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Tirole, Jean

Works: 248 works in 1,025 publications in 5 languages and 14,040 library holdings
Genres: History 
Roles: Secretary, Honoree, Publishing director, Editor, Redactor, Creator
Classifications: HE7631, 384.041
Publication Timeline
Publications about Jean Tirole
Publications by Jean Tirole
Most widely held works by Jean Tirole
Competition in telecommunications by Jean-Jacques Laffont( file )
27 editions published between 1999 and 2002 in English and Undetermined and held by 2,192 libraries worldwide
Analyzes regulatory reform and the emergence of competition in network industries using the theoretical tools of industrial organization, political economy, and the economics of incentives. The book is written in a style accessible to managers, consultants and government officials
The theory of industrial organization by Jean Tirole( file )
75 editions published between 1988 and 2011 in 3 languages and held by 2,025 libraries worldwide
To study industrial organization is to study the functioning of markets, a central concept in microeconomics. However, it took a long time and two waves of interest for industrial organization to become one of the main fields of economics
Game theory by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
55 editions published between 1991 and 2010 in English and Undetermined and held by 1,227 libraries worldwide
An advanced text which aims to introduce the principles of non co-operative game theory - including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games and games of incomplete information - in a direct and uncomplicated style that covers the broad spectrum of the field
Inside and outside liquidity by Bengt Holmström( file )
13 editions published between 2011 and 2013 in English and held by 1,218 libraries worldwide
"Why do financial institutions, industrial companies, and households hold low-yielding money balances, Treasury bills, and other liquid assets? When and to what extent can the state and international financial markets make up for a shortage of liquid assets, allowing agents to save and share risk more effectively? These questions are at the center of all financial crises, including the current global one. In Inside and Outside Liquidity, leading economists Bengt Holmstrom and Jean Tirole offer an original, unified perspective on these questions drawing on insights from modern corporate finance. In a slight, but important departure from the standard theory of finance, they show how imperfect pledgeability of corporate income leads to a demand for as well as a shortage of liquidity with interesting implications for the pricing of assets, investment decisions, and liquidity management. The government has an active role to play in improving risk-sharing between consumers with limited commitment power and firms dealing with the high costs of potential liquidity shortages. In this perspective, private risk sharing is always imperfect and may lead to financial crises that can be alleviated through government interventions. In an epilogue, Holmstrom and Tirole show how their theory can be used to understand some aspects of the recent financial crisis"--Book jacket
The prudential regulation of banks by M Dewatripont( file )
15 editions published between 1993 and 2010 in English and Italian and held by 1,069 libraries worldwide
A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation by Jean-Jacques Laffont( Book )
24 editions published between 1993 and 2009 in English and Spanish and held by 727 libraries worldwide
Balancing the banks : global lessons from the financial crisis by M Dewatripont( Book )
16 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 634 libraries worldwide
The financial crisis that began in 2007 in the US swept the world, producing substantial bank failures and forcing unprecedented state aid for the crippled global financial system. This book draws critical lessons from the causes of the crisis and proposes important regulatory reforms
The theory of corporate finance by Jean Tirole( Book )
17 editions published between 2005 and 2009 in English and Spanish and held by 592 libraries worldwide
This text conveys the organizing principles that structure the analysis of key management and public policy issues, such as the reform of corporate governance and auditing; the role of private equity, financial markets, and takeovers; and the design of managerial incentive packages
Financial crises, liquidity, and the international monetary system by Jean Tirole( Book )
10 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 567 libraries worldwide
"Jean Tirole first analyzes the current views on the crises and on the reform of the international financial architecture. Reform proposals often treat the symptoms rather than the fundamentals, he argues, and sometimes fail to reconcile the objectives of setting effective financing conditions while ensuring that a country "owns" its reform program. A proper identification of market failures is essential to reformulating the mission of an institution such as the IMF, he emphasizes. Next he adapts the basic principles of corporate governance, liquidity provision, and risk management of corporations to the particulars of country borrowing. Building on a "dual- and common-agency perspective," he revisits commonly advocated policies and considers how multilateral organizations can help debtor countries reap enhanced benefits while liberalizing their capital accounts."--Jacket
