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Calomiris, Charles W.

Works: 116 works in 444 publications in 1 language and 4,952 library holdings
Genres: Conference proceedings  History  Case studies 
Roles: Editor
Classifications: HG2491, 332.10973
Publication Timeline
Publications about Charles W Calomiris
Publications by Charles W Calomiris
Most widely held works by Charles W Calomiris
U.S. bank deregulation in historical perspective by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
20 editions published between 2000 and 2009 in English and held by 651 libraries worldwide
This book shows how and why deregulation has transformed the size, structure and geographic range of US banks, the scope of banking services, and the nature of bank-customer relationships. Over recent decades the characteristics that had made American banks different - the fragmented geographical structure of the industry, which restricted the scale of banks and their ability to compete with one another, and strict limits on the kinds of products and services commercial banks could offer - have virtually been eliminated. Understanding the origins and persistence of the unique banking regulations that defined US banking for over a century lends an important perspective on the economic and political causes and consequences of the current process of deregulation. History helps to define the political constituencies for and against deregulation, the political process through which bank regulations are determined, and the way deregulation is likely to affect future bank performance and stability
Sustaining India's growth miracle ( file )
12 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 468 libraries worldwide
"The economy of India is growing at a rate of 8 percent per year, and its exports of goods and services have more than doubled in the past three years. Considering these trends, economists, scholars, and political leaders across the globe are beginning to wonder whether India's growth can be sustained." "Sustaining India's Growth Miracle is a valuable resource for practitioners, policymakers. students, and scholars. It tackles issues from political, economic, and academic perspectives. The concluding chapter, a talk given by the commerce and industry minister of India, discusses the country's position as a world power, outlining several reasons for India's success and exploring the difficulties that lie ahead."--Jacket
High loan-to-value mortgage lending problem or cure? by Charles W Calomiris( file )
7 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 323 libraries worldwide
China's financial transition at a crossroads ( Book )
8 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 305 libraries worldwide
The postmodern bank safety net lessons from developed and developing economies by Charles W Calomiris( file )
8 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 296 libraries worldwide
Emerging financial markets by David O Beim( Book )
7 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 173 libraries worldwide
Is the bank merger wave of the 1990s efficient? : lessons from nine case studies by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
4 editions published between 1998 and 2000 in English and held by 165 libraries worldwide
A globalist manifesto for public policy : the tenth annual IEA Hayek Memorial Lecture by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
9 editions published between 2001 and 2002 in English and held by 95 libraries worldwide
Leverage as a state variable for employment, inventory accumulation, and fixed investments by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
13 editions published between 1994 and 1997 in English and held by 89 libraries worldwide
The importance of a firm's balance sheet for determining its investment and employment decisions is the central assumption of macroeconomic models of 'debt deflation' or 'debt overhang.' According to these models, firm investment decisions are influenced not only by the fundamental opportunity set of the firm, but also by the firm's existing financial condition, especially its leverage. This paper tests that assumption by examining whether the responsiveness of employment, investment, and inventory accumulation to exogenous changes in sales depend on the leverage of the firm. We find that leverage acts as an important state variable for conditioning the response of all three variables to changes in sales. We also find that this effect varies depending on the state of the economy. During recessions, higher leverage magnifies the contractionary effect of declines in sales on investment; during times of positive sales growth, higher leverage tends to dampen the expansionary effect of growth in demand. The size and significance of leverage conditioning effects are larger during recessions. These results support theoretical models of the potential importance of 'debt overhang' effects. Firms that use debt to finance expansion during times of increasing demand suffer reduced ability to maintain growth during recessions as a consequence of their higher leverage
Commercial paper, corporate finance, and the business cycle : a microeconomic perspective by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
9 editions published in 1994 in English and held by 83 libraries worldwide
