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Shleifer, Andrei

Works: 276 works in 1,185 publications in 1 language and 11,830 library holdings
Genres: History 
Roles: Author
Classifications: HC340.12, 338.947
Publication Timeline
Publications about Andrei Shleifer
Publications by Andrei Shleifer
Most widely held works by Andrei Shleifer
Without a map political tactics and economic reform in Russia by Andrei Shleifer( file )
15 editions published between 1999 and 2001 in English and held by 2,162 libraries worldwide
"Renewing a strain of analysis that runs from Machiavelli to Hirschman, the authors reach conclusions about political strategies that have important implications for other reformers. They draw on their extensive knowledge of the country and recent experience as advisors to Russian policymakers. The book should appeal to economists, political scientists, policymakers, businesspeople, and all those interested in Russian politics or economics."--Jacket
Privatizing Russia by Maxim Boycko( file )
22 editions published between 1995 and 1997 in English and Undetermined and held by 1,982 libraries worldwide
Annotation Honorable Mention in the category of Economics in the 1995 Professional/Scholarly Publishing Annual Awards Competition presented by the Association of American Publishers, Inc
Inefficient markets : an introduction to behavioral finance by Andrei Shleifer( Book )
40 editions published between 1999 and 2013 in English and held by 865 libraries worldwide
Describes an alternative approach to the study of financial markets: behavioral finance. This approach starts with an observation that the assumptions of investor rationality and perfect arbitrage are overwhelmingly contradicted by both psychological and institutional evidence. In actual financial markets, less than fully rational investors trade against arbitrageurs whose resources are limited by risk aversion, short horizons, and agency problems. The book presents and empirically evaluates models of such inefficient markets
The grabbing hand : government pathologies and their cures by Andrei Shleifer( Book )
15 editions published between 1998 and 2002 in English and held by 482 libraries worldwide
In many countries, public sector institutions impose heavy burdens on economic life: heavy and arbitrary taxes retard investment, regulations enrich corrupt bureaucrats, state firms consume national wealth, and the most talented people turn to rent-seeking rather than productive activities. The authors of this collection of essays describe many of these pathologies of a grabbing hand government and examine their consequences for growth
A normal country : Russia after communism by Andrei Shleifer( Book )
7 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 335 libraries worldwide
"Russia's historic transition from communism in the 1990s sparked intense, often ideological debates. This book offers a firsthand glimpse into the intellectual challenges that Russia's turbulent transition generated. It deals with many of the most important reforms, from Gorbachev's hesitant "perestroika," to the mass privatization program, to the efforts to build legal and regulatory institutions of a market economy. The essays in this book attempt to identify the driving forces of Russia's rapidly changing economic and political reality."--BOOK JACKET
The economics and politics of transition to an open market economy : Russia by Andrei Shleifer( Book )
4 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 228 libraries worldwide
The failure of judges and the rise of regulators by Andrei Shleifer( Book )
5 editions published in 2012 in English and held by 209 libraries worldwide
State versus private ownership by Andrei Shleifer( Book )
12 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 106 libraries worldwide
Abstract: Private ownership should generally be preferred to public ownership when the incentives to innovate and to contain costs must be strong. In essence, this is the case for capitalism over socialism, explaining the dynamic vitality' of free enterprise. The great economists of the 1930s and 1940s failed to see the dangers of socialism in part because they focused on the role of prices under socialism and capitalism and ignored the enormous importance of ownership as the source of capitalist incentives to innovate. Moreover, many of the concerns that private firms fail to address social goals' can be addressed through government contacting and regulation without resort to government ownership. The case for private provision only becomes stronger when competition between suppliers, reputational mechanisms, and the possibility of provision by private not-for-profit firms, as well as political patronage and corruption, are brought into play
Family firms by Mike Burkart( Book )
26 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 102 libraries worldwide
Abstract: We present a model of succession in a firm controlled and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on how much, if any, of the shares to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better manager than the heir, and describe how the founder's decision is shaped by the legal environment. Specifically, we show that, in legal regimes that successfully limit the expropriation of minority shareholders, the widely held professionally managed corporation emerges as the equilibrium outcome. In legal regimes with intermediate protection, management is delegated to a professional, but the family stays on as large shareholders to monitor the manager. In legal regimes with the weakest protection, the founder designates his heir to manage and ownership remains inside the family. This theory of separation of ownership from management includes the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European patterns of corporate governance as special cases, and generates additional empirical predictions consistent with cross-country evidence
Privatization in the United States by Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes( Book )
15 editions published between 1995 and 1996 in English and held by 100 libraries worldwide
Abstract: In the United States, the two principal modes of producing local government services are inhouse provision by government employees and contracting out to private suppliers, also known as privatization. We examine empirically how United States counties choose their mode of providing services. The evidence indicates that state clean- government laws and state laws restricting county spending encourage privatization, whereas strong public unions discourage it. The evidence is inconsistent with the view that efficiency considerations alone govern the provision mode, and points to the important roles played by political patronage and taxpayer resistance to government spending in the privatization decision
The proper scope of government : theory and an application to prisons by Oliver D Hart( Book )
13 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 99 libraries worldwide
When should a government provide a service inhouse and when should it contract out provision? We develop a model in which the provider can invest in improving the quality of service or reducing cost. If contracts are incomplete, the private provider has a stronger incentive to engage in both quality improvement and cost reduction than a government employee. However, the private contractor's incentive to engage in cost reduction is typically too strong because he ignores the adverse effect on non-contractible quality. The model is applied to understanding the costs and benefits of prison privatization
A survey of corporate governance by Andrei Shleifer( Book )
16 editions published between 1995 and 2000 in English and held by 98 libraries worldwide
This paper surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world
The invisible hand and the grabbing hand by Timothy Frye( Book )
14 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 95 libraries worldwide
