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Bagwell, Kyle

Works: 164 works in 690 publications in 1 language and 7,201 library holdings
Genres: Commercial treaties  Handbooks and manuals 
Roles: Author, Editor, Thesis advisor, Other, Scenarist, Honoree
Publication Timeline
Publications about Kyle Bagwell
Publications by Kyle Bagwell
Most widely held works by Kyle Bagwell
The economics of the world trading system by Kyle Bagwell( file )
17 editions published between 2002 and 2004 in English and held by 2,450 libraries worldwide
Preferential trade agreements : law, policy, and economics by Kyle Bagwell( file )
5 editions published between 2011 and 2014 in English and held by 331 libraries worldwide
Examines preferential trade agreements and the various dysfunctions that place them among the priority items for negotiation by the WTO
Law and economics of contingent protection in international trade by Kyle Bagwell( Book )
21 editions published between 2009 and 2014 in English and held by 278 libraries worldwide
"This book discusses the regulatory framework of contingent protection in the World Trade Organization (WTO) - antidumping, countervailing duties, and safeguards as well as an economic analysis of these instruments. The book's various chapters illuminate the basic functioning of all three protections."-
Preferential trade agreements : a law and economics analysis by Kyle Bagwell( Book )
16 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 276 libraries worldwide
This volume assembles a stellar group of scholars and experts to examine preferential trade agreements (PTAs), a topic that has time and again attracted the interest of analysts. It presents a discussion of the evolving economic analysis regarding PTAs and the various dysfunctions that continually place them among the priority items for (re)negotiation by the WTO. The book explores recent empirical research that casts doubt on the old 'trade diversion' school and debates why the WTO should deal with PTAs and if PTAs belong under the mandate of the WTO as we now know it
The economics of advertising ( Book )
11 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 179 libraries worldwide
Handbook of commercial policy ( file )
7 editions published in 2016 in English and held by 160 libraries worldwide
Handbook of Commercial Policy explores three main topics that permeate the study of commercial policy. The first section presents a broad set of basic empirical facts regarding the pattern and evolution of commercial policy, with the second section investigating the crosscutting legal issues relating to the purpose and design of agreements. Finally, the third section covers key issues of commercial policy in the modern global economy. Every chapter in the book provides coverage from the perspectives of multilateral, and where appropriate, preferential trade agreements. While most other volumes are policy-oriented, this comprehensive guide explores the ways that intellectual thinking and rigor organize research, further making frontier-level synthesis and current theoretical and empirical research accessible to all
Legal and economic principles of world trade law : the genesis of the GATT, the economics of trade agreements, border instruments, and national treatment : report to ALI (April 16, 2012) by Henrik Horn( Book )
1 edition published in 2012 in English and held by 157 libraries worldwide
"Submitted by the Council to the Members of the American Law Institute for discussion at the eighty-ninth annual meeting on May 21, 22, and 23, 2012."
Multilateral tariff cooperation during the formation of customs unions by Kyle Bagwell( Book )
16 editions published between 1993 and 1994 in English and held by 113 libraries worldwide
We study the implications of customs union formation for multilateral tariff cooperation. We model cooperation in multilateral trade policy as self-enforcing, in that it involves balancing the current gains from deviating unilaterally from an agreed-upon trade policy against the future losses from forfeiting the benefits of multilateral cooperation that such a unilateral defection would imply. The early stages of the process of customs union formation are shown to alter this dynamic incentive constraint in a way that leads to a temporary 'honeymoon' for liberal multilateral trade policies. We find, however, that the harmony between customs unions and multilateral liberalization is temporary: Eventually, as the full impact of the emerging customs union becomes felt, a less favorable balance between current and future conditions reemerges, and the liberal multilateral policies of the honeymoon phase cannot be sustained. We argue that this is compatible with the evolving implications of the formation of the European Community customs union for the ability to sustain liberal multilateral trade policies under the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade
An economic theory of GATT by Kyle Bagwell( Book )
16 editions published between 1997 and 1998 in English and held by 108 libraries worldwide
Despite the important roel played by GATT in the world economy, economist have nto developed a unified theoretical framework that interprets and evaluates the principles that form the foundation of GATT. Our purpose here is to propose such a framework. Working within a general equilibrium trade model, we represent government preferences with a very general formulation that includes all the major political-economy models of trade policy as special cases. Using this general framework we establish three key results. First, GATT's principle of reciprocity can by viewed as a mechanism for implementing efficient trade agreements. Second, through the principle of reciprocity countries can implement efficient trade agreements if and only if they also abide by the principle of nondiscrimination. And third, preferential agreements undermine GATT's ability to deliver efficient multilateral outcomes through the principle of reciprocity, unless these agreements take the form of customs unions among partners that are sufficiently similar
Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral opportunism and the rules of GATT by Kyle Bagwell( Book )
13 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 108 libraries worldwide
Trade negotiations occur through time and between the governments of many countries. An important issue is thus whether the value of concessions that a government wins in a current negotiation may be eroded in a future bilateral negotiation to which it is not party. In the absence of rules that govern the bilateral negotiation, we first show that the potential for opportunistic bilateral agreements is indeed severe. We next identify rules of negotiation that serve to protect the welfare of governments that are not participating in the bilateral negotiation. The reciprocal market access' rule ensures that the market access of a non-participating country is unaltered, and we show that this rule eliminates the potential for opportunistic bilateral negotiations. This rule, however, has practical limitations, and so we next consider the negotiation rules that are prominent in GATT practice and discussion. Our main finding is that the two central rules of GATT -- non-discrimination (MFN) and reciprocity -- effectively mimic the reciprocal market access rule, and therefore offer a practical means through which to protect non-participant welfare and thereby eliminate the potential for opportunistic bilateral negotiations
