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Calomiris, Charles W.

Works: 144 works in 680 publications in 3 languages and 7,469 library holdings
Genres: History  Conference papers and proceedings  Case studies 
Roles: Author, Editor, Contributor
Classifications: HG2491, 332.10973
Publication Timeline
Publications about Charles W Calomiris
Publications by Charles W Calomiris
Most widely held works by Charles W Calomiris
Fragile by design : the political origins of banking crises and scarce credit by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
21 editions published between 2014 and 2015 in English and Chinese and held by 747 libraries worldwide
"Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries--but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents due to unforeseen circumstances. Rather, these fluctuations result from the complex bargains made between politicians, bankers, bank shareholders, depositors, debtors, and taxpayers. The well-being of banking systems depends on the abilities of political institutions to balance and limit how coalitions of these various groups influence government regulations. Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation. Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why some endure while others are undermined, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues."--Publisher's description
U.S. bank deregulation in historical perspective by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
25 editions published between 2000 and 2009 in English and held by 658 libraries worldwide
This book shows how and why deregulation has transformed the size, structure and geographic range of US banks, the scope of banking services, and the nature of bank-customer relationships. Over recent decades the characteristics that had made American banks different - the fragmented geographical structure of the industry, which restricted the scale of banks and their ability to compete with one another, and strict limits on the kinds of products and services commercial banks could offer - have virtually been eliminated. Understanding the origins and persistence of the unique banking regulations that defined US banking for over a century lends an important perspective on the economic and political causes and consequences of the current process of deregulation. History helps to define the political constituencies for and against deregulation, the political process through which bank regulations are determined, and the way deregulation is likely to affect future bank performance and stability
China's financial transition at a crossroads by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
13 editions published in 2007 in English and Undetermined and held by 285 libraries worldwide
"Drawing on the contemporary research of prominent international scholars, the experts in this volume outline the trajectory of China's financial markets since the advent of reform and anticipate their uncertain future. The book begins with an overview of the history of financial-sector development, regulation, and performance and then focuses on the banking sector, discussing the progress, challenges, and prospects of current sector reform. Subsequent chapters describe the role of foreign capital in China's development and analyze the changes in capital flows and controls over time; explore various explanations for China's composition of foreign-capital and foreign-exchange policies, particularly the factors shaping China's reliance on foreign direct investment; and provide an international, comparative perspective on the remarkable growth experience of China and the contribution of its institutional environment to that experience."--BOOK JACKET
Sustaining India's growth miracle by Jagdish N Bhagwati( Book )
17 editions published between 2008 and 2012 in English and Undetermined and held by 223 libraries worldwide
"The economy of India is growing at a rate of 8 percent per year, and its exports of goods and services have more than doubled in the past three years. Considering these trends, economists, scholars, and political leaders across the globe are beginning to wonder whether India's growth can be sustained." "Sustaining India's Growth Miracle is a valuable resource for practitioners, policymakers. students, and scholars. It tackles issues from political, economic, and academic perspectives. The concluding chapter, a talk given by the commerce and industry minister of India, discusses the country's position as a world power, outlining several reasons for India's success and exploring the difficulties that lie ahead."--Jacket
Emerging financial markets by David O Beim( Book )
10 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 185 libraries worldwide
Is the bank merger wave of the 1990s efficient? : lessons from nine case studies by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
5 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 166 libraries worldwide
High loan-to-value mortgage lending : problem or cure? by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
10 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 139 libraries worldwide
A globalist manifesto for public policy : the tenth annual IEA Hayek Memorial Lecture by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
14 editions published between 2001 and 2002 in English and held by 117 libraries worldwide
The postmodern bank safety net : lessons from developed and developing economies by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
