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Zeckhauser, Richard

Works: 271 works in 744 publications in 4 languages and 9,136 library holdings
Genres: Conference proceedings  History 
Roles: Author, Editor, Redactor, Honoree
Classifications: HV95, 361.6120973
Publication Timeline
Publications about Richard Zeckhauser
Publications by Richard Zeckhauser
Most widely held works by Richard Zeckhauser
Targeting in social programs avoiding bad bets, removing bad apples by Peter H Schuck( file )
9 editions published between 2006 and 2007 in English and held by 1,583 libraries worldwide
"Provides a framework for analyzing the challenges involved in defining bad bets and bad apples and discusses the safeguards that any classification process must provide. Examines public schools, public housing, and medical care and proposes policy changes that could reduce the problems these two groups pose in social welfare programs"--Provided by publisher
A primer for policy analysis by Edith Stokey( Book )
16 editions published between 1978 and 2004 in 3 languages and held by 881 libraries worldwide
Principals and agents : the structure of business ( Book )
21 editions published between 1985 and 1991 in 3 languages and held by 672 libraries worldwide
The patron's payoff : conspicuous commissions in Italian Renaissance art by Jonathan Katz Nelson( Book )
9 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 519 libraries worldwide
An analysis of Italian Renaissance art from the perspective of the patrons who made 'conspicuous commissions', this text builds on three concepts from the economics of information - signaling, signposting, and stretching - to develop a systematic methodology for assessing the meaning of patronage
Demographic dimensions of the New Republic : American interregional migration, vital statistics, and manumissions, 1800-1860 by Peter D McClelland( Book )
11 editions published between 1982 and 2004 in English and held by 506 libraries worldwide
A comprehensive analysis of American vital statistics and migration patterns up to the Civil War
What role for government? : lessons from policy research ( Book )
6 editions published in 1983 in English and Undetermined and held by 461 libraries worldwide
Strategy and choice by Richard Zeckhauser( Book )
19 editions published between 1991 and 1993 in English and held by 430 libraries worldwide
Collaborative governance : private roles for public goals in turbulent times by John D Donahue( Book )
12 editions published between 2011 and 2012 in English and Undetermined and held by 410 libraries worldwide
All too often government lacks the skill, the will, and the wallet to meet its missions. Schools fall short of the mark while roads and bridges fall into disrepair. Health care costs too much and delivers too little. Budgets bleed red ink as the cost of services citizens want outstrips the taxes they are willing to pay. Collaborative Governance is the first book to offer solutions by demonstrating how government at every level can engage the private sector to overcome seemingly insurmountable problems and achieve public goals more effectively. John Donahue and Richard Zeckhauser show how the p
Wise choices : decisions, games, and negotiations ( Book )
13 editions published between 1996 and 2006 in English and held by 405 libraries worldwide
"In this collection - a tribute to the lifetime intellectual odyssey of Howard Raiffa, world-renowned applied mathematician - leading scholars in economics, psychology, statistics, and decision theory grapple with the perennial question of how to make wise choices. Their answers reflect the unity of the three fields Raiffa pioneered: decision analysis, game theory, and negotiation." "The twenty-three papers in this collection address such topics as individual decision making under uncertainty, games of strategy in which one player's actions directly influence another's welfare, and the process of forging negotiated agreements. The contributors, including Thomas C. Schelling of the University of Maryland and Amos Tversky of Stanford, also analyze decisions regarding personal medical problems, national public policies, business investments, and international diplomacy." "Whether your challenge is to craft a stock portfolio, forge a diplomatic settlement, or make your technology a standard on the Internet, this volume will help you think deeply and choose wisely."--Jacket
American society : public and private responsibilities ( Book )
6 editions published in 1986 in English and held by 357 libraries worldwide
Collective investment decision making with heterogeneous time preferences by Christian Gollier( file )
10 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 115 libraries worldwide
Abstract: We examine the investment decision problem of a group whose members have heterogeneous time preferences. In particular, they have different discount factors for utility, possibly not exponential. We characterize the properties of efficient allocations of resources and of shadow prices that would decentralize such allocations. We show in particular that the term structure of interest rates is decreasing when all members have DARA preferences. Heterogeneous groups should not use exponential discounting for their collective investment decisions even if all agents discount exponentially. We also exhibit conditions that lead the representative agent to have a rate of impatience that decreases with GDP per capita
Adverse selection in health insurance by David M Cutler( Book )
13 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 106 libraries worldwide
Abstract: Individual choice over health insurance policies may result in risk-based sorting across plans. Such adverse selection induces three types of losses: efficiency losses from individuals being allocated to the wrong plans; risk sharing losses since premium variability is increased; and losses from insurers distorting their policies to improve their mix of insureds. We discuss the potential for these losses, and present empirical evidence on adverse selection in two groups of employees: Harvard University, and the Group Insurance Commission of Massachusetts (serving state and local employees). In both groups, adverse selection is a significant concern. At Harvard, the University's decision to contribute an equal amount to all insurance plans led to the disappearance of the most generous policy within 3 years. At the GIC, adverse selection has been contained by subsidizing premiums on a proportional basis and managing the most generous policy very tightly. A combination of prospective or retrospective risk adjustment, coupled with reinsurance for high cost cases, seems promising as a way to provide appropriate incentives for enrollees and to reduce losses from adverse selection
Restraining the leviathan : property tax limitation in Massachusetts by David M Cutler( Book )
13 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and held by 105 libraries worldwide