Evidence from a survey of 105 shop-owners in Moscow and Warsaw shows that the reliance on private protection, as well as the burden of regulation and corruption, are much greater in Moscow. The evidence suggests that the ìnvisible hand' model of government better fits the Warsaw local government, and thegrabbing hand' model is more appropriate for Moscow. The evidence implies that the singular focus on the speed of economic reforms to understand the success of transition is misplaced, and that the quality of government may be as essential
Government ownership of banks by Rafael La Porta( Book )
16 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 94 libraries worldwide
Abstract: In this paper, we investigate a neglected aspect of financial systems of many countries around the world: government ownership of banks. We assemble data which establish four findings. First, government ownership of banks is large and pervasive around the world. Second, such ownership is particularly significant in countries with low levels of per capita income, underdeveloped financial systems, interventionist and inefficient governments, and poor protection of property rights. Third, government ownership of banks is associated with slower subsequent financial development. Finally, government ownership of banks is associated with lower subsequent growth of per capita income, and in particular with lower growth of productivity rather than slower factor accumulation. This evidence is inconsistent with the optimistic development' theories of government ownership of banks common in the 1960s, but supports the more recent political' theories of the effects of government ownership of firms
Corporate ownership around the world by Rafael La Porta( Book )
11 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 93 libraries worldwide
Abstract: We present data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies, making an effort to identify ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely-held, in contrast to the Berle and Means image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the State. Equity control by financial institutions or other widely-held corporations is less common. The controlling shareholders typically have the power over firms significantly in excess of their cash flow rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management. The results suggest that the principal agency problem in large corporations around the world is that of restricting expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders, rather than that of restricting empire building by professional managers unaccountable to shareholders
Coase v. the Coasians by Simon Johnson( Book )
11 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 89 libraries worldwide
Abstract: The Coase theorem implies that, in a world of positive transaction costs, any of a number of strategies, including judicially enforced private contracts, judicially enforced laws, or even government regulation, may be the cheapest way to bring about efficient resource allocation. Unfortunately, some Coasians have ignored the possibility that the last of these strategies may sometimes be the best. This paper compares the regulation of financial markets in Poland and the Czech Republic in the 1990s, when the judicial systems remained underdeveloped in both countries. In Poland, strict enforcement of the securities law by an independent Securities and Exchange Commission was associated with rapid development of the stock market. In the Czech Republic, hands-off regulation was associated with a near collapse of the stock market. These episodes illustrate the centrality of law enforcement in making markets work, and the possible role of regulators in law enforcement
The limits of arbitrage by Andrei Shleifer( Book )
14 editions published in 1995 in English and held by 89 libraries worldwide
In traditional models, arbitrage in a given security is performed by a large number of diversified investors taking small positions against its mispricing. In reality, however, arbitrage is conducted by a relatively small number of highly specialized investors who take large positions using other people's money. Such professional arbitrage has a number of interesting implications for security pricing, including the possibility that arbitrage becomes ineffective in extreme circumstances, when prices diverge far from fundamental values. The model also suggests where anomalies in financial markets are likely to appear, and why arbitrage fails to eliminate them
Will the sovereign debt market survive? by Andrei Shleifer( Book )
13 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 85 libraries worldwide
Abstract: Economic theory and evidence from a variety of debt markets shed light on current reform proposals concerning emerging market debt. Debt markets, including the U.S. municipal bond market, generally function best when the rights of creditors are protected most effectively. Since current IMF reform proposals significantly emasculate creditor rights, they are likely to have an adverse effect on the flow of new funds to sovereign borrowers
The Curley effect by Edward L Glaeser( Book )
13 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 83 libraries worldwide
Abstract: James Michael Curley, a four-time mayor of Boston, used wasteful redistribution to his poor Irish constituents and incendiary rhetoric to encourage richer citizens to emigrate from Boston, thereby shaping the electorate in his favor. Boston as a consequence stagnated, but Curley kept winning elections. We present a model of the Curley effect, in which inefficient redistributive policies are sought not by interest groups protecting their rents, but by incumbent politicians trying to shape the electorate through emigration of their opponents or reinforcement of class identities. The model sheds light on ethnic politics in the United States and abroad, as well as on class politics in many countries including Britain
Federalism with and without political centralization : China versus Russia by Olivier Blanchard( Book )
16 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 83 libraries worldwide
Abstract: In China, local governments have actively contributed to the growth of new firms. In Russia, local governments have typically stood in the way, be it through taxation, regulation, or corruption. There appears to be two main reasons behind the behavior of local governments in Russia. First, capture by old firms, leading local governments to protect them from competition by new entrants. Second, competition for rents by local officials, eliminating incentives for new firms to enter. The question then is why this has not happened in China. We argue that the answer lies in the degree of political centralization present in China, but not in Russia. Transition in China has taken place under the tight control of the communist party. As a result, the central government has been in a strong position both to reward and to punish local administrations, reducing both the risk of local capture and the scope of competition for rents. By contrast, transition in Russia has come with the emergence of a partly dysfunctional democracy. The central government has been neither strong enough to impose its views, nor strong enough to set clear rules about the sharing of the proceeds of growth. As a result, local governments have had few incentives either to resist capture or to rein in competition for rents. Based on the experience of China, a number of researchers have argued that federalism could play a central role in development. We agree, but with an important caveat. We believe the experience of Russia indicates that another ingredient is crucial, namely political centralization
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Alternative Names
Schleifer, Andrei
Schleifer, Andrei 1961-
Shliefer, Andrei 1961-
Shlyaifer, A. 1961-
Šlejfer, Andrej 1961-
Šljajfer, Andrej 1961-
Шлейфер, Андрей 1961-
シュレイファー, A
English (297)
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