into their private and public components to test for the correlation between volatility and investment in a set of developing countries. We uncover a statistically significant negative correlation between various volatility measures and private investment, even when adding the standard control variables. No such correlation is uncovered when the investment measure is the sum of private and public investment spending. Indeed, public investment spending is positively correlated with some measures of volatility. We also use the new World Bank data to redo the Ramey and Ramey (1995) test for a correlation between investment and the standard deviation of innovations to a forecasting equation for growth. While Ramey and Ramey found no significant correlation using aggregate investment data, we find a negative and highly significant relationship between innovation volatility and private investment in developing countries. These findings suggest that the detrimental impact of volatility on investment may be difficult to detect using aggregate data
Volatility, investment and disappointment aversion by Joshua Aizenman( Book )
10 editions published in 1995 in English and held by 80 libraries worldwide
This study uncovers a statistically significant negative correlation between volatility and private investment over the 1970-93 period in a set of almost fifty developing countries and provides a possible interpretation of this result by using the disappointment- aversion expected utility framework first described by Gul (1991). We consider a number of different volatility measures related to domestic policies or to external factors. As the various volatility measures tend to be positively correlated, we do not claim to identify a unique measure as the dominant source of volatility. Instead, we demonstrate that for a number of different measures, volatility reduces private investment in developing countries. We then show that the disappointment-aversion framework provides a useful way of illustrating the adverse first-order effects of volatility. When agents are disappointment-averse, they put more weight on 'bad' outcomes and less weight on 'good' outcomes than in the standard case. The asymmetric weighting of outcomes introduces additional concavity into the utility function and causes volatility to have significant, negative effects on economic performance. The large, negative effects of increased volatility continue to hold even if the coefficient of relative risk aversion approaches zero (that is, even if the marginal utility of income is constant so that agents are risk neutral in the conventional sense)
The size and timing of devaluations in capital-controlled developing economies by Robert P Flood( Book )
9 editions published in 1994 in English and held by 79 libraries worldwide
Reserve uncertainty and the supply of international credit by Joshua Aizenman( Book )
11 editions published between 1999 and 2001 in English and held by 78 libraries worldwide
This paper examines how increased uncertainty about an emerging market's international reserves affects the willingness of foreign investors to supply international credits. We illustrate the relevance of this concern for South Korea during the recent financial crisis. Using available information about Korea's reserves at the onset of the crisis, we show that 'usable' reserves turned out to be much lower than what a reasonable forecast would have predicted. We then develop a model of an emerging-market economy where there is sovereign risk and moral hazard is a problem because agents expect the emerging market to bail out creditors with its reserves. We show that reserve uncertainty has a non-linear effect on the supply of credit. When the expected reserve position of an emerging market is large relative to the potential bailout in bad states of nature, reserve volatility does not matter. However, the same amount of reserve volatility can cause a large reduction in the supply of international credit if the emerging market's foreign debt is large enough or if the collapse of output forces the private sector to downgrade its priors about repayment possibilities. In addition, reserve volatility can reduce international credit if investors become more pessimistic about the emerging market's reserve position
Exchange-rate regimes in transition : Italy 1974 by Robert P Flood( Book )
5 editions published in 1981 in English and Undetermined and held by 77 libraries worldwide
Uncertainty and the disappearance of international credit by Joshua Aizenman( Book )
10 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 75 libraries worldwide
We show that increased uncertainty about the size of an emerging market's external debt has a nonlinear and potentially large adverse effect on the supply of international credit offered to them. We also show that if international creditors are first- order risk averse, attaching greater weight to utility derived from bad outcomes than from good ones, a moderate increase in uncertainty about debt overhang or about other relevant factors affecting repayment prospects-- can cause the supply of credit to dry up completely. We therefore offer one possible explanation for why emerging markets may find themselves suddenly cut off from international capital markets
The merits of horizontal versus vertical FDI in the presence of uncertainty by Joshua Aizenman( Book )
9 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 75 libraries worldwide
This paper examines the impact of uncertainty on the profitability of vertical and horizontal foreign direct investment (FDI). Vertical FDI takes place when the multinational fragments the production process internationally, locating each stage of production in the country where it can be done at the least cost. Horizontal FDI occurs when the multinational undertakes the same production activities in multiple countries. We consider a model where the risk-neutral multinational must commit its investment prior to the realization of shocks. The multinational has monopoly power and confronts two types of risk. It may face random productivity shocks or encounter a host country that tries to confiscate its rents. We show that greater uncertainty reduces the expected income from vertical FDI but increases the expected income from horizontal FDI. In addition, predatory actions by the host country are more costly to the multinational that has structured its production vertically rather than horizontally. Consequently, increased uncertainty should encourage horizontal FDI but discourage vertical FDI. If vertical FDI is more likely to flow into emerging markets and horizontal FDI into mature markets, then the empirical finding that most FDI is horizontal rather than vertical might be due, in part, to the greater uncertainty associated with emerging markets. We report cross-country regression results that provide some support for the predictions of the model. Volatility appears to have a differential impact on FDI inflows into mature and emerging markets. For mature markets that supposedly attract mainly horizontal FDI, greater volatility significantly increases FDI inflows. For emerging markets that receive relatively more vertical FDI inflows, increased volatility does not increase FDI inflows
International reserve holdings with sovereign risk and costly tax collection by Joshua Aizenman( Book )