10 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 113 libraries worldwide
Can emerging market bank regulators establish credible discipline? : the case of Argentina by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
19 editions published between 1996 and 2000 in English and Spanish and held by 92 libraries worldwide
In the early 1990s, after decades of high inflation and financial repression, Argentina embarked on a course of macroeconomic and bank regulatory reform. Bank regulatory policy promoted privatization, financial liberalization, and free entry, limited safety net support, and established a novel mix of regulatory and market discipline to ensure stable growth of the banking system during the liberalization process. Argentina suffered some fallout from the Mexican tequila crisis of 1995, but its response to that crisis (allowing weak banks to close) and the redoubling of regulatory efforts to promote market discipline after the crisis made Argentina's banking system quite resilient during the Asian, Russian, and Brazilian crises. Argentina's bank regulatory system now is widely regarded as one of the two or three most successful among emerging market economies. This paper traces the evolution of the regulatory policy changes of the 1990s and shows that the reliance on market discipline has played an important role in prudential regulation by encouraging proper risk management by banks. There is substantial heterogeneity among banks in the interest rates they pay for debt and the rate of growth of their deposits, and that heterogeneity is traceable to fundamental attributes of banks that affect the riskiness of deposits (i.e. asset risk and leverage). Moreover, market perceptions of default risk are mean-reverting, indicating that market discipline encourages banks to respond to increases in default risk by limiting asset risk or lowering leverage
Leverage as a state variable for employment, inventory accumulation, and fixed investments by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
18 editions published in 1994 in English and held by 77 libraries worldwide
The importance of a firm's balance sheet for determining its investment and employment decisions is the central assumption of macroeconomic models of 'debt deflation' or 'debt overhang.' According to these models, firm investment decisions are influenced not only by the fundamental opportunity set of the firm, but also by the firm's existing financial condition, especially its leverage. This paper tests that assumption by examining whether the responsiveness of employment, investment, and inventory accumulation to exogenous changes in sales depend on the leverage of the firm. We find that leverage acts as an important state variable for conditioning the response of all three variables to changes in sales. We also find that this effect varies depending on the state of the economy. During recessions, higher leverage magnifies the contractionary effect of declines in sales on investment; during times of positive sales growth, higher leverage tends to dampen the expansionary effect of growth in demand. The size and significance of leverage conditioning effects are larger during recessions. These results support theoretical models of the potential importance of 'debt overhang' effects. Firms that use debt to finance expansion during times of increasing demand suffer reduced ability to maintain growth during recessions as a consequence of their higher leverage
Government credit policy and industrial performance : Japanese machine tool producers, 1963-1991 by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
11 editions published between 1995 and 1999 in English and held by 73 libraries worldwide
March 1995 Programs to direct credit to industry can be uniquely beneficial if 1) the purpose of government credit is to relax borrowing constraints on firms, as an end in itself, or (2) other government objectives can best be achieved by relaxing firms' borrowing constraints (in which case, product and factor market externalities motivate government credit programs). According to Japanese officials, government involvement is warranted when: 1) investment risk is too high for a particular activity (because it is too large-scale or high-tech, or needs long gestation and market development); 2) there is a big discrepancy between private and social benefits when industries or parts of industries may save foreign exchange, for example, and thus relieve the balance of payments constraint on other growth industries); 3) information problems discourage lending to small and medium-scale industries; 4) infant industries face large social set-up costs. The authors examine the effect of policy-based finance for the period 1963-91 for Japan's machine tool industry, an industry with high potential spillover effects on technological innovation and learning. They found that directed credit may have helped to promote investment among postwar Japanese machine tool producers. Important components of that credit seem to have spurred growth. The government credit programs did not crowd out private funds and did not succeed by providing a permanent lifeline (credit insurance) to firms. But the authors do not endorse government interventions in credit markets. For one thing, the effective operation of industrial directed credit in Japan seems to be an unrepresentative case. In many countries, such government intervention has produced large costs: inefficient borrowers have been funded and public funds have been captured by special interests. In Japan, directed-credit policy is designed to promote investment, crowd in private funds, and avoid the capture of policy funds by particular firms or industries. The priorities of credit policy are determined as part of a national plan with broad participation (rather than by special-interest lobbying), and once industry-level priorities have been established, firm-level lending decisions by agencies are shielded from political pressure. In political systems that cannot implement such effective plans for distributing industrial credit, government-directed credit programs may create more problems than they solve