Dynamic models of oligopoly by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
22 editions published between 1983 and 2013 in English and Undetermined and held by 357 libraries worldwide
Fudenberg and Tirole use the game-theoretic issues of information, commitment and timing to provide a realistic approach to oligopoly
Industrieökonomik by Jean Tirole( Book )
6 editions published between 1995 and 1999 in German and held by 138 libraries worldwide
Energie économie et politiques by Jean-Pierre Hansen( Book )
2 editions published in 2010 in French and held by 120 libraries worldwide
Incentives in procurement contracting ( Book )
4 editions published in 1993 in English and held by 117 libraries worldwide
Self-confidence and social interactions by Roland Benabou( Book )
18 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 104 libraries worldwide
This paper studies the interactions between an individual's self esteem and his social environment in the workplace, at school, and in personal relationships. Because a person generally has only imperfect knowledge of his own abilities, people who derive benefits from his performance (parent, spouse, friend, teacher, manager, etc.) have incentives to manipulate his self confidence. We first study situations where an informed principal chooses an incentive structure, such as offering payments or rewards, delegating a task, or giving encouragement. We show that extrinsic rewards may have hidden costs as stressed by psychologists in that they undermine intrinsic motivation. As a result, they may be only weak reinforcers in the short run, and become negative reinforcers once withdrawn. Similarly, empowerment is likely to increase motivation, while offers of help may create a dependance. More generally, we identify when the hidden costs of rewards are a myth or a reality. We next consider situations where people criticize or downplay the performance of their spouse, child, colleague, or subordinate. We formalize ego bashing as reflecting battles for dominance or authority within the relationship. Finally, we turn to the self presentation strategies of privately informed agents. We study in particular how depressed individuals may engage in self-deprecation as a way of seeking leniency (a lowering of expectancies) or a helping hand' on various obligations
LAPM : a liquidity-based asset pricing model by Bengt Holmström( Book )
14 editions published between 1998 and 2000 in English and held by 100 libraries worldwide
The intertemporal CAPM predicts that an asset's price is equal to the expectation of the product of the asset's payoff and a representative consum substitution. This paper develops an alternative approach to asset pricing based on industrial and financial corporations' desire to hoard liquidity to fulfill future cash needs. Our corporate finance a determinants of asset prices such as the distribution of wealth within the corporate sector and between the corporate sector and the consumers. Also, leverage ratios, capital adequacy requirements, and the composition of savings affect the corporate demand for li The paper first sets up a general model of corporate demand for liquid assets, and obtains an explicit formula for the associated liquidity permia. It then derives some implications of corporate liquidity demand for the equity premium puzzle, for the yield curve, and for the state-contingent volatility of asset prices. Finally, the paper looks at some macroeconomic implications of the theory. It shows that government may be able to boost aggregate liquidity and enhance economic efficiency by promoting job and asset price stability. On the liability side, long-term deposits and equity investments, which depend on the consumers' endogenously determined liquidity needs, contribute to creating a feedback effect between employment prospects and equity-like investments. On the asset side, orderly sales of real estate by liquidity-squeezed institutions may generate a Pareto improvement
Théorie de l'organisation industrielle by Jean Tirole( Book )
4 editions published between 1993 and 1998 in French and held by 88 libraries worldwide
Private and public supply of liquidity by Bengt Holmström( Book )
14 editions published between 1996 and 2004 in English and Undetermined and held by 86 libraries worldwide
This paper addresses a basic yet unresolved question: Do claims on private assets provide sufficient liquidity for an efficient functioning of the productive sector? Or does the State have a role in creating liquidity and regulating it either through adjustments in the stock of government securities or by other means? In our model, firms can meet future liquidity needs in three ways: by issuing new claims and diluting old ones, by obtaining a credit credit line from a financial intermediary, and by holding claims on other firms. When there is no aggregate uncertainty, we show that these instruments are sufficient for attaining the socially optimal (second-best) contract between investors and firms. Such a contract imposes both a maximum leverage ratio and a liquidity constraint on firms. Intermediaries coordinate the use of liquidity. Without intermediation, scarce liquidity may be wasted and the social optimum may not be attainable. When there is only aggregate uncertainty the private sector is no longer self-sufficient with regard to liquidity. The government can improve liquidity by issuing bonds that commit future consumer income. Government bonds command a liquidity premium over private claims. The supply of liquidity can be managed by loosening liquidity (boosting the value of its securities) when the aggregate liquidity shock is high and tightening liquidity when the shock is low. The paper thus provides a microeconomic example of government supplied liquidity as well as of the possibility of active government policy