8 editions published between 2002 and 2003 in English and held by 75 libraries worldwide
This paper analyzes the international reserve-holding behavior of developing countries. It shows that political-economy considerations modify the optimal reserve level determined by efficiency criteria. A country characterized by volatile output, inelastic demand for fiscal outlays, high tax collection costs and sovereign risk will want to accumulate international reserves as well as external debt. Efficiency considerations imply that reserves are optimal when the benefits they provide for intertemporal consumption and distortion smoothing equal the costs of acquiring them. However, a greater chance of opportunistic behavior by future policy makers reduces the demand for international reserves and increases external borrowing. Political corruption also reduces optimal reserve holdings. We provide some evidence to support these findings. Consequently, the debt-to-reserves ratio may be less useful as a vulnerability indicator. A version of the Lucas Critique suggests that if a high debt-to-reserves ratio is a symptom of opportunistic behavior, a policy recommendation to increase international reserve holdings may be welfare-reducing
The high demand for international reserves in the far east : what's going on? by Joshua Aizenman( Book )
9 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 73 libraries worldwide
This paper explores econometric and theoretical interpretations for the relatively high demand for international reserves by countries in the Far East and the relatively low demand by some other developing countries. Using a sample of about 125 developing countries, we show that reserve holdings over the 1980-1996 period seem to be the predictable outcome of a few key factors, such as the size of international transactions, their volatility, the exchange-rate arrangement, and political considerations. The estimating equation does a good job of predicting reserve holdings in Asia before the 1997 financial crisis. After the crisis, the estimating equation significantly under-predicts the reserve holdings of several key Far East countries, as one might expect from the Lucas Critique. This under-prediction is consistent with models explaining reserve demand in developing countries. Specifically, we show that sovereign risk and costly tax collection to cover fiscal liabilities lead to a relatively large precautionary demand for international reserves. In the aftermath of a crisis, countries that have to deal with higher perceived sovereign risk and higher fiscal liabilities (both funded and unfunded) will opt to increase their demand for reserves. The models also help us understand why some developing countries do not hold large precautionary reserve balances in the aftermath of crises. Countries with high discount rates, political instability or political corruption find it optimal to hold smaller precautionary balances. We also show that models that incorporate loss aversion predict a relatively large demand for international reserves. Hence, if a crisis increases the volatility of shocks and/or loss aversion, it will greatly increase the demand for international reserves. Consequently, we conclude that the puzzling' pattern in international reserve holdings is reasonably explained by the extended models described in this paper
Policy uncertainty, persistence and growth by Joshua Aizenman( Book )
8 editions published in 1991 in English and held by 54 libraries worldwide
This paper explores links between policy uncertainty and growth. It provides evidence on the correlation between policy uncertainty and per capita real GDP for 46 developing countries over the 1970-85 period. Cross-section regressions on growth suggest that after accounting for standard variables from the endogenous growth literature, policy uncertainty and growth are correlated. The importance of the correlation and even its sign depend on the particular policy and on the geographical region examined. One channel through which policy uncertainty may affect growth is the investment channel. Using an endogenous growth model where domestic investment is characterized by irreversibilities and policy fluctuates between a high and lowtax regime, we show that the gap between the two regimes and the persistence of a regime jointly determine the pattern of investment and growth. Policy uncertainty in the absence of persistence does not affect long run growth
Empirical evidence on European dual exchange rates and its relevance for Latin America by Nancy Peregrim Marion( Book )
7 editions published in 1991 in English and held by 53 libraries worldwide
This paper uncovers some important empirical regularities for the European dual exchange markets of the early 1970s, examines some of the stylized facts about the Latin American dual-rate regimes and assesses whether there are strong parallels between the two. It concludes that one should be cautious about applying the lessons from the European experience to the Latin American ones
The implications of knowledge-based growth for the optimality of open capital markets by Meir G Kohn( Book )
2 editions published in 1988 in English and held by 36 libraries worldwide
This paper reexamines the view that opening capital markets must have long-run benefits. The analysis shows that the desirability of opening a country's capital markets depends on the nature of the technology assumed. Models of knowledge-based growth predict that changes which alter the economy's level of production will also affect the economy's growth rate and hence the welfare of future generations. Standard neoclassical growth models imply no such effects on growth or welfare. If production does involve an important element of learning by doing, inference from the standard models may be seriously misleading. In particular, opening capital markets does not necessarily improve welfare for the nation or for the world as a whole
Using inflation to erode the U.S. public debt by Joshua Aizenman( Computer File )
8 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 33 libraries worldwide
"As a share of GDP, the U.S. Federal debt held by the public exceeds 50 percent in FY2009, the highest debt ratio since 1955. Projections indicate the debt ratio may be in the 70-100 percent range within ten years. In many respects, the temptation to inflate away some of this debt burden is similar to that at the end of World War II. In 1946, the debt ratio was 108.6 percent. Inflation reduced this ratio about 40 percent within a decade. Yet there are some important differences-shorter debt maturities today reduce the temptation to inflate, while the larger share held by foreigners increases it. This paper lays out an analytical framework for determining the impact of a large nominal debt overhang on the temptation to inflate. It suggests that when economic growth is stalled, the U.S. debt overhang may trigger an increase in inflation of about 5 percent for several years. This additional inflation would significantly reduce the debt ratio, even with some shortening of debt maturities"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
 
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Alternative Names
Marion, N.
Marion, N. (Nancy)
Marion, N. P.
Marion, Nancy
Marion, Nancy P.
Peregrim Marion, Nancy
Languages
English (170)
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