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Morck, Randall

Works: 146 works in 530 publications in 2 languages and 6,618 library holdings
Genres: History  Conference proceedings 
Roles: Author, Editor, Honoree
Classifications: HD2741, 338.7
Publication Timeline
Publications about Randall Morck
Publications by Randall Morck
Most widely held works by Randall Morck
A history of corporate governance around the world family business groups to professional managers by Randall Morck( file )
31 editions published between 2005 and 2007 in English and held by 1,892 libraries worldwide
For many Americans, capitalism is a dynamic engine of prosperity that rewards the bold, the daring, and the hardworking. But to many outside the United States, capitalism seems like an initiative that serves only to concentrate power and wealth in the hands of a few hereditary oligarchies. In A History of Corporate Governance around the World, some of the brightest minds in the field of economics present new empirical research that suggests that each side of the debate has something to offer the other. The contributors argue that free enterprise and well-developed financial systems are proven
Concentrated corporate ownership by Randall Morck( file )
13 editions published between 2000 and 2007 in English and held by 1,503 libraries worldwide
"Standard economic models assume that many small investors own firms. This is so in most large U.S. firms, but wealthy individuals or families generally hold controlling blocks in smaller U.S. firms and in virtually all firms in most other countries. Given this, the lack of theoretical and empirical work on tightly held firms in surprising." "Drawing together leading scholars from law, economics, and finance, this volume examines the economic and legal issues of concentrated ownership and their impact on a shifting global economy."--Jacket
Corporate decision-making in Canada by Canada( Book )
9 editions published in 1995 in English and held by 359 libraries worldwide
Capitalizing China by Joseph P. H Fan( file )
18 editions published between 2011 and 2013 in English and held by 302 libraries worldwide
China's economic boom over the last two decades has taken many analysts by surprise, given the ongoing role of central government planning. Its current growth trajectory suggests that the size of its economy could soon surpass that of the United States. Some argue that continued growth and the expanding middle class will ultimately exert pressure on the government to bring about greater openness of the financial market. To better understand China's recent economic performance, this volume examines the distinctive system it has developed: "(Bmarket socialism with Chinese characteristics." While its formal institutional makeup resembles that of a free-market economy, many of its practices remain socialist, including strategically placed state-owned enterprises that wield influence both directly and through controlled business groups, and Communist Party cells whose purpose is to maintain control of many segments of the economy. China's economic system, the contributors find, also retains many historical characteristics that play a central role in managing the economy. These and other issues are examined in chapters on China's financial regulations, corporate governance codes, bankruptcy laws, taxation, and disclosure rules
The corporate response - innovation in the information age by Randall Morck( file )
11 editions published in 1998 in English and French and held by 137 libraries worldwide
The economic determinants of innovation by Randall Morck( Book )
9 editions published in 2001 in English and French and held by 123 libraries worldwide
Inherited wealth, corporate control and economic growth : the Canadian disease? by Randall Morck( Book )
15 editions published between 1998 and 1999 in English and held by 92 libraries worldwide
Abstract: Countries in which billionaire heirs' wealth is large relative to G.D.P. grow more slowly, show signs of more political rent-seeking, and spend less on innovation than do other countries at similar levels of development. In contrast, countries in which self-made entrepreneur billionaire wealth is large relative to G.D.P. grow more rapidly and show fewer signs of rent seeking. We argue that this is consistent with wealthy entrenched families' having objectives other than creating public shareholder value. Also, the control pyramids through which they are entrenched give wealthy families preferential access to capital and enhanced lobbying power. Entrenched families also have vested interest in preserving the value of existing capital. To investigate these arguments, we use firm-level Canadian data. Heir-controlled Canadian firms show low industry-adjusted financial performance, labor capital ratios, and R&D spending relative to other firms the same ages and sizes. We argue that concentrated, inherited corporate control impedes growth, and dub this the Canadian disease.' Further research is needed to determine the international incidence of this condition. Finally, heir-controlled Canadian firms' share prices fell relative to those of comparable firms on the news that the Canada-U.S. free trade agreement would be ratified. A key provision of that treaty is capital market openness. Under the treaty, heir-controlled Canadian firms' labor capital ratios rose, while the incidence of heir-control fell. We suggest that openness, especially of capital markets, may mitigate the ill effects of concentrated inherited control. If so, capital market openness matters for reasons not captured by standard international trade and finance models
Why some double taxation might make sense : the special case of inter-corporate dividends by Randall Morck( Book )
10 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 76 libraries worldwide