Universal banking and the financing of industrial development by Charles W Calomiris( file )
11 editions published in 1995 in English and Undetermined and held by 70 libraries worldwide
November 1995 Developing countries designing financial systems should take a lesson from U.S. financial history and avoid a costly, lengthy detour through financial fragmentation. In universal banking, large banks operate extensive networks of branches, provide many different services, hold several claims on firms (including equity and debt), and participate directly in the corporate governance of firms that rely on the banks for funding or as insurance underwriters. Would universal banking be effective in a newly industrializing economy? Does universal banking reduce corporate financing costs for a newly industrializing economy? Calomiris contrasts the cost of financing industrialization in the United States and in Germany during the second industrial revolution. Between 1870 and 1913, large production and distribution activities brought a new challenge to financial markets: the rapid financing of very large, minimally efficient industries. Large production is typical of modern industrial practice, so the lessons from that period apply broadly to contemporary developing countries. The second industrial revolution involved many new products and technologies, especially involving machinery, electricity, and chemicals. The novelty of these production processes posed severe information problems for external sources of finance. Firms were producing new goods in new ways on an unprecedented scale. Firms needed quick access to heavy financing from sources whose information and control costs were greater because of the difficulty of evaluating proposed projects and controlling the use of funds. Finance costs for industry were lower in Germany than in the United States, because U.S. regulations prevented the universal banking from which Germany benefited. High finance costs retarded U.S. realization of its full industrial potential and influenced U.S. firms inefficiently to rely more on raw materials and labor rather than on hard-to-finance equipment (fixed capital). Industrial buildings and equipment are less desirable than materials and accounts receivable for a financially constrained firm, because they are less liquid. The potential to expand quickly and reap economies of scale was greater in German industrialization. The cost of industrial financing began to decline when institutional changes came about that increased the concentration of financial market transactions. In recent decades, a combination of macroeconomic distress, international competitive pressure, and the creative invention of new financial intermediaries has helped the U.S. financial system overcome the regulatory mandate of financial fragmentation. This paper -- a joint product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Division, Policy Research Department, and the Financial Sector Development Department -- was presented at a Bank seminar, Financial History: Lessons of the Past for Reformers of the Present, and is a chapter in a forthcoming volume, Reforming Finance: Some Lessons from History, edited by Gerard Caprio, Jr. and Dimitri Vittas
Bank capital and portfolio management : the 1930's "capital crunch" and scramble to shed risk by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
12 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 69 libraries worldwide
Recent models of banking under asymmetric information argue that depositors penalize banks that offer high-risk deposits. Focusing on New York City banks in the 1920's and 1930's, this study examines how banks manage risk during normal times and in response to severe shocks. We develop and apply a simple framework that identifies the tradeoffs among alternative means of satisfying depositors' preferences for low-risk deposits (i.e. low asset risk versus high capital). During the 1920's profitable lending opportunities and low costs of raising capital prompted banks to increase their asset risk, while increasing capital to maintain low default risks on deposits. Cross-sectional differences in the cost of raising equity explain differences in banks' choices of asset risk and capital ratios. In the wake of the loan losses produced by the Depression, high default risk was penalized with deposit withdrawals. To reduce deposit risk, banks increased their riskless assets and cut dividends, but avoided costly equity issues. Banks with high default risk or with high costs of raising equity contracted dividends the most during the 1930's
Commercial paper, corporate finance, and the business cycle : a microeconomic perspective by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
13 editions published in 1994 in English and held by 68 libraries worldwide