Incentives and prosocial behavior by Roland Benabou( Book )
20 editions published between 2004 and 2008 in English and held by 86 libraries worldwide
"We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material or image-related) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed and this "overjustification effect" can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. We also identify settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and those where disclosing one's generosity may backfire. Finally, we analyze the choice by public and private sponsors of incentive levels, their degree of confidentiality and the publicity given to agents' behavior. Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare"--NBER website
Belief in a just world and redistributive politics by Roland Benabou( Book )
11 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 85 libraries worldwide
"International surveys reveal wide differences between the views held in different countries concerning the causes of wealth or poverty and the extent to which people are responsible for their own fate. At the same time, social ethnographies and experiments by psychologists demonstrate individuals' recurrent struggle with cognitive dissonance as they seek to maintain, and pass on to their children, a view of the world where effort ultimately pays off and everyone gets their just deserts. This paper offers a model that helps explain: (i) why most people feel such a need to believe in a "just world"; (ii) why this need, and therefore the prevalence of the belief, varies considerably across countries; (iii) the implications of this phenomenon for international differences in political ideology, levels of redistribution, labor supply, aggregate income, and popular perceptions of the poor. The model shows in particular how complementarities arise endogenously between individuals' desired beliefs or ideological choices, resulting in two equilibria. A first, "American" equilibrium is characterized by a high prevalence of just-world beliefs among the population and relatively laissez-faire policies. The other, "European" equilibrium is characterized by more pessimism about the role of effort in economic outcomes and a more extensive welfare state. More generally, the paper develops a theory of collective beliefs and motivated cognitions, including those concerning "money" (consumption) and happiness, as well as religion"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Reliability and competitive electricity markets by Paul L Joskow( Book )
15 editions published between 2004 and 2007 in English and held by 85 libraries worldwide
"Despite all of the talk about deregulation' of the electricity sector, a large number of non-market mechanisms have been imposed on emerging competitive wholesale and retail markets. These mechanisms include spot market price caps, operating reserve requirements, non-price rationing protocols, and administrative protocols for managing system emergencies. Many of these mechanisms have been carried over from the old regime of regulated monopoly and continue to be justified as necessary responses to market imperfections of various kinds and engineering requirements dictated by the special physical attributes of electric power networks. This paper seeks to bridge the gap between economists focused on designing competitive market mechanisms and engineers focused on the physical attributes and engineering requirements they perceive as being needed for operating a reliable electric power system. The paper starts by deriving the optimal prices and investment program when there are price-insensitive retail consumers, and their load serving entities can choose any level of rationing they prefer contingent on real time prices. It then examines the assumptions required for a competitive wholesale and retail market to achieve this optimal price and investment program. The paper analyses the implications of relaxing several of these assumptions. First, it analyzes the interrelationships between regulator-imposed price caps, capacity obligations, and system operator procurement, dispatch and compensation arrangements. It goes on to explore the implications of potential network collapses, the concomitant need for operating reserve requirements and whether market prices will provide incentives for investments consistent with these reserve requirement"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
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Alternative Names
Tirole, J. 1953-
Тироль, Жан
ティロール, J
ティロール, ジャン
English (359)
French (7)
German (6)
Spanish (3)
Italian (1)
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