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Fudenberg, Drew

Overview
Works: 105 works in 306 publications in 3 languages and 4,729 library holdings
Roles: Author, Editor
Classifications: HB144, 658.40353
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about Drew Fudenberg
Publications by Drew Fudenberg
Most widely held works by Drew Fudenberg
Game theory by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
57 editions published between 1991 and 2014 in English and Undetermined and held by 946 libraries worldwide
An advanced text which aims to introduce the principles of non co-operative game theory - including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games and games of incomplete information - in a direct and uncomplicated style that covers the broad spectrum of the field
The theory of learning in games by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
23 editions published between 1998 and 2007 in English and Chinese and held by 502 libraries worldwide
"In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements." "In The Theory of Learning in Games Drew Fudenberg and David Levine develop an alternative explanation that equilibrium arises as the long-run outcome of a process in which less than fully rational players grope for optimality over time. The models they explore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest useful ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts."--Jacket
Dynamic models of oligopoly by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
26 editions published between 1983 and 2013 in English and Italian and held by 341 libraries worldwide
Fudenberg and Tirole use the game-theoretic issues of information, commitment and timing to provide a realistic approach to oligopoly
A long-run collaboration on long-run games by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
14 editions published between 2008 and 2009 in English and held by 96 libraries worldwide
"This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work."--P. [4] de la couv
Knife edge of plateau : when do market models tip? by Glenn Ellison( Book )
11 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 44 libraries worldwide
This paper studies whether agents must agglomerate at a single location in a class of models of two-sided interaction. In these models there is an increasing returns effect that favors agglomeration, but also a crowding or market-impact effect that makes agents prefer to be in a market with fewer agents of their own type. We show that such models do not tip in the way the term is commonly used. Instead, they have a broad plateau of equilibria with two active markets, and tipping occurs only when one market is below a critical size threshold. Our assumptions are fairly weak, and are satisfied in Krugman's [1991b] model of labor market pooling, a heterogeneous-agent version of Pagano's [1989] asset market model, and Ellison, Fudenberg and oebius's [2002] model of competing auctions
Lectures on learning and equilibrium in strategic form games by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
6 editions published in 1992 in English and held by 14 libraries worldwide
Payoff information and self-comfirming equilibrium by Eddie Dekel( Book )
3 editions published between 1996 and 1999 in English and held by 10 libraries worldwide
Subgame perfect implementation with almost perfect information and the hold-up problem by Philippe Aghion( Book )
7 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 9 libraries worldwide
The foundations of incomplete contracts have been questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We consider the robustness of subgame perfect implementation to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. We show that Moore- Repullo mechanisms may not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation in pure or totally mixed strategies as the amount of asymmetric information goes to zero. Moreover, we argue that a wide class of extensive-form mechanisms are subject to this fragility
On the robustness of equilibrium refinements by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
4 editions published between 1986 and 1987 in English and held by 7 libraries worldwide
Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
5 editions published between 1987 and 1988 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
3 editions published between 1987 and 1989 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Evolution and cooperation in noisy repeated games by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
2 editions published in 1990 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization : an introduction and overview by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
3 editions published between 1986 and 1987 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Rational expectations business cycles in search equilibrium by Peter A Diamond( Book )
2 editions published in 1987 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Learning purified mixed equilibria by Glenn Ellison( Book )
1 edition published in 1998 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Upgrades, trade-ins, and buy-backs by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
2 editions published between 1997 and 1999 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Finite player approximations to a continuum of players by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
2 editions published in 1987 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Customer poaching and brand switching ( Article )
1 edition published in 2000 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
"Firms sometimes try to "poach" the customers of their competitors by offering them inducements to switch. We analyze duopoly poaching under both short-term and long-term contracts assuming either that each consumer's brand preferences are fixed over time or that preferences are independent over time. With fixed preferences, short-term contracts lead to poaching and socially inefficient switching. The equilibrium with long-term contracts has less switching than when only short-term contracts are feasible, and it involves the sale of both short-term and long-term contracts. With independent preferences, short-term contracts are efficient, but long-term contracts lead to inefficiently little switching."
When is reputation bad? by Jeffrey Ely( Book )
6 editions published between 2002 and 2004 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
In traditional reputation theory, reputation is good for the long-run player. In 'Bad Reputation,' Ely and Valimaki give an example in which reputation is unambiguously bad. This paper characterizes a more general class of games in which that insight holds, and presents some examples to illustrate when the bad reputation effect does and does not play a role. The key properties are that participation is optional for the short-run players, and that every action of the long-run player that makes the short-run players want to participate has a chance of being interpreted as a signal that the long-run player is 'bad. We also broaden the set of commitment types, allowing many types, including the 'Stackelberg type' used to prove positive results on reputation. Although reputation need not be bad if the probability of the Stackelberg type is too high, the relative probability of the Stackelberg type can be high when all commitment types are unlikely
 
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Languages
English (173)
Italian (3)
Chinese (1)
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