Abstract: Proposition 2.5, a ballot initiative approved by Massachusetts voters in 1980 sharply reduced local property taxes and restricted their future growth. We examine the effects of Proposition 2.5 on municipal finances and assess voter satisfaction with these effects. We find that Proposition 2.5 had a smaller impact on local revenues and spending than expected; amendments to the law and a strong economy combined to boost both property tax revenue and state aid above forecasted amounts. Proposition 2.5 did reduce local revenues substantially during the recession of the early 1990s. There were two reasons for voter discontent with the pre-Proposition 2.5 financing system: agency losses from inability to monitor government were perceived to be high, and individuals viewed government as inefficient because their own tax burden was high. Through override votes, voters approved substantial amounts of taxes above the limits imposed by the Proposition
Can market and voting institutions generate optimal intergenerational risk sharing? by Antonio Rangel( Book )
12 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 104 libraries worldwide
Abstract: Are market and voting institutions capable of producing optimal intergenerational risk-sharing? To study this question, we consider a simple endowment economy with uncertainty and overlapping generations. Endowments are stochastic; thus it is possible to increase the welfare of every generation using intergenerational transfers that might depend on the state of the world. We characterize the transfers that are necessary to restore efficiency and compare them to the transfers that take place in markets and voting institutions. Unlike most of that literature, we study both ex-ante and interim risk-sharing. Our main conclusion is that both types of institutions have serious problems. Markets cannot generate ex-ante risk-sharing because agents can trade only after they are born. Furthermore, markets generate interim efficient insurance in some but not all economies because they cannot generate forward (old to young) intergenerational transfers. This market failure, in theory, could be corrected by government intervention. However, as long as government policy is determined by voting, intergenerational transfers might by driven more by redistributive politics than by risk sharing considerations. Successful government intervention can arise, even though agents can only vote after they are born, but only if the young determine policy in every election
The anatomy of health insurance by David M Cutler( Book )
10 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 96 libraries worldwide
Abstract: This article describes the anatomy of health insurance. It begins by considering the optimal design of health insurance policies. Such policies must make tradeoffs appropriately between risk sharing on the one hand and agency problems such as moral hazard (the incentive of people to seek more care when they are insured) and supplier-induced demand (the incentive of physicians to provide more care when they are well reimbursed) on the other. Optimal coinsurance arrangements make patients pay for care up to the point where the marginal gains from less risk sharing are just offset by the marginal benefits from less wasteful care being provided. Empirical evidence shows that both moral hazard and demand-inducement are quantitatively important. Coinsurance based on expenditure is a crude control mechanism. Moreover, it places no direct incentives on physicians, who are responsible for most expenditure decisions. To place such incentives on physicians is the goal of supply-side cost containment measures, such as utilization review and capitation. This goal motivates the surge in managed care in the United States, which unites the functions of insurance and provision, and allows for active management of the care that is delivered. The analysis then turns to the operation of health insurance markets. Economists generally favor choice in health insurance for the same reasons they favor choice in other markets: choice allows people to opt for the plan that is best for them and encourages plans to provide services efficiently. But choice in health insurance is a mixed blessing because of adverse selection -- the tendency for the sick to choose more generous insurance than the healthy. When sick and healthy enroll in different plans, plans disproportionately composed of poor risks have to charge more than they would if they insured an average mix of people. The resulting high premiums create two adverse effects: they discourage those who are healthier but would prefer generous care from enrolling in those plans (because the premiums are so high), and they encourage plans to adopt measures that deter the sick from enrolling (to reduce their overall costs). The welfare losses from adverse selection are large in practice. Added to them are further losses from having premiums vary with observable health status. Because insurance is contracted for annually, people are denied a valuable form of intertemporal insurance -- the right to buy health coverage at average rates in the future should they get sick today. As the ability to predict future health status increases, the lack of intertemporal insurance will become more problematic. The article concludes by relating health insurance to the central goal of medical care expenditures - better health. Studies to date are not clear on which approaches to health insurance promote health in the most cost-efficient manner. Resolving this question is the central policy concern in health economics
Reinsurance for catastrophies and cataclysms by David M Cutler( Book )
12 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 96 libraries worldwide
This paper examines the optimal design of insurance and reinsurance policies. We first consider reinsurance for catastrophes: risks which are large for any one insurer but not for the reinsurance market as a whole. Reinsurance for catastrophes is complicated by adverse selection. Optimal reinsurnace in the presence of adverse selection depends critically on the source of information asymmetry. When information on the probability of a loss is private but the magnitude of the loss is public optimal reinsurance employs a deductible-style deductible-style excess-of-loss policy, and when is is private but the proba- bility of a loss is common, optimal reinsurance covers small and large risks, but makes the primary insurer responsible for moderate risks. There is a dramatic divergence between these designs, which suggests that traditional approaches to design may be misguided. We then consider reinsurance for cata- clysms: risks that are so large that a loss can threaten the solvency of re- insurance such as a major earthquake, while others derive from common risks-changes in conditions that affect many individuals-such as the liability revolution or or escalating medical care costs. We argue that cataclysms must be reinsured in either broad securities markets or by the government. Beyond their one- period loss potential, cataclysms pose another risk: risk levels change over time. A simulation model traces the implications of evolving risk levels for long-term patterns of losses and premiums, where the latter reflect learning learning about loss distributions. Premium risk emerges as an important part of risk, which reinsurance and primary insurance markets do not adequately diversify."