Little is known about the characteristics of individual commercial paper issuers, or about the reasons for the countercyclical issuance of commercial paper in the aggregate. To address these issues we construct a new panel dataset linking Moody's data on commercial paper issues with Standard and Poor's Compustat. High credit quality is a requirement for entry into the commercial paper market, but long-term credit quality (bond rating) is not a sufficient statistic for short-term quality. These characteristics allow firms to issuenear-riskless short-term debt and supply a near-money asset to themarket, thereby reducing their interest costs by the amount of the" commercial paper liquidity premium. We find that low-credit-quality firms have higher stocks of inventories and financial assets. In contrast to the countercyclicality of aggregate commercial paper, we find that firm-level commercial paper is procyclical. Our data support three explanations for this apparent contradiction, all of which recognize that commercial paper issuers are atypical. First, firms of high credit quality can use commercial paper to finance inventory accumulation during downturns. Second, they also can use commercial paper to finance countercyclical increases in accounts receivable. This suggests that commercial paper issuers serve as intermediaries for other firms during downturns. Third, it may be that portfolio demand for commercial paper -- a highly liquid, safe asset -- increases during downturns
The efficiency of self-regulated payments systems : learning from the Suffolk system by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
9 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 83 libraries worldwide
This paper analyzes the operation of the Suffolk System, an interbank note-clearing network operating throughout New England from the 1820s through the 1850s. Banks made markets in each other's notes at par, which allowed New England to avoid discounting of bank notes in trade. Privately enforced regu- lations prevented free riding in the form of excessive risk taking. Observers of the Suffolk System have been divided. Some emphasized the stability and effi these arrangements. Others argued that the arrangements were motivated by rent-seeking on the part of Boston banks, and were primarily coervice and exploitative. In the neighboring Mid-Atlantic states, regulations limited the potential for developing a regional clearing system centered in New York City on the model of the Suffolk System. This difference makes it possible to compare the performance of banks across regulatory regimes to judge the relative merits of the sanguine and jaundiced views of the Suffolk System. Evidence supports the sanguine view. New England's banks were able to issue more notes and these notes traded at uniform and low discount rates compared to those of other banks. An examination of the balance sheets and stock returns of Boston and New York City banks indicates that the stock market perceived that bank lending produced less risk for bank debt holders in Boston than in New York. The benefits of the system extended outside of Boston. Peripheral New England banks displayed high propensities to issue notes, and wer able to maintain low specie reserves. Boston banks did not show high profit rates or high ratios of market-to-book values of equity; thus there is no evidence that Boston banks extracted rents from their control of the payments system
Was the Great Depression a watershed for American monetary policy? by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
10 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 83 libraries worldwide
The Great Depression changed the institutions governing monetary policy. These changes included the departure from the gold standard, an opening of a a new avenue for monetizing government debt, changes in the structure of the the Federal Reserve System, and new monetary powers of the Treasury. Ideo- logical changes accompanied institutional changes. We examine whether and how thes changes mattered for post-Depression monetary policy. With regard to the period 1935-1941, the tools of Fed policy, but not its goals or tactics, changed. But structural reforms weakened the Federal Reserve relative to the Treasury, and removed a key limit on the monetization of government debt. The increased power of the Treasury to determine the direction of policy, along with the departure from gold and the new ment debt produced a new (albeit small) inflationary bias in monetary policy that lasted until the Treasury-Fed Accord of 1951. The Fed regained some independence with the Accord of 1951. The Fed returned to its traditional pre-Depression) operating methods, and the procyclical bias in these procedures--along with pressures to monetize government debt--explains how the Fed stumbled into an inflationary policy in the 1960s. Depression-era changes--especially the departure from the gold standard in 1933 and the relaxation of an important constraint on deficit monetization in 1932--made this inflationary policy error possible, and contributed to the persistence of inflationary policy
Bank capital and portfolio management : the 1930's "capital crunch" and scramble to shed risk by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
8 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 80 libraries worldwide
Recent models of banking under asymmetric information argue that depositors penalize banks that offer high-risk deposits. Focusing on New York City banks in the 1920's and 1930's, this study examines how banks manage risk during normal times and in response to severe shocks. We develop and apply a simple framework that identifies the tradeoffs among alternative means of satisfying depositors' preferences for low-risk deposits (i.e. low asset risk versus high capital). During the 1920's profitable lending opportunities and low costs of raising capital prompted banks to increase their asset risk, while increasing capital to maintain low default risks on deposits. Cross-sectional differences in the cost of raising equity explain differences in banks' choices of asset risk and capital ratios. In the wake of the loan losses produced by the Depression, high default risk was penalized with deposit withdrawals. To reduce deposit risk, banks increased their riskless assets and cut dividends, but avoided costly equity issues. Banks with high default risk or with high costs of raising equity contracted dividends the most during the 1930's