Abstract: Little is known about the characteristics of individual commercial paper issuers, or about the reasons for the countercyclical issuance of commercial paper in the aggregate. To address these issues we construct a new panel dataset linking Moody's data on commercial paper issues with Standard and Poor's Compustat. High credit quality is a requirement for entry into the commercial paper market, but long-term credit quality (bond rating) is not a sufficient statistic for short-term quality. These characteristics allow firms to issuenear-riskless short-term debt and supply a near-money asset to themarket, thereby reducing their interest costs by the amount of the" commercial paper liquidity premium. We find that low-credit-quality firms have higher stocks of inventories and financial assets. In contrast to the countercyclicality of aggregate commercial paper, we find that firm-level commercial paper is procyclical. Our data support three explanations for this apparent contradiction, all of which recognize that commercial paper issuers are atypical. First, firms of high credit quality can use commercial paper to finance inventory accumulation during downturns. Second, they also can use commercial paper to finance countercyclical increases in accounts receivable. This suggests that commercial paper issuers serve as intermediaries for other firms during downturns. Third, it may be that portfolio demand for commercial paper -- a highly liquid, safe asset -- increases during downturns
Was the Great Depression a watershed for American monetary policy? by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
12 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 67 libraries worldwide
The Great Depression changed the institutions governing monetary policy. These changes included the departure from the gold standard, an opening of a a new avenue for monetizing government debt, changes in the structure of the the Federal Reserve System, and new monetary powers of the Treasury. Ideo- logical changes accompanied institutional changes. We examine whether and how thes changes mattered for post-Depression monetary policy. With regard to the period 1935-1941, the tools of Fed policy, but not its goals or tactics, changed. But structural reforms weakened the Federal Reserve relative to the Treasury, and removed a key limit on the monetization of government debt. The increased power of the Treasury to determine the direction of policy, along with the departure from gold and the new ment debt produced a new (albeit small) inflationary bias in monetary policy that lasted until the Treasury-Fed Accord of 1951. The Fed regained some independence with the Accord of 1951. The Fed returned to its traditional pre-Depression) operating methods, and the procyclical bias in these procedures--along with pressures to monetize government debt--explains how the Fed stumbled into an inflationary policy in the 1960s. Depression-era changes--especially the departure from the gold standard in 1933 and the relaxation of an important constraint on deficit monetization in 1932--made this inflationary policy error possible, and contributed to the persistence of inflationary policy
The efficiency of self-regulated payments systems : learning from the Suffolk system by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
12 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 64 libraries worldwide
Abstract: This paper analyzes the operation of the Suffolk System, an interbank note-clearing network operating throughout New England from the 1820s through the 1850s. Banks made markets in each other's notes at par, which allowed New England to avoid discounting of bank notes in trade. Privately enforced regu- lations prevented free riding in the form of excessive risk taking. Observers of the Suffolk System have been divided. Some emphasized the stability and effi these arrangements. Others argued that the arrangements were motivated by rent-seeking on the part of Boston banks, and were primarily coervice and exploitative. In the neighboring Mid-Atlantic states, regulations limited the potential for developing a regional clearing system centered in New York City on the model of the Suffolk System. This difference makes it possible to compare the performance of banks across regulatory regimes to judge the relative merits of the sanguine and jaundiced views of the Suffolk System. Evidence supports the sanguine view. New England's banks were able to issue more notes and these notes traded at uniform and low discount rates compared to those of other banks. An examination of the balance sheets and stock returns of Boston and New York City banks indicates that the stock market perceived that bank lending produced less risk for bank debt holders in Boston than in New York. The benefits of the system extended outside of Boston. Peripheral New England banks displayed high propensities to issue notes, and wer able to maintain low specie reserves. Boston banks did not show high profit rates or high ratios of market-to-book values of equity; thus there is no evidence that Boston banks extracted rents from their control of the payments system
Historical macroeconomics and American macroeconomic history by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
10 editions published in 1994 in English and held by 64 libraries worldwide