Price versus quantity : market clearing mechanisms when sellers differ in quality by Andrew Metrick( Book )
13 editions published between 1995 and 1996 in English and held by 89 libraries worldwide
Abstract: High-quality producers in a vertically differentiated market can reap superior profits by charging higher prices, selling greater quantities, or both. If qualities are known by consumers and production costs are constant, then having a higher quality secures the producer both higher price and higher quantity; if marginal costs are rising, having a higher quality assures only higher price. If only some consumers can discern quality but others cannot, then high- and low-quality producers may set a common price, but the high-quality producer will sell more. In this context, quality begets quantity. Empirical analyses suggest that in both the mutual fund and automobile industries, high-quality producers sell more units than their low-quality competitors, but at no higher price (or markup) per unit
The profits to insider trading : a performance-evaluation perspective by Leslie A Jeng( Book )
13 editions published between 1998 and 1999 in English and held by 89 libraries worldwide
Abstract: This paper estimates the profits to insiders when they trade their company's stock. We construct a rolling purchase portfolio' that holds all shares purchased by insiders over the previous year and an analogous sale portfolio' that holds all shares sold by insiders over the previous year. We then analyze the returns to these value-weighted portfolios using performance-evaluation methods. This approach allows us to study the returns to insider transactions beginning on the day after their execution, and is free of the statistical difficulties that plague event studies on long-horizon returns. Using a comprehensive sample of reported insider transactions from 1975 - 1996, we find that the purchase portfolio earns abnormal returns of about 40 basis points per month, with about one-sixth of these abnormal returns accruing within the first five days after the initial transaction, and one-third within the first month. The sale portfolio does not earn abnormal returns. Our portfolio-based approach also allows for straightforward decompositions of the purchase and sale portfolios by various characteristics. We find that the abnormal returns to insider trades in small firms are not significantly different from those in large firms, and that top executives do not earn higher abnormal returns than do other insiders
A Renaissance instrument to support non-profits : the sale of private chapels in Florentine churches by Jonathan Katz Nelson( Book )
10 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 82 libraries worldwide
Catholic churches in Renaissance Florence supported themselves overwhelmingly from the contributions of wealthy citizens. The sale of private chapels within churches to individuals was a significant source of church funds, and facilitated a church construction boom. Chapel sales offered three benefits to churches: prices were usually far above cost; donor/purchasers purchased masses and other tie-in services; and they added to the magnificence of the church because donors were required to decorate chapels expensively. Donors purchased chapels for two primary reasons: to facilitate services for themselves and their families, such as masses and church burials, that would speed their departure from Purgatory; and to gain status in the community. Chapels were private property within churches, but were only occasionally used directly by their owners. The expense of chapels and their decorations made them an ideal signal for wealth, particularly since sumptuary laws limited most displays of wealth. To overcome the contributions free-rider problem, these churches sold private benefits not readily available elsewhere, namely status and salvation
Enrollee mix, treatment intensity, and cost in competing indemnity and HMO plans by Daniel Altman( Book )
11 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 82 libraries worldwide
Abstract: We examine why managed care plans are less expensive than traditional indemnity insurance plans. Our database consists of the insurance experiences of over 200,000 state and local employees in Massachusetts and their families, who are insured in a single pool. Within this group, average HMO costs are 40 percent below those of the indemnity plan. We evaluate cost differences for 8 conditions representing over 10 percent of total health expenditures. They are: heart attacks, cancers (breast, cervical, colon, prostate), diabetes (type I and II), and live births. For each condition, we identify the portions of the cost differential arising from differences in treatment intensity, enrollee mix, and prices paid for the same treatment. Surprisingly, treatment intensity differs hardly at all between the HMOs and the indemnity plan. That is, relative to their fee-for-service competitor, HMOs do not curb the use of expensive treatments. Across the 8 conditions, roughly half of the HMO cost savings is due to the lower incidence of the diseases in the HMOs. Virtually all of the remaining savings come because HMOs pay lower prices for the same treatment
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Alternative Names
Zeckhauser, R. J. 1940-
Zeckhauser, Richard
Zeckhauser, Richard J.
Zeckhauser, Richard J. 1940-
Zeckhauser, Richard J. (Richard Jay)
Zeckhauser, Richard J. (Richard Jay), 1940-
Zeckhauser, Richard Jay 1940-
ゼックハウザー, R
English (229)
Japanese (3)
Chinese (2)
French (1)
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