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Fudenberg, Drew

Overview
Works: 100 works in 336 publications in 2 languages and 4,447 library holdings
Roles: Editor
Classifications: QA269, 519.3
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about Drew Fudenberg
Publications by Drew Fudenberg
Most widely held works by Drew Fudenberg
The theory of learning in games by Drew Fudenberg( file )
23 editions published between 1998 and 2007 in English and held by 1,556 libraries worldwide
Game theory by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
54 editions published between 1991 and 2010 in English and Undetermined and held by 1,226 libraries worldwide
An advanced text which aims to introduce the principles of non co-operative game theory - including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games and games of incomplete information - in a direct and uncomplicated style that covers the broad spectrum of the field
A long-run collaboration on long-run games by Drew Fudenberg( Computer File )
13 editions published between 2008 and 2009 in English and held by 953 libraries worldwide
"This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work."--Back cover
Dynamic models of oligopoly by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
23 editions published between 1983 and 2013 in English and Undetermined and held by 359 libraries worldwide
Fudenberg and Tirole use the game-theoretic issues of information, commitment and timing to provide a realistic approach to oligopoly
Knife edge of plateau : when do market models tip? by Glenn Ellison( Book )
7 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 69 libraries worldwide
This paper studies whether agents must agglomerate at a single location in a class of models of two-sided interaction. In these models there is an increasing returns effect that favors agglomeration, but also a crowding or market-impact effect that makes agents prefer to be in a market with fewer agents of their own type. We show that such models do not tip in the way the term is commonly used. Instead, they have a broad plateau of equilibria with two active markets, and tipping occurs only when one market is below a critical size threshold. Our assumptions are fairly weak, and are satisfied in Krugman's [1991b] model of labor market pooling, a heterogeneous-agent version of Pagano's [1989] asset market model, and Ellison, Fudenberg and oebius's [2002] model of competing auctions
Subgame perfect implementation with almost perfect information and the hold-up problem by Philippe Aghion( file )
9 editions published between 2008 and 2009 in English and held by 44 libraries worldwide
The foundations of incomplete contracts have been questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We consider the robustness of subgame perfect implementation to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. We show that Moore- Repullo mechanisms may not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation in pure or totally mixed strategies as the amount of asymmetric information goes to zero. Moreover, we argue that a wide class of extensive-form mechanisms are subject to this fragility
Lectures on learning and equilibrium in strategic form games by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
5 editions published in 1992 in English and held by 11 libraries worldwide
Payoff information and self-comfirming equilibrium by Eddie Dekel-Tabak( Book )
4 editions published between 1996 and 1999 in English and held by 10 libraries worldwide
When is reputation bad? by Jeffrey Ely( Computer File )
9 editions published between 2002 and 2004 in English and held by 9 libraries worldwide
In traditional reputation theory, reputation is good for the long-run player. In 'Bad Reputation,' Ely and Valimaki give an example in which reputation is unambiguously bad. This paper characterizes a more general class of games in which that insight holds, and presents some examples to illustrate when the bad reputation effect does and does not play a role. The key properties are that participation is optional for the short-run players, and that every action of the long-run player that makes the short-run players want to participate has a chance of being interpreted as a signal that the long-run player is 'bad.' We also broaden the set of commitment types, allowing many types, including the 'Stackelberg type' used to prove positive results on reputation. Although reputation need not be bad if the probability of the Stackelberg type is too high, the relative probability of the Stackelberg type can be high when all commitment types are unlikely
Steady state learning and the code of Hammurabi by David K Levine( Book )
6 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 7 libraries worldwide
The code of Hammurabi specified a 'trial by surviving in the river' as a way of deciding whether an accusation was true. This system is puzzling for two reasons. First, it is based on a superstition: We do not believe that the guilty are any more likely to drown than the innocent. Second, if people can be easily persuaded to hold a superstitious belief, why such an elaborate mechanism? Why not simply assert that those who are guilty will be struck dead by lightning? We attack these puzzles from the perspective of the theory of learning in games. We give a partial characterization of patiently stable outcomes that arise as the limit of steady states with rational learning as players become more patient. These 'subgame-confirmed Nash equilibria' have self-confirming beliefs at certain information sets reachable by a single deviation. We analyze this refinement and use it as a tool to study the broader issue of the survival of superstition. According to this theory Hammurabi had it exactly right: his law uses the greatest amount of superstition consistent with patient rational learning
Customer poaching and brand switching by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
3 editions published between 1999 and 2000 in English and held by 7 libraries worldwide
"Firms sometimes try to "poach" the customers of their competitors by offering them inducements to switch. We analyze duopoly poaching under both short-term and long-term contracts assuming either that each consumer's brand preferences are fixed over time or that preferences are independent over time. With fixed preferences, short-term contracts lead to poaching and socially inefficient switching. The equilibrium with long-term contracts has less switching than when only short-term contracts are feasible, and it involves the sale of both short-term and long-term contracts. With independent preferences, short-term contracts are efficient, but long-term contracts lead to inefficiently little switching."