What can macroeconomic history offer macroeconomic theorists and macroeconometricians? Macroeconomic history offers more than longer time series or special controlled experiments.' It suggests an historical definition of the economy, which has implications for macroeconometric methods. The defining characteristic of the historical view is its emphasis on path dependence': ways in which the cumulative past, including the history of shocks and their effects, change the structure of the economy. This essay reviews American macroeconomic history to illustrate its potential uses and draw out methodological implications. Keynesian' models can account for the most obvious cycle patterns in all historical periods, while ew classical' models cannot. Nominal wage rigidity was important historically and some models of wage rigidity receive more support from history than others. A shortcoming of both Keynesian and new-classical approaches is the assumption that low-frequency change is exogenous to demand. The history of the Kuznets cycle shows how aggregate-demand shocks can produce endogenous changes in aggregate supply. Economies of scale, learning effects, and convergences of expectations-many within the spatial contexts of city building and frontier settlement-seem to have been very important in making the aggregate supply path-dependent.' Institutional innovation (especially government regulation) has been another source of endogenous change in aggregate supply. The historical view's emphasis on endogenous structural change points in the analysis over short sample periods to identify the sources and consequences of macroeconomic shocks
Contagion and bank failures during the Great Depression : the June 1932 Chicago banking panic by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
12 editions published in 1994 in English and held by 59 libraries worldwide
Studies of pre-Depression banking argue that banking panics resulted from depositor confusion about the incidence of shocks, and that interbank cooperation avoided unwarranted failures. This paper uses individual bank data to address the question of whether solvent Chicago banks failed during the panic asthe result of confusion by depositors. Chicago banks are divided" into three groups: panic failures, failures outside the panic window, and survivors. The characteristics of these three groups are compared to determine whether the banks that failed during the panic were similar ex ante" to those that survived the panic or whether they shared characteristics with other banks that failed. Each category of comparison -- the market-to-book value of equity, the estimated probability or failure or duration of survival the composition of debt, the rates of withdrawal of debt during 1931, and the interest rates paid on debt -- leads to the same conclusion: banks that failed during the panic were similar to others that failed and different from survivors. The special attributes of failing banks were distinguishable at least six months before the panic and were reflected in stock prices, failure probabilities, debt composition, and interest rates at least that far in advance. We conclude that failures during the panic reflected relative weakness in the face of common asset value shock rather than contagion. Other evidence points to cooperation among solvent Chicago banks a key factor in avoiding unwarranted bank failures during the panic
Causes of U.S. bank distress during the Depression by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
17 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 56 libraries worldwide
Abstract: This paper provides the first comprehensive econometric analysis of the causes of bank distress during the Depression. We assemble bank-level data for virtually all Fed member banks, and combine those data with county-level, state-level, and national-level economic characteristics to capture cross-sectional and inter-temporal variation in the determinants of bank failure. We construct a model of bank survival duration using these fundamental determinants of bank failure as predictors, and investigate the adequacy of fundamentals for explaining bank failures during alleged episodes of nationwide or regional banking panics. We find that fundamentals explain most of the incidence of bank failure, and argue that contagion' or liquidity crises' were a relatively unimportant influence on bank failure risk prior to 1933. We construct upper-bound measures of the importance of contagion or liquidity crises. At the national level, we find that the first two banking crises identified by Friedman and Schwartz in 1930 and 1931 are not associated with positive unexplained residual failure risk, or with changes in the importance of liquidity measures for forecasting bank failures. The third banking crisis they identify is a more ambiguous case, but even if one views it as a bona fide national liquidity crisis, the size of the contagion effect could not have been very large. The last banking crisis they identify at the beginning of 1933 is associated with important, unexplained increases in bank failure risk. We also investigate the potential role of regional or local contagion and illiquidity crises for promoting bank failure and find some evidence in support of such effects, but these are of small importance in the aggregate. We also investigate the causes of bank distress measured as deposit contraction, using county-level measures of deposits of all commercial banks, and reach similar conclusions about the importance of fundamentals in determining deposit contraction
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Alternative Names
Calomiris, C.
Calomiris, Charles
Calomiris, Charles 1957-
English (266)
Spanish (2)
Chinese (1)
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