Contagion and bank failures during the Great Depression : the June 1932 Chicago banking panic by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
9 editions published between 1994 and 1997 in English and held by 79 libraries worldwide
Studies of pre-Depression banking argue that banking panics resulted from depositor confusion about the incidence of shocks, and that interbank cooperation avoided unwarranted failures. This paper uses individual bank data to address the question of whether solvent Chicago banks failed during the panic asthe result of confusion by depositors. Chicago banks are divided" into three groups: panic failures, failures outside the panic window, and survivors. The characteristics of these three groups are compared to determine whether the banks that failed during the panic were similar ex ante" to those that survived the panic or whether they shared characteristics with other banks that failed. Each category of comparison -- the market-to-book value of equity, the estimated probability or failure or duration of survival the composition of debt, the rates of withdrawal of debt during 1931, and the interest rates paid on debt -- leads to the same conclusion: banks that failed during the panic were similar to others that failed and different from survivors. The special attributes of failing banks were distinguishable at least six months before the panic and were reflected in stock prices, failure probabilities, debt composition, and interest rates at least that far in advance. We conclude that failures during the panic reflected relative weakness in the face of common asset value shock rather than contagion. Other evidence points to cooperation among solvent Chicago banks a key factor in avoiding unwarranted bank failures during the panic
Historical macroeconomics and American macroeconomic history by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
7 editions published in 1994 in English and held by 78 libraries worldwide
What can macroeconomic history offer macroeconomic theorists and macroeconometricians? Macroeconomic history offers more than longer time series or special controlled experiments.' It suggests an historical definition of the economy, which has implications for macroeconometric methods. The defining characteristic of the historical view is its emphasis on path dependence': ways in which the cumulative past, including the history of shocks and their effects, change the structure of the economy. This essay reviews American macroeconomic history to illustrate its potential uses and draw out methodological implications. Keynesian' models can account for the most obvious cycle patterns in all historical periods, while ew classical' models cannot. Nominal wage rigidity was important historically and some models of wage rigidity receive more support from history than others. A shortcoming of both Keynesian and new-classical approaches is the assumption that low-frequency change is exogenous to demand. The history of the Kuznets cycle shows how aggregate-demand shocks can produce endogenous changes in aggregate supply. Economies of scale, learning effects, and convergences of expectations-many within the spatial contexts of city building and frontier settlement-seem to have been very important in making the aggregate supply path-dependent.' Institutional innovation (especially government regulation) has been another source of endogenous change in aggregate supply. The historical view's emphasis on endogenous structural change points in the analysis over short sample periods to identify the sources and consequences of macroeconomic shocks
Is the discount window necessary? : a Penn-Central perspective by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
9 editions published in 1993 in English and held by 67 libraries worldwide
The discount window has been under attack recently as a costly and unnecessary tool of policy. This paper argues that the primary role of the discount window should be to provide occasional, temporary support to particular financial markets during localized financial crises. The benefits of the discount window revolve around information externalities across firms resulting from confusion over the incidence of bad news, or reductions in the net worth of market intermediaries. The history of the Penn Central commercial paper crisis of 1970, and the Fed's use of the discount window to combat that crisis, are reviewed. The crisis is visible in a pronounced decline in outstanding commercial paper, an increase in the interest rate spreads for commercial paper and for long-term debt, and declines in stock prices. Cross-sectional variation in abnormal stock returns indicates that, controlling for other factors, firms that were likely to have had outstanding debt in the form of commercial paper suffered larger negative returns during the onset of the crisis, and larger positive returns after the Fed intervened to lower the cost of commercial paper rollover. Implications of the 1970 crisis for current financial markets, and for discount window policy, are considered in light of this evidence
Causes of U.S. bank distress during the Depression by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
10 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 66 libraries worldwide