Evolution and cooperation in noisy repeated games by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
5 editions published in 1990 in English and held by 7 libraries worldwide
Modelli dinamici di oligopolio by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
3 editions published in 1994 in Italian and held by 7 libraries worldwide
On the robustness of equilibrium refinements by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
4 editions published between 1986 and 1987 in English and held by 7 libraries worldwide
A dual self model of impulse control by Drew Fudenberg( Computer File )
6 editions published between 2004 and 2006 in English and held by 6 libraries worldwide
We propose that a simple 'dual-self' model gives a unified explanation for several empirical regularities, including the apparent time-inconsistency that has motivated models of hyperbolic discounting and Rabin's paradox of risk aversion in the large and small. The model also implies that self-control costs imply excess delay, as in the O'Donoghue and Rabin models of hyperbolic utility, and it explains experimental evidence that increased cognitive load makes temptations harder to resist. Finally, the reduced form of the base version of our model is consistent with the Gul-Pesendorfer axioms
Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
5 editions published between 1987 and 1988 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Self-confirming equilibrium by Drew Fudenberg( Computer File )
5 editions published between 1991 and 2007 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
>2142. Drew Fudenberg and David K. LevineSelf-Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas CritiqueAbstract|PaperWe examine the role of off-path 'superstitions' in macro-economics, and show how a false belief about off-play is the key element underlying both the Lucas Critique and the game-theoretic concept of self-confirming equilibrium. However, the impact of false beliefs in these two cases is different: In the Lucas case, a policy maker's incorrect beliefs about off-path play can lead to the adoption of mistaken policy innovation. However, the consequences of such an innovation provide evidence that the belief that motivated them was wrong. In contrast, play may never escape an undesirable self-confirming equilibrium, as the action implied by the mistaken belief does not generate data that contradicts it; escape from the self-confirming equilibrium requires that payers do a sufficient amount of experimentation with off-path actions
Topologies on type by Eddie Dekel( Computer File )
3 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
We define and analyze 'strategic topologies' on types, under which two types are close if their strategic behavior will be similar in all strategic situations. To oper- ationalize this idea, we adopt interim rationalizability as our solution concept, and define a metric topology on types in the Harsanyi-Mertens-Zamir universal type space. This topology is the coarsest metric topology generating upper and lower hemiconti- nuity of rationalizable outcomes. While upper strategic convergence is equivalent to convergence in the product topology, lower strategic convergence is a strictly stronger requirement, as shown by the electronic mail game. Nonetheless, we show that the set of 'finite types' (types describable by finite type spaces) are dense in the lower strategic topology
Pricing under the threat of entry by a sole supplier of a network good by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
2 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
The Nash threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games by Drew Fudenberg( Computer File )
4 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
 
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Alternative Names
Fudenberg, D.
Languages
English (186)
Italian (3)
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