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Kroszner, Randy

Overview
Works: 61 works in 254 publications in 3 languages and 4,358 library holdings
Genres: Conference proceedings  Rules  History 
Roles: Editor, Collaborator, Honoree
Classifications: HG181, 332.0973
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about Randy Kroszner
Publications by Randy Kroszner
Most widely held works by Randy Kroszner
Reforming U.S. financial markets reflections before and beyond Dodd-Frank by Randy Kroszner( file )
13 editions published between 2011 and 2013 in 3 languages and held by 1,256 libraries worldwide
Over the last few years, the financial sector has experienced its worst crisis since the 1930s. The collapse of major firms, the decline in asset values, the interruption of credit flows, the loss of confidence in firms and credit market instruments, the intervention by governments and central banks: all were extraordinary in scale and scope. In this book, leading economists Randall Kroszner and Robert Shiller discuss what the United States should do to prevent another such financial meltdown. Their discussion goes beyond the nuts and bolts of legislative and regulatory fixes to consider fundamental changes in our financial arrangements. Kroszner and Shiller offer two distinctive approaches to financial reform, with Kroszner providing a systematic analysis of regulatory gaps and Shiller addressing the broader concerns of democratizing and humanizing finance. Kroszner focuses on key areas for reform, including credit rating agencies and the mortgage securitization market. Shiller argues that reform must serve to make the full power of financial theory work for everyone--bringing the technology of finance to bear on managing risk, for example--and should acknowledge the reality of human nature. After brief discussions by four commentators, Kroszner and Shiller each offer a response to the other's proposals, creating a fruitful dialogue between two major figures in the field
The Economic nature of the firm : a reader by Louis G Putterman( Book )
37 editions published between 1986 and 2009 in English and Undetermined and held by 870 libraries worldwide
Explorations in the new monetary economics by Tyler Cowen( Book )
9 editions published in 1994 in English and held by 289 libraries worldwide
Were the good old days that good? : changes in managerial stock ownership since the Great Depression by Clifford G Holderness( Book )
12 editions published between 1996 and 1998 in English and held by 97 libraries worldwide
We document that ownership by officers and directors of publicly-traded firms is on average higher today than earlier in the century. Managerial ownership rises from 13 percent for the universe of exchange-listed corporations in 1935, the earliest year for which such data exist, to 21 percent in 1995. We examine in detail the robustness of the increase and explore hypotheses to explain it. Higher managerial ownership has not substituted for alternative corporate governance mechanisms. Lower volatility and greater hedging opportunities associated with the development of financial markets appear to be important factors explaining the increase in managerial ownership
What drives deregulation? : economics and politics of the relaxation of bank branching restrictions by Randy Kroszner( Book )
11 editions published between 1998 and 1999 in English and held by 92 libraries worldwide
This paper examines the key forces behind deregulation in order to assess the relative importance of alternative theories of regulatory entry and exit. We focus on bank branching deregulation across the states which began a quarter century ago and cumulated in federal deregulation in 1994. The cross-sectional and time-series variation of branching deregulation allows us to develop a hazard model to explain the timing of deregulation across the states using proxies motivated by private-interest, public-interest, and political-institutional theories, the public interest approach cannot easily explain our findings that deregulation occurs later in states with relatively more small banks and with a relatively large insurance sector in states where banks can sell insurance. We also find that the ex post consequences of deregulation for the different interest groups are consistent with the ex ante lobbying patterns we infer from the hazard model. Some political-institutional factors also play a role in the process of regulatory change. The same forces that explain the timing of deregulation across the states also explain the pattern of voting in Congress on interstate branching deregulation. We conclude by considering the implications of our results for tyhe future path of deregulation and applications of our research design to other episodes of regulatory entry and exit
Interests, institutions, and ideology in the Republican conversion to trade liberalization, 1934-1945 by Douglas A Irwin( Book )
10 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 81 libraries worldwide
This paper investigates the factors explaining significant policy change by studying how bipartisan support developed to sustain the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1934. The RTAA fundamentally transformed both the process and outcome of U.S. trade policy: Congress delegated its authority over tariff-setting to the president sharply toward trade liberalization. The durability of this change was achieved only when the Republicans, long-time supporters of high tariffs who originally vowed to repeal the RTAA, began to support this Democratic initiative in the 1940s. In seeking to explain this conversion, we find little evidence of an ideological shift among Republicans, but rather an increased sensitivity to export interests for which the institutional structure of the RTAA itself may have been responsible. Our results suggest that analyzing changes in both institutional incentives and economic interests are important for understanding lasting change in economic policy
Organization structure and credibility : evidence from commercial bank securities activities before the Glass-Steagall Act by Randy Kroszner( Book )
9 editions published between 1995 and 1996 in English and held by 81 libraries worldwide