Abstract: Arguments for eliminating the double taxation of dividends apply only to dividends paid by corporations to individuals. The double (and multiple) taxation of dividends paid by one firm to another intercorporate dividends - was explicitly included in the 1930s to eliminate pyramidal corporate groups. These structures exist elsewhere, and are associated with corporate governance problems, corporate tax avoidance, and a greater concentration of economic power than is currently possible in the United States. Current US tax reform proposals do not distinguish dividends paid to individuals from intercorporate dividends and, by eliminating double taxation on both sorts of dividends, may allow pyramidal groups in the US again for the first time since the 1930s
Canadian corporate governance : policy options by Ronald J Daniels( Book )
5 editions published in 1996 in English and Undetermined and held by 73 libraries worldwide
The purpose of this paper is to examine corporate decision-making in Canada and to clarify the factors that, in the past, have sometimes led to less than optimal corporate governance
Recreating Canada : essays in honour of Paul Weiler ( Book )
3 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 71 libraries worldwide
Weiler's Notwithstanding Clause saved the floundering constitutional talks that eventually rebuilt Canada upon the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In Part One of this book, Weiler lucidly describes his very Canadian legal philosophy, spelling out his original intent in drafting the clause. Joining Harvard in 1979, he set up a Canada Program that has provided the image of Canada held by many future leaders. He reenergized the languishing Mackenzie King Endowment for Canadian Studies and soon Mackenzie King visiting professors were teaching everything from Canadian economics to Canadian aboriginal history. After Weiler's address at the 2005 conference, past Mackenzie King professors spoke on Canada; the second part of this book contains their essays. Many discuss constitutional law or politics but discussions range from economic nationalism to water rights."--Pub. desc
Does firm-specific information in stock prices guide capital allocation? by Artyom Durnev( Book )
13 editions published between 2000 and 2001 in English and held by 69 libraries worldwide
Abstract: We show that firms in industries in which firm-specific stock price variation is larger use more external financing and allocate capital with greater precision in the sense that their marginal q ratios are closer to one. According to the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, greater firm-specific stock price variation reflects higher intensity firm-specific information capitalization in stock prices. We propose that higher firm-specific price variation may be an indicator of greater functional-form market efficiency in the sense of Tobin (1982)
The rise and fall of the widely held firm : a history of corporate ownership in Canada by Randall Morck( Book )
8 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 67 libraries worldwide
"A panel of corporate ownership data, stretching back to 1902, shows that the Canadian corporate sector began the century with a predominance of large pyramidal corporate groups controlled by wealthy families or individuals. By mid-century, widely held firms predominated. But, from the 1970s on, pyramidal groups controlled by wealthy families and individuals resurge, restoring a situation similar to that a century earlier. Institutional factors underlying this resurgence are shown to have antecedents deep in the country's colonial past"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Heterogeneous investors and their changing demand and supply schedules for individual common stocks by Jung-Wook Kim( Book )
11 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 67 libraries worldwide
"Using 550 million limit orders submitted in the Korea Stock Exchange, we estimate demand and supply elasticities of heterogeneous investor types and their changes around the Asian financial crisis. We find that domestic individuals have substantially more inelastic demand and supply curves than domestic institutions and foreign investors. The crisis permanently reduced price elasticities of domestic individuals by 50% but had no effect on those of foreign investors. Institutional changes restricting margin purchases, implemented after the crisis, seem particularly important in explaining the dramatic drop. Information heterogeneity, availability of close substitutes and arbitrage risk also explain time-series variations in elasticities"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Corporate governance, economic entrenchment and growth by Randall Morck( Book )
8 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 66 libraries worldwide
"Around the world, large corporations usually have controlling owners, who are usually very wealthy families. Outside the U.S. and the U.K., pyramidal control structures, cross shareholding and super voting rights are common. Using these devices, a family can control corporations without making a commensurate capital investment. In many countries, such families end up controlling considerable proportions of their countries'' economies. Three points emerge. First, at the firm level, these ownership structures vest dominant control rights with families who often have little real capital invested creating agency and entrenchment problem simultaneously. In addition, controlling shareholders can divert corporate resources for private benefits using transactions within the pyramidal group. The result is a poor utilization of resources. At the economy level, extensive control of corporate assets by a few families distorts capital allocation and reduces the rate of innovation. The result is an economy-wide misallocation of resources, and slower economic growth. Second, political influence is plausibly related to what one controls, rather than what one owns. The controlling owners of pyramids thus have greatly amplified political influence relative to their actual wealth. They appear to influence the development of both public policy, such as property rights protection and enforcement, and institutions like capital markets. We denote this phenomenon economic entrenchment. Third, we conceive of a relationship between the distribution of corporate control and institutional development that generates and preserves economic entrenchment as one equilibrium; but not the only one. Based on the literature, we identify key determinants of economic entrenchment. We also identify many gaps where further work exploring the political economy importance of the distribution of corporate control is needed"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
