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Boot, Arnoud W. A. (Willem Alexander) 1960-

Overview
Works: 102 works in 327 publications in 2 languages and 1,708 library holdings
Genres: Handbooks and manuals 
Roles: Author, Editor, Reviewer, Thesis advisor, Contributor
Classifications: HG3891.5, 332.10973
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about Arnoud W. A Boot
Publications by Arnoud W. A Boot
Most widely held works by Arnoud W. A Boot
Credit, intermediation, and the macroeconomy : readings and perspectives in modern financial theory by Sudipto Bhattacharya( Book )
12 editions published between 2001 and 2004 in English and held by 225 libraries worldwide
Developments in theories of financial markets and institutions using the tools of the economics of uncertainty and contracts constitute a burgeoning field of research. This collection draws together highlights of the literature in this area
Handbook of financial intermediation and banking by Anjan V Thakor( Book )
20 editions published between 2008 and 2011 in English and held by 173 libraries worldwide
The growth of financial intermediation research has yielded a host of questions that have pushed "design" issues to the fore even as the boundary between financial intermediation and corporate finance has blurred. This volume presents review articles on six major topics that are connected by information-theoretic tools and characterized by valuable perspectives and important questions for future research. Touching upon a wide range of issues pertaining to the designs of securities, institutions, trading mechanisms and markets, industry structure, and regulation, this volume will encourage bold new efforts to shape financial intermediaries in the future. Original review articles offer valuable perspectives on research issues appearing in top journals. Twenty articles are grouped by six major topics, together defining the leading research edge of financial intermediation. Corporate finance researchers will find affinities in the tools, methods, and conclusions featured in these articles
Contemporary financial intermediation by Stuart I Greenbaum( Book )
8 editions published between 2015 and 2016 in English and held by 36 libraries worldwide
"In Contemporary Financial Intermediation, Second Edition, Stuart Greenbaum and Anjan Thakor bring a unique analytical approach to the subject of banks and banking in this completely revised and updated second edition. The authors expand the scope of the typical bank management course by addressing all types of deposit-type financial institutions and by explaining the "why" of intermediation rather than simply describing institutions, regulations, and market phenomena. This analytic approach strikes at the heart of financial intermediation by explaining why financial intermediaries exist and what they do. Specific regulations, economies, and policies will change, but the underlying philosophical foundations remain the same
Can relationship banking survive competition? by Arnoud W. A Boot( Book )
12 editions published between 1996 and 1998 in English and held by 31 libraries worldwide
Expansion of banking scale and scope : don't banks know the value of focus by Arnoud W. A Boot( Book )
11 editions published between 1998 and 1999 in English and held by 30 libraries worldwide
Financial system architecture by Arnoud W. A Boot( Book )
10 editions published between 1994 and 1996 in English and held by 29 libraries worldwide
Banking scope, financial innovation, and the evolution of the financial system by Arnoud W. A Boot( Book )
12 editions published in 1995 in English and held by 26 libraries worldwide
Market discipline and incentive problems in conglomerate banks by Arnoud W. A Boot( Book )
8 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 26 libraries worldwide
Credit ratings as coordination mechanism by Arnoud W. A Boot( Book )
12 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 24 libraries worldwide
In this article, we provide a novel rationale for credit ratings. The rationale that we propose is that credit ratings serve as a coordinating mechanism in situations where multiple equilibria can obtain. We show that credit ratings provide a focal point for firms and their investors, and explore the vital, but previously overlooked implicit contractual relationship between a credit rating agency (CRA) and a firm through its credit watch procedures. Credit ratings can help fix the desired equilibrium and as such play an economically meaningful role. Our model provides several empirical predictions and insights regarding the expected price impact of rating changes
Objectivity, proximity and adaptability in corporate governance by Arnoud W. A Boot( Book )
10 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 22 libraries worldwide
De ontwortelde onderneming : ondernemingen overgeleverd aan financiers? by Arnoud W. A Boot( Book )
1 edition published in 2009 in Dutch and held by 21 libraries worldwide
