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Bulow, Jeremy

Works: 64 works in 222 publications in 1 language and 885 library holdings
Genres: Trials, litigation, etc 
Roles: Thesis advisor
Classifications: H62.5.U5, 332.632
Publication Timeline
Publications about Jeremy Bulow
Publications by Jeremy Bulow
Most widely held works by Jeremy Bulow
The generalized war of attrition by Jeremy Bulow( Book )
20 editions published between 1996 and 1999 in English and held by 120 libraries worldwide
We generalize the War of Attrition model to allow for N + K firms competing for N prizes. Two special cases are of particular interest. First, if firms continue to pay their full costs after dropping out (as in a standard-setting context), each firm's exit time is independent both of K and of the actions of other players. Second, in the limit in which firms pay no costs after dropping out (as in a natural-oligopoly problem), the field is immediately reduced to N + 1 firms. Furthermore, we have perfect sorting, so it is always the K 1 lowest-value players who drop out in zero time, even though each player's value is private information to the player. We apply our model to politics, explaining the length of time it takes to collect a winning coalition to pass a bill
Auctions vs. negotiations by Jeremy Bulow( Book )
14 editions published between 1993 and 1994 in English and held by 89 libraries worldwide
Which is the more profitable way to sell a company: a public auction or an optimally structured negotiation with a smaller number of bidders? We show that under standard assumptions the public auction is always preferable, even if it forfeits all the seller's negotiating power, including the ability to withdraw the object from sale, provided that it attracts at least one extra bidder. An immediate public auction also dominates negotiating while maintaining the right to hold an auction subsequently with more bidders. The results hold for both the standard independent private values model and a common values model. They suggest that the value of negotiating skill is small relative to the value of additional competition
When are auctions best? by Jeremy Bulow( file )
11 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 59 libraries worldwide
We compare the two most common bidding processes for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly to buyers. In an auction all entry decisions are made prior to any bidding. In a sequential bidding process earlier entrants can make bids before later entrants choose whether to compete. The sequential process is more efficient because entrants base their decisions on superior information. But pre-emptive bids transfer surplus from the seller to buyers. Because the auction is more conducive to entry in several ways it usually generates higher expected revenue
Matching and price competition by Jeremy Bulow( Computer File )
7 editions published between 2003 and 2005 in English and held by 58 libraries worldwide
"We develop a model in which firms set impersonal salary levels before matching with workers. Salaries fall relative to any competitive equilibrium while profits rise by almost as much, implyinglittle inefficiency. Furthermore, the best firms gain the most from the system while wages becomecompressed. We discuss the performance of alternative institutions and the recent antitrust caseagainst the National Residency Matching Program in light of our results"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Sovereign debt repurchases : no cure for overhang by Jeremy Bulow( Book )
8 editions published between 1989 and 1990 in English and held by 55 libraries worldwide
We show, in a reasonably general model, that if a highly indebted country has good investment projects available to it, then it will not benefit from using any of its resources to buy back debt at market prices. Debt buybacks and debt-equity swaps only make sense for the country if these programs are heavily subsidized by creditors. This result holds for all buyback programs large and small, so long as they involve voluntary creditor participation and are not part of a larger deal including offsetting concessions from lenders. Our analysis therefore casts doubt on the popular argument that unilateral debt repurchases benefit HICs by relieving "debt overhang."
Rational frenzies and crashes by Jeremy Bulow( Book )
12 editions published in 1991 in English and Undetermined and held by 53 libraries worldwide
Most markets clear through a sequence of sales rather than through a Walrasian auctioneer. Because buyers can decide between buying now or later, rather than only now or never, buyers' current 'willingness to pay' is much more sensitive to price than is the demand curve. A consequence is that markets will be extremely sensitive to new information, leading to both 'frenzies, " where demand feeds upon itself, and "crashes, " where price drops discontinuously. Although no buyer's independent reservation value reveals much about overall demand, a small increase in one such value can cause a large increase or decrease in average price
Sovereign Debt Is To Forgive To Forget? by Jeremy Bulow( Book )
10 editions published between 1988 and 1994 in English and held by 42 libraries worldwide
International lending to a less-developed country cannot be based on the debtor's reputation for making repayments. That is, loans to LDCs will not be made or repaid unless foreign creditors have legal or other direct sanctions they can exercise against a sovereign debtor who defaults Even if some lending is feasible because of direct sanctions, having a reputation for repayment in no way enhances a small LDC's ability to borrow
Winning play in spectrum auctions by Jeremy Bulow( file )
8 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 40 libraries worldwide
We describe factors that make bidding in large spectrum auctions complex -- including exposure and budget problems, the role of timing within an ascending auction, and the possibilities for price forecasting -- and how economic and game-theoretic analysis can assist bidders in overcoming these problems. We illustrate with the case of the FCC's Advanced Wireless Service auction, in which a new entrant, SpectrumCo, faced all these problems yet managed to purchase nationwide coverage at a discount of roughly a third relative to the prices paid by its incumbent competitors in the same auction, saving more than a billion dollars
A constant recontracting model of sovereign debt by Jeremy Bulow( Book )
7 editions published between 1986 and 1987 in English and held by 37 libraries worldwide