This paper investigates how organizational structure can affect a firm's ability to compete. In particular, we examine the two ways in which U.S. commercial banks organized their investment banking operations before the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act forced the banks to leave the securities business: as an internal securities department within the bank and as a separately incorporated and capitalized securities affiliate. We document a strong movement toward the use of the affiliate structure during the 1920s, and regulation does not appear to explain this evolution. While departments underwrote seemingly higher quality firms and securities than did comparable affiliates, the departments obtained lower prices for the issues they underwrote. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that there was a perception of potential conflicts of interest when lending and underwriting were closely combined in the departmental structure. We find evidence that bank managers during this period were concerned about such perceptions. We then develop further tests to support the view that by distancing underwriting activities from lending operations, banks could more credibly certify the quality of the issues they underwrote, thereby obtaining higher prices for them. Our results suggest that internal organization may indeed affect the activities and effectiveness of a firm. They also suggest that bank regulators' interest in 'firewalls' between commercial and investment banking may be reasonable, but that the market may propel banks to adopt an internal structure that would address regulators' concerns
Log-rolling and economic interests in the passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariff by Douglas A Irwin( Book )
10 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 81 libraries worldwide
We analyze Senate roll-call votes concerning tariffs on specific goods in order to understand the economic and political factors influencing the passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. Contrary to recent studies emphasizing the partisan nature of the Congressional votes, our reading of the debates in the Congressional Record suggests that the final, party-line voting masks a rich vote- trading dynamic. We estimate a logit model of specific tariff votes that permits us to identify (a) important influences of specific producer beneficiaries in each Senator's constituency and (b) log- rolling coalitions among Senators with otherwise unrelated constituency interests which succeeded in raising tariff rates
Obstacles to optimal policy : the interplay of politics and economics in shaping bank supervision and regulation reforms by Randy Kroszner( Book )
12 editions published between 2000 and 2001 in English and held by 81 libraries worldwide
This paper provides a positive political economy analysis of the most important revision of the U.S. supervision and regulation system during the last two decades, the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA). We analyze the impact of private interest groups as well as political-institutional factors on the voting patterns on amendments related to FDICIA and its final passage to assess the empirical importance of different types of obstacles to welfare-enhancing reforms. Rivalry of interests within the industry (large versus small banks) and between industries (banks versus insurance) as well as measures of legislator ideology and partisanship play important roles and, hence, should be taken into account in order to implement successful change. A divide and conquer' strategy with respect to the private interests appears to be effective in bringing about legislative reform. The concluding section draws tentative lessons from the political economy approaches about how to increase the likelihood of welfare-enhancing regulatory change
Bankers on boards : monitoring, conflicts of interest, and lender liability by Randy Kroszner( Book )
12 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 78 libraries worldwide
This paper investigates what factors determine whether a commercial banker is on the board of a non-financial firm. We consider the tradeoff between the benefits of direct bank monitoring to the firm and the costs of active bank involvement in firm management. Given the different payoff structures to debt and equity, lenders and shareholders may have conflicting interests in running the firm. In addition, the U.S. legal doctrines of 'equitable subordination' and 'lender liability' could generate high costs for banks which have a representative on the board of a client firm that experiences financial distress. Consistent with high potential costs of active bank involvement, we find that bankers tend to be represented on the boards of large stable firms with high proportions of tangible ('collateralizable') assets and low reliance on short-term financing. The protection of shareholder versus creditor rights under the U.S. bankruptcy doctrines may reduce the role that banks play in corporate governance and the management of financial distress, in contrast to Germany and Japan. We conclude with implications for the current bank regulatory reform debate, such as whether to permit banks to own equity in non-financial firms that, in turn, could allow them to mitigate the conflict
Federal terrorism risk insurance by Jeffrey R Brown( Book )
7 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 77 libraries worldwide
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 represented a loss for commercial property & casualty insurers that was both unprecedented and unanticipated. After sustaining this record capital loss, the availability of adequate private insurance coverage against future terrorist attacks came into question. Concern over the potential adverse consequences of the lack of availability of insurance against terrorist incidents led to calls for federal intervention in insurance markets. This paper discusses the economic rationale for and against federal intervention in the market, and concludes that the benefits from establishing a temporary transition program, during which the private sector can build capacity and adapt to a dramatically changed environment for terrorism risk, may provide benefits to the economy that exceed the direct and indirect costs