This paper provides the first comprehensive econometric analysis of the causes of bank distress during the Depression. We assemble bank-level data for virtually all Fed member banks, and combine those data with county-level, state-level, and national-level economic characteristics to capture cross-sectional and inter-temporal variation in the determinants of bank failure. We construct a model of bank survival duration using these fundamental determinants of bank failure as predictors, and investigate the adequacy of fundamentals for explaining bank failures during alleged episodes of nationwide or regional banking panics. We find that fundamentals explain most of the incidence of bank failure, and argue that contagion' or liquidity crises' were a relatively unimportant influence on bank failure risk prior to 1933. We construct upper-bound measures of the importance of contagion or liquidity crises. At the national level, we find that the first two banking crises identified by Friedman and Schwartz in 1930 and 1931 are not associated with positive unexplained residual failure risk, or with changes in the importance of liquidity measures for forecasting bank failures. The third banking crisis they identify is a more ambiguous case, but even if one views it as a bona fide national liquidity crisis, the size of the contagion effect could not have been very large. The last banking crisis they identify at the beginning of 1933 is associated with important, unexplained increases in bank failure risk. We also investigate the potential role of regional or local contagion and illiquidity crises for promoting bank failure and find some evidence in support of such effects, but these are of small importance in the aggregate. We also investigate the causes of bank distress measured as deposit contraction, using county-level measures of deposits of all commercial banks, and reach similar conclusions about the importance of fundamentals in determining deposit contraction
How to restructure failed banking systems : lessons from the U.S. in the 1930's and Japan in the 1990's by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
7 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 65 libraries worldwide
The costs of government assistance to banks depend on the way rescues are managed. The cnetral questions of policy reference do not revolve around whether to bail out banks, but rather around the choice of which banks to rescue and the means for doing so. If a rescue is handled skillfully, the cost can be greatly reduced. The history of assistance to U.S. banks during the Great Depression illustrates these themes well, and can provide useful lessons for Asia today. This paper reviews the history of bank distress and assistance in the United States during the 1930's and examines in detail the role of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation - how it targeted banks, the effect of its assistance, the cost of providing assistance, and the way that it tried to align bank incentives to protect against abuse of government protection. Then, the paper contrasts that experience with the recent government loans and preferred stock purchases for Japanese banks. We argue that combining subsidized preferred stock purchases with mandatory matching contributions of common stock, limits on bank dividend payments, and reforms on bank capital regulation that credibly incorporate market discipline into the regulatory process would increase the benefits and reduce the costs of government support for banks
Corporate-finance benefits from universal banking : Germany and the United States, 1870-1914 by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
8 editions published in 1993 in English and held by 64 libraries worldwide
Limitations on bank consolidation and branching in the United States at an early date effectively limited the scope of commercial banks and their involvement in financing large-scale industry, and increased information and transaction costs of issuing securities. In contrast, German industry was financed by large-scale universal banks who maintained long-term relationships with firms, involving ongoing monitoring and disciplining of management, and underwriting. Low costs of German industrial finance are reflected in lower investment banking spreads on securities issues and a higher propensity to issue equity relative to the United States
Resolving the puzzle of the underissuance of national bank notes by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
8 editions published between 2004 and 2005 in English and held by 62 libraries worldwide
"The puzzle of underissuance of national bank notes disappears when one disaggregates data, takes account of regulatory limits, and considers differences in opportunity costs. Banks with poor lending opportunities maximized their issuance. Other banks chose to limit issuance. Redemption costs do not explain cross-sectional variation in issuance and the observed relationship between note issuance and excess reserves is inconsistent with the redemption risk hypothesis of underissuance. National banks did not enter primarily to issue national bank notes, and a "pure arbitrage" strategy of chartering a national bank only to issue national bank notes would not have been profitable. Indeed, new entrants issued less while banks exiting were often maximum issuers. Economies of scopebetween note issuing and deposit banking included shared overhead costs and the ability to reduce costs of mandatory minimum reserve and capital requirements"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
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Alternative Names
Calomiris, C.
Calomiris, Charles
Calomiris, Charles 1957-
English (182)
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