Competition and entry in banking : implications for stability and capital regulation by Arnoud W. A Boot( Book )
12 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 20 libraries worldwide
We assess the influence of competition and capital regulation on the stability of the banking system. We particularly ask two questions: i) how does capital regulation affect (endogenous) entry; and ii) how do (exogenous) changes in the competitive environment affect bank monitoring choices and the effectiveness of capital regulation? Our approach deviates from the extant literature in that it recognizes the fixed costs associated with banks' monitoring technologies. These costs make market share and scale important for the banks' cost structures. Our most striking result is that increasing (costly) capital requirements can lead to more entry into banking, essentially by reducing the competitive strength of lower quality banks. We also show that competition improves the monitoring incentives of better quality banks and deteriorates the incentives of lower quality banks; and that precisely for those lower quality banks competition typically compromises the effectiveness of capital requirements. We generalize the analysis along a few dimensions, including an analysis of the effects of asymmetric competition, e.g. one country that opens up its banking system for competitors but not vice versa
Go public or stay private : a theory of entrepreneurial choice by Arnoud W. A Boot( Book )
10 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and held by 19 libraries worldwide
In this paper we analyze an entrepreneur /manager's choice between private and public ownership in a setting in which management needs some elbow room or autonomy to optimally manage the firm. In public capital markets, the corporate governance regime in place exposes the firm to exogenous controls, so that management may lack the autonomy it desires. By contrast, private ownership can provide management the desired autonomy due to the possibility of precisely-calibrated private contracting. The disadvantage of private ownership (relative to public ownership) is that it imposes a cost of illiquidity on those who provide financing. We explore this tradeoff between managerial autonomy and the cast of capital in a simple setting and draw a number of new testable implications
Disagreement and flexibility : a theory of optimal security issuance and capital structure by Arnoud W. A Boot( Book )
10 editions published between 2002 and 2003 in English and held by 19 libraries worldwide
In this paper we introduce flexibility as an economic concept and apply it to the firm'ssecurity issuance decision and capital structure choice. Flexibility is the ability to makedecisions that one thinks are best even when others disagree. The firm's management valuesflexibility because it allows management to make decisions it believes are best forshareholders without being blocked by dissenters. The amount of flexibility management has atany point in time depends on how the firm is financed. Debt offers little flexibility relativeto equity. However, the flexibility offered by equity depends on the extent to whichshareholders are inclined to agree with management's strategic choices. Equity offers thegreatest flexibility when the propensity for shareholder agreement is the highest. It turnsout that the firm's stock price is also increasing in shareholders' propensity to agree withmanagement. Thus, the flexibility benefit of equity is high only when the sh!are price is high. The firm's optimal security-issuance choice trades off the flexibilitybenefit of equity against the now-familiar debt tax shield, and the firm's capital structure isthe consequence of a sequence of past security-issuance choices. The strongest implication ofthis theory of capital structure evolution is that optimal capital structure is essentiallydynamic, and depends on the firm's stock price, implying that firms issue equity when stockprices are high and debt when stock prices are low. The theory explains many stylized factsthat fly in the face of existing capital structure theories and also generates new testablepredictions. Moreover, the theory can rationalize the use of debt in the absence of taxes,agency costs or signaling considerations
The economic value of flexibility when there is disagreement by Arnoud W. A Boot( Book )
10 editions published between 2002 and 2003 in English and held by 18 libraries worldwide