Throwing good money after bad? : board connections and conflicts in bank lending by Randy Kroszner( Book )
10 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 74 libraries worldwide
This paper investigates the frequency of connections between banks and non-financial firms through board linkages and whether those connections affect lending and borrowing behavior. Although a board linkages may reduce the costs of information flows between the lender and borrower, a board linkage may generate pressure for special treatment of a borrower not normally justifiable on economic grounds. To address this issue, we first document that banks are heavily involved in the corporate governance network through frequent board linkages. Banks tend to have larger boards with a higher proportion of outside directors than non- financial firms, and bank officer-directors tend to have more external board directorships than executives of non- financial firms. We then show that low- information cost firms -- large firms with a high proportion of tangible assets and relatively stable stock returns -- are most likely to have board connections to banks. These same low- information cost firms are also more likely to borrow from their connected bank, and when they do so the terms of the loan appear similar to loans to unconnected firms. In contrast to studies of Mexico, Russia and Asia where connections have been misused, our results suggest that avoidance of potential conflicts of interest explains both the allocation and behavior of bankers in the U.S. corporate governance system
Does political ambiguity pay? : corporate campaign contributions and the rewards to legislator reputation by Randy Kroszner( Book )
11 editions published between 1999 and 2000 in English and held by 74 libraries worldwide
Do politicians tend to follow a strategy of ambiguity in their policy positions or a strategy of reputational development to reduce uncertainty about where they stand? Ambiguity could allow a legislator to avoid alienating constituents and to play rival interests off against each other to maximize campaign contributions. Alternatively, reputational clarity could help to reduce uncertainty about a candidate and lead to high campaign contributions from favored interests. We outline a theory that considers conditions under which a politician would and would not prefer reputational development and policy-stance clarity in the context of repeat dealing with special interests. Our proxy for reputational development is the percent of repeat givers to a legislator. Using data on corporate political action committee contributions (PACs) to members of the U.S. House during the seven electoral cycles from 1983/84 to 1995/96, we find that legislators do not appear to follow a strategy of ambiguity and that high reputational development is rewarded with high PAC contributions
Free banking : the Scottish experience as a model for emerging economies by Randy Kroszner( Book )
5 editions published between 1995 and 1997 in English and held by 56 libraries worldwide
Financial crises, financial dependence, and industry growth by Luc Laeven( file )
8 editions published in 2002 in English and Undetermined and held by 51 libraries worldwide
Laeven, Klingebiel, and Kroszner investigate the link between financial crises and industry growth. They analyze data from 19 industrial and developing countries that have experienced financial crises during the past 30 years to investigate how financial crises affect sectors dependent on external sources of finance. Specifically, the authors examine whether the impact of a financial crisis on externally dependent sectors varies with the depth of the financial system. They find that sectors highly dependent on external finance tend to experience a greater contraction of value added during a crisis in deeper financial systems than in countries with shallower financial systems. They hypothesize that the deepening of the financial system allows sectors dependent on external finance to obtain relatively more external funding in normal periods, so a crisis in such countries would have a disproportionately negative effect on externally dependent sectors. In contrast, since externally dependent firms tend to obtain relatively less external financing in shallower financial systems (and hence have relatively lower growth rates in such countries during normal times), a crisis in such countries has less of a disproportionately negative effect on the growth of externally dependent sectors. This paper--a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department--is part of a larger effort in the department to study the link between financial development and economic growth. The authors may be contacted at llaeven@worldbank.org, dklingebiel@worldbank.org, or randy.kroszner@gsb.uchicago.edu
How should financial institutions and markets be structured? : Analysis and options for financial system design by George G Kaufman( Book )
9 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and held by 31 libraries worldwide
Unintended consequences what caused the great depression ( visu )
1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 26 libraries worldwide
Discusses how the inaction of the Federal Reserve led to the deepening of a recession into the Great Depression and includes an interview with Federal Reserve Governor Randy Kroszner
La naturaleza económica de la empresa ( Book )
4 editions published in 1994 in Spanish and held by 24 libraries worldwide
Banking crises, financial dependence and growth by Randy Kroszner( Book )
6 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 14 libraries worldwide
The political economy of deregulation : evidence from the relaxation of bank branching restrictions in the United States by Randy Kroszner( Book )
5 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 8 libraries worldwide
 
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Alternative Names
Kroszner, R. S. 1962-
Kroszner, Randall
Kroszner, Randall 1962-
Kroszner, Randall S.
Kroszner, Randall Scott
Kroszner, Randall Scott, 1962-
Kroszner, Randy.
Kroszner, Randy 1962-
Krozsner Randall Scott 1962-....
Languages
English (200)
Spanish (4)
Italian (1)
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