How to eliminate pyramidal business groups : the double taxation of inter-corporate dividends and other incisive uses of tax policy by Randall Morck( Book )
8 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 64 libraries worldwide
"Arguments for eliminating the double taxation of dividends apply only to dividends paid by corporations to individuals. The double (and multiple) taxation of dividends paid by one firm to another - intercorporate dividends - was explicitly included in the 1930s as part of a package of tax and other policies aimed at eliminating United States pyramidal business groups. These structures remain the predominant form of corporate organization outside the United States. The first Roosevelt administration associated them with corporate governance problems, corporate tax avoidance, market power, and an objectionable concentration of economic power. Future tax reforms in the United States should mind the original intent of Congress and the President regarding intercorporate dividend taxation. Foreign governments may find the American experience of value should they desire to eliminate their business groups"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
The global history of corporate governance an introduction by Randall Morck( file )
8 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 64 libraries worldwide
"This paper presents a synopsis of recent NBER studies of the history of corporate governance in Canada, China, France, Germany, Japan, India, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Together, the studies underscore the importance of path dependence, often as far back into preindustrial period; legal system origin, though in a more nuanced form than mere statutory shareholder rights; and wealthy families. They also clarify the roles of ideologies, business groups, trust, institutional transplants, and politics in institutional evolution and financial development. Other themes are the universality of business insiders' investments in, entrenchment, and a possible behavioral basis for this"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
When labor has a voice in corporate governance by Olubunmi Faleye( file )
8 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 62 libraries worldwide
"Equity ownership gives labor both a fractional stake in the firm's residual cash flows and a voice in corporate governance. Relative to other firms, labor-controlled publicly-traded firms deviate more from value maximization, invest less in long-term assets, take fewer risks, grow more slowly, create fewer new jobs, and exhibit lower labor and total factor productivity. We therefore propose that labor uses its corporate governance voice to maximize the combined value of its contractual and residual claims, and that this often pushes corporate policies away from, rather than towards, shareholder value maximization"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Behavioral finance in corporate governance - independent directors and non-executive chairs by Randall Morck( Book )
10 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 60 libraries worldwide
"Corporate governance disasters could often be averted had directors asked CEOs questions, demanded answers, and blown whistles. Milgram (1974) reveals an innate psychological predisposition to obey authority. Such undesirable agentic behavior, dubbed a Type II agency problem, explains directors' acquiescence. Other work reveals dissenting peers, conflicting authorities, and distant authorities weakening such acquiescence. This justifies independent directors, non-executive chairs, and independent directors meeting without CEOs. Empirical evidence that such measures work is scant. This may reflect measurement problems, for apparently independent directors often have financial or personal ties to CEOs; or other behavioral factors that reinforce director subservience"--NBER website
Special issues relating to corporate governance and family control by Randall Morck( Book )
6 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 53 libraries worldwide
"Control of corporate assets by wealthy families in economies lacking institutional integrity is common. It has negative implications on corporate governance and adverse macroeconomic effects when it extends across a sufficiently large part of the country's corporate sector. Morck and Yeung consider the reasons why family control and control pyramids predominate in emerging market economies and in some industrial economies. They also discuss the reasons why widely held freestanding firms predominate in the United States. The authors discuss policies that countries might adopt to discourage family control pyramids, but caution that control pyramids are but one feature of an institutionally deficient economy. A concerted effort to improve a country's institutions is needed before diffuse ownership is desirable. This paper a product of the Global Corporate Governance Forum, Corporate Governance Department is part of a larger effort in the department to improve the understanding of corporate governance reform in developing countries"--World Bank web site
Do managerial objectives drive bad acquisitions? by Randall Morck( Book )
9 editions published between 1989 and 1990 in English and held by 50 libraries worldwide
This paper documents for a sample of 327 US acquisitions between 1975 and 1987 three forces that systematically reduce the announcement day return of bidding firms. The returns to bidding shareholders are lower when their firm diversifies, when it buys a rapidly growing target, and when the performance of its managers has been poor before the acquisition. These results are consistent with the proposition that managerial rather than shareholders' objectives drive bad acquisitions
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Alternative Names
Morck, R.
Morck, Randall
Morck, Randall K.
Morck, Randall K. (Randall Karl)
English (205)
French (7)
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