Few sovereign debtors have repudiated their obligations entirely. But despite the significant sanctions at the disposal of lenders, many borrowers have been able to consistently negotiate for reduced repayments. This paper presents a model of the on-going bargaining process that determines repayment levels. We derive a bargaining equilibrium in which countries with large debts achieve negotiated partial default. The ability to credibly threaten more draconian penalties in the event of repudiation may be of no benefit to lenders. Furthermore, unanticipated increases in world interest rates may actually help the borrowers by making lenders more inpatient for a negotiated settlement. Finally, Western governments may be induced to make payments to facilitate reschedulings even though efficient agreements will be reached without their intervention
Estimating the efficiency gains of debt restructuring by Jeremy Bulow( Book )
4 editions published in 1994 in English and held by 32 libraries worldwide
Sovereign debt restructurings : panacea or pangloss? by Jeremy Bulow( Book )
3 editions published in 1988 in English and held by 31 libraries worldwide
The most widely proposed LDC debt plans are flawed by their failure to recognize the fundamental differences between corporate and sovereign debt. Consequently, many plans intended to help highly-indebted countries mainly aid their foreign creditors. This paper emphasizes the crucial distinction between marginal and average sovereign debt. This distinction provides the cornerstone for an understanding of debt buybacks, debt-equity swaps, and debt-for-debt swaps involving new classes of seniority. Highly indebted countries would benefit more from direct transfers than from the same resources spent on any of these financial engineering schemes
The tobacco deal by Jeremy Bulow( Book )
12 editions published between 1998 and 1999 in English and held by 30 libraries worldwide
Concerns the United States
Toeholds and takeovers by Jeremy Bulow( Book )
12 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 27 libraries worldwide
A theory of dual labor markets with application to industrial policy, discrimination and Keynesian unemployment by Jeremy Bulow( Book )
6 editions published in 1985 in English and held by 26 libraries worldwide
This paper develops a model of dual labor markets based on employers' need to motivate workers. In order to elicit effort from their workers, employers may find it optimal to pay more than the going wage. This changes fundamentally the character of labor markets. The modelis applied to a wide range of labormarket phenomena. It provides a coherent framework for understanding the claims of industrial policy advocates. It also can provide the basis for a theory of occupational segregation and discrimination which will not be eroded by market forces. Finally, the model provides the basis for a theory of involuntary unemployment
How does the market value unfunded pension liabilities? by Jeremy Bulow( Book )
4 editions published in 1985 in English and held by 25 libraries worldwide
We lead off by discussing a number of theoretical reasons for expecting various relationships between a firm's unfunded pension liability and its market value. We then discuss our doubts about the methodology of earlier papers which studied the empirical relation between funding and market value using standard cross sectional techniques. A modified cross sectional approach which alleviates some of these doubts, and a variable effect event study methodology which alleviates most of them are both employed to investigate the issues raised in the first part of the paper. Our conclusion confirms those of earlier studies that unfunded pension liabilities are accurately reflected in lower share prices
The Winner's curse and the failure of the law of demand by Jeremy Bulow( Book )
8 editions published between 1997 and 1998 in English and held by 23 libraries worldwide
The taxation of risky assets by Jeremy Bulow( Computer File )
2 editions published in 1982 in English and held by 20 libraries worldwide
"This paper reconsiders the effects of taxation on risky assets, recognizing the importance of variations in asset prices. We show that earlier analyses which assumed that depreciation rates are constant and that the future price of capital goods is known with certainty are very misleading, as guides to the effects of corporate taxes. We then examine the concept of economic depreciation in a risky environment, and show that depreciation allowances, if set ex-ante, should be adjusted to take account of future asset price risk. Some empirical calculations suggest that these adjustments are large, and have important implications for the burdens of, and non-neutralities in, the corporate income tax"--NBER website
Multilateral developing-country debt rescheduling negotiations : a bargaining-theoretic framework by Jeremy Bulow( Book )
5 editions published in 1988 in English and held by 15 libraries worldwide
This paper employs a dynamic bargaining-theoretic framework to analyze multilateral sovereign debt rescheduling negotiations. The analysis illustrates how various factors, such as the debtor's gains from trade and the level of world interest rates, affect the relative bargaining power of various parties to a rescheduling agreement. If creditor-country taxpayers have a vested interest in maintaining normal levels of trade with debtor countries, then they can sometimes be bargained into making sidepayments. The benefits from unanticipated creditor-country sidepayments accrue to both lenders and borrowers. But the benefit from perfectly anticipated sidepayments accrue entirely to borrowers
Price controls and consumer surplus by Jeremy Bulow( Book )
7 editions published between 2009 and 2011 in English and held by 15 libraries worldwide
The condition for when a price control increases consumer welfare in perfect competition is tighter than often realised. When demand is linear, a small restriction on price only increases consumer surplus if the elasticity of demand exceeds the elasticity of supply; with log-linear or constant-elasticity, demand consumers are always hurt by price controls. The results are best understood - and can be related to monopoly-theory results - using the fact that consumer surplus equals the area between the demand curve and the industry marginal-revenue curve
Why do sellers (usually) prefer auctions? by Jeremy Bulow( Book )
4 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 11 libraries worldwide
We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether or not to enter the bidding. The sequential process is always more efficient. But pre-emptive bids transfer surplus from the seller to buyers. Because the auction is more conducive to entry - precisely because of its inefficiency - it usually generates higher expected revenue. We also discuss the effects of lock-ups, matching rights, break-up fees (as in takeover battles), entry subsidies, etc
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Alternative Names
Bulow, Jeremy I.
English (163)
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