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Fudenberg, Drew

Overview
Works: 44 works in 243 publications in 3 languages and 5,017 library holdings
Genres: Textbooks  Popular works 
Roles: Author, Editor
Classifications: HB144, 658.40353
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about Drew Fudenberg
Publications by Drew Fudenberg
Most widely held works by Drew Fudenberg
Game theory by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
56 editions published between 1991 and 2014 in 3 languages and held by 999 libraries worldwide
An advanced text which aims to introduce the principles of non co-operative game theory - including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games and games of incomplete information - in a direct and uncomplicated style that covers the broad spectrum of the field
The theory of learning in games by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
22 editions published between 1998 and 2007 in English and Chinese and held by 526 libraries worldwide
"In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements." "In The Theory of Learning in Games Drew Fudenberg and David Levine develop an alternative explanation that equilibrium arises as the long-run outcome of a process in which less than fully rational players grope for optimality over time. The models they explore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest useful ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts."--Jacket
Dynamic models of oligopoly by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
28 editions published between 1983 and 2006 in English and Italian and held by 367 libraries worldwide
Fudenberg and Tirole use the game-theoretic issues of information, commitment and timing to provide a realistic approach to oligopoly
A long-run collaboration on long-run games by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
15 editions published between 2008 and 2009 in English and held by 104 libraries worldwide
"This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work."--Back cover
Knife edge of plateau : when do market models tip? by Glenn Ellison( Book )
12 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 51 libraries worldwide
This paper studies whether agents must agglomerate at a single location in a class of models of two-sided interaction. In these models there is an increasing returns effect that favors agglomeration, but also a crowding or market-impact effect that makes agents prefer to be in a market with fewer agents of their own type. We show that such models do not tip in the way the term is commonly used. Instead, they have a broad plateau of equilibria with two active markets, and tipping occurs only when one market is below a critical size threshold. Our assumptions are fairly weak, and are satisfied in Krugman's [1991b] model of labor market pooling, a heterogeneous-agent version of Pagano's [1989] asset market model, and Ellison, Fudenberg and Möbius's [2002] model of competing auctions. Keywords: Tipping, Agglomeration, Two-sided Markets, Network Externalities, Increasing Returns. JEL Classification: R1, G2, C7
Lectures on learning and equilibrium in strategic form games by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
6 editions published in 1992 in English and held by 15 libraries worldwide
Payoff information and self-comfirming equilibrium by Eddie Dekel( Book )
6 editions published between 1991 and 1999 in English and held by 14 libraries worldwide
Subgame perfect implementation with almost perfect information and the hold-up problem by Philippe Aghion( Book )
10 editions published between 2008 and 2009 in English and held by 11 libraries worldwide
The foundations of incomplete contracts have been questioned using or extending the subgame perfect implementation approach of Moore and Repullo (1988). We consider the robustness of subgame perfect implementation to the introduction of small amounts of asymmetric information. We show that Moore- Repullo mechanisms may not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation in pure or totally mixed strategies as the amount of asymmetric information goes to zero. Moreover, we argue that a wide class of extensive-form mechanisms are subject to this fragility
On the robustness of equilibrium refinements by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
4 editions published between 1986 and 1987 in English and held by 7 libraries worldwide
Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
5 editions published between 1987 and 1988 in English and held by 6 libraries worldwide
The neo-Luddite's lament : excessive upgrades in the software industry by Glenn Ellison( Book )
2 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Customer poaching and brand switching by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
2 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Learning purified mixed equilibria by Glenn Ellison( Book )
2 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization : an introduction and overview by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
3 editions published between 1986 and 1987 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Perfect Bayesian and sequential equilibria : a clarifying note by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
3 editions published between 1988 and 1989 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Pricing under the threat of entry by a sole supplier of a network good by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
2 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Evolution and cooperation in noisy repeated games by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
2 editions published in 1990 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Upgrades, trade-ins, and buy-backs by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
2 editions published between 1997 and 1999 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Steady state learning and the code of Hammurabi by David K Levine( Book )
4 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
The code of Hammurabi specified a 'trial by surviving in the river' as a way of deciding whether an accusation was true. This system is puzzling for two reasons. First, it is based on a superstition: We do not believe that the guilty are any more likely to drown than the innocent. Second, if people can be easily persuaded to hold a superstitious belief, why such an elaborate mechanism? Why not simply assert that those who are guilty will be struck dead by lightning? We attack these puzzles from the perspective of the theory of learning in games. We give a partial characterization of patiently stable outcomes that arise as the limit of steady states with rational learning as players become more patient. These 'subgame-confirmed Nash equilibria' have self-confirming beliefs at certain information sets reachable by a single deviation. We analyze this refinement and use it as a tool to study the broader issue of the survival of superstition. According to this theory Hammurabi had it exactly right: his law uses the greatest amount of superstition consistent with patient rational learning
On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games by Drew Fudenberg( Book )
3 editions published in 1987 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
 
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Languages
English (181)
Chinese (3)
Italian (3)
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