We develop an economic theory of "flexibility", which we interpret as the discretion orability to make a decision that others disagree with. We show that flexibility is essentiallyan option for the decisionmaker, and can be valued as such. The value of the flexibilityoption is decreasing in the extent to which the decisionmaker's future decision-relevantopinion is correlated with the opinions of others who may be able to impede the decision.We argue that flexibility drives economic decisions in a significant way. Theapplications we consider are: the entrepreneur's choice of flexibility in the initial mix offinancing raised, the use of flexibility to understand differences in security design and thefirm's security-issuance decision, the impact of flexibility on the use of collateral inlending, the role of flexibility in capital budgeting decisions, the effect of flexibilityconsiderations in the design of contracts in a principal-agent setting, the interpretation of"power" and conformity in organizations in the context of flexibility, and the choice betweenprivate an public ownership in the context of flexibility
The economics of bank regulation by Sudipto Bhattacharya( Book )
10 editions published between 1995 and 1996 in English and held by 18 libraries worldwide
Market liquidity, investor participation and managerial autonomy : why do firms go private? by Arnoud W. A Boot( Book )
9 editions published between 2005 and 2006 in English and held by 15 libraries worldwide
We analyze a publicly-traded firm's decision to stay public or go private when managerial autonomy from shareholder intervention affects the supply of productive inputs by management. We show that both the advantage and the disadvantage of public ownership relative to private ownership lie in the liquidity of public ownership. While the liquidity of public ownership lets shareholders trade easily and supply capital at a lower cost, the liquidity-engendered trading also results in stochastic shocks to a firm's shareholder base. This exposes management to uncertainty regarding the identity of future shareholders and their extent of intervention in management decisions and in turn curtails managerial incentives. By contrast, because of its illiquidity, private ownership provides a stable shareholder base and improves these inputprovision incentives but results in a higher cost of capital. Thus, capital market liquidity, while being a principal advantage of public ownership, also has a surprising 'dark side' that discourages public ownership. Our model takes seriously a key difference between private and public equity markets in that, unlike the private market, the firm's shareholder base, namely the extent of investor participation, is stochastic in the public market. This allows us to extract predictions about the effects of investor participation on the stock price level and volatility and on the public firm's incentives to go private, thereby providing a link between investor participation and firm participation in public markets. Lesser investor participation induces lower and more volatile stock prices, encouraging public firms to go private, whereas greater investor participation encourages younger firms to go public. Moreover, IPO underpricing is optimal because it is shown to lead to a higher and less volatile post-IPO stock price, greater autonomy for the manager and a higher supply of privately-costly managerial inputs
Reputation and discretion in financial contracting by Arnoud W. A Boot( Book )
7 editions published between 1992 and 1993 in English and held by 14 libraries worldwide
De toekomst van het Nederlands verdienmodel by Hans Strikwerda( Book )
2 editions published in 2014 in Dutch and held by 12 libraries worldwide
Banking and trading by Arnoud W. A Boot( Book )
12 editions published in 2012 in English and held by 9 libraries worldwide
We study the effects of a bank's engagement in trading. Traditional banking is relationship-based: not scalable, long-term oriented, with high implicit capital, and low risk (thanks to the law of large numbers). Trading is transactions-based: scalable, short-term, capital constrained, and with the ability to generate risk from concentrated positions. When a bank engages in trading, it can use its 'spare' capital to profitably expand the scale of trading. However there are two inefficiencies. A bank may allocate too much capital to trading ex-post, compromising the incentives to build relationships ex-ante. And a bank may use trading for risk-shifting. Financial development augments the scalability of trading, which initially benefits conglomeration, but beyond some point inefficiencies dominate. The deepening of financial markets in recent decades leads trading in banks to become increasingly risky, so that problems in managing and regulating trading in banks will persist for the foreseeable future. The analysis has implications for capital regulation, subsidiarization, and scope and scale restrictions in banking
 
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Alternative Names
Arnoud Boot Dutch columnist and economist
Arnoud Boot Nederlands columnist
Boot, A. W. A. 1960-
Boot, Arnold W.A. 1960-
Boot, Arnoud 1960-
Boot, Arnoud W. 1960-
Boot, Arnoud W. A. 1960-
Boot, Arnoud W. A. (Willem Alexander), 1960-
Boot, Arnoud Willem Alexander.
Boot, Arnoud Willem Alexander 1960-
Languages
English (195)
Dutch (3)
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