Protection and the business cycle by Kyle Bagwell( Book )
16 editions published between 1995 and 1996 in English and held by 107 libraries worldwide
Empirical studies have repeatedly documented the countercyclical nature of trade barriers. In this paper, we propose a simple theoretical framework that is consistent with this and other empirical regularities in the relationship between protection and the business cycle. We examine the ability of countries to maintain efficiency- enhancing reciprocal trade agreements that control their temptation to resort to beggar-thy-neighbor policies, under the requirement that such agreements are self-enforcing. We find theoretical support for countercyclical movements in protection levels, as the fast growth in trade volume that is associated with a boom phase facilitates the maintenance of more liberal trade policies that can be sustained during a recession phase in which growth is slow. However, we also find that acyclical increases in the level of trade volume give rise to protection, implying that whether rising imports are met with greater liberalization or increased protection depends on whether they are part of a cyclic upward trend in trade volume or an acyclical increase in import levels
Reciprocal trade liberalization by Kyle Bagwell( Book )
16 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 107 libraries worldwide
Why have governments found reciprocal trade agreements such as GATT to be a more effective means of facilitating trade liberalization than unilateral initiatives? We provide in this paper an analytic framework for the study of reciprocal trade agreements. We use this framework to establish three main results. First, we argue that political-economy factors are important for explaining the range of trade policies observed, but that these factors cannot explain why governments seek reciprocal trade agreements as an institutional form for implementing their preferred policies. Rather, whether or not governments are politically motivated, Johnson (1953-54) was right: The central purpose of a reciprocal trade agreement is to eliminate the terms-of-trade driven policies that arise in the absence of such an agreement. Second, we establish an economic interpretation of the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination that represent the foundation of postwar reciprocal trade agreements. Finally, we offer new insights regarding the treatment of export subsidies in reciprocal trade agreements
Strategic export subsidies and reciprocal trade agreements : the natural monopoly case by Kyle Bagwell( Book )
16 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 105 libraries worldwide
Why do governments seek restrictions on the use of export subsidies through reciprocal trade agreements such as GATT? With existing arguments, it is possible to understand GATT's restrictions on export subsidies as representing an inefficient victory of the interests of exporting governments over the interests of importing governments. However, to our knowledge, there does not exist a formal theoretical treatment that provides circumstances under which GATT's restrictions on export subsidies can be given a world-wide efficiency rationale. In this paper, we offer one such treatment in the context of a natural monopoly market. We emphasize that subsidy competition between governments can serve to coordinate the entry decisions of firms, finding that consumers in the importing countries may suffer if the coordination afforded exporters by government subsidy programs does more to prevent entry than to promote it. In such circumstances, we show that the existence of export subsidy programs can lead to inefficiencies, and importing countries and the world as a whole can be better off when such programs are banned
The simple economics of labor standards and the GATT by Kyle Bagwell( Book )
15 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 105 libraries worldwide
How should the issue of domestic labor standards be handled in the GATT/ WTO? This question is part of a broader debate over the appropriate scope of international economic institutions such as the GATT, where member-countries are considering proposals for a new round of n3 negotiations that would move beyond GATT's focus on trade barriers and cover domestic' issues such as labor and environmental standards and regulatory reform which have traditionally been treated with benign neglect' within GATT. Such proposals encroach on traditional limits of national sovereignty, and they raise fundamental challenges to the existing structure of international economics relations among sovereign states. In this paper we consider several approaches to the treatment of domestic labor standards within a trade agreement. We use simple economic arguments to show that, while the benign neglect of labor standards within a trade agreement will result in inefficient choices for both trade barriers and labor standards, direct negotiations over labor standards are not required to reach efficient outcomes. Specifically, we describe two tafiff negotiating structures that deliver efficient outcomes while preserving varying degrees of national sovereignty over policy choices. A first approach combines tariff negotiations with subsequent Kemp-Wan adjustments, under which each government is free to alter unilaterally its policy mix so long as trade volumes are not affected. A second approach adds to the first, under which afte tariff negotiations each governement can alter unilaterally its tariff, but its trading partner is then free to issue a tariff response to stabilize export prices. We show that both approaches deliver govts. to the efficiency frontier but that the second approach provides govts. with greater sovereignty over policy choices and bears a strong resemblance to the negotiating procedures in G
Reciprocity, non-discrimination and preferential agreements in the multilateral trading system by Kyle Bagwell( Book )
15 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 104 libraries worldwide
And non-discrimination, the two principles that are the pillars of the multi- lateral trading system as embodied in GATT and its successor, the WTO. We show that GATT's principle of reciprocity serves to neutralize the world-price effects of a country's trade policy decisions, and hence can deliver efficient trade-policy outcomes for its member governments provided that the externa- lities associated with trade intervention travel through world prices. We then establish that externalities indeed travel in this way if and only if tariffs also conform to the principle of non-discrimination (MFN). In this way, the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination can work together to deliver efficient outcomes for the multilateral trading system. We also consider within our framework the implications of preferential agreements for the multilateral trading system. The introduction of free trade agreements com- plicates the way in which externalities are transmitted across countries, and in this environment the principle of reciprocity can not longer deliver efficient multilateral outcomes for its member governments. We do find a limited place for customs unions in the multilateral trading system, provided that the member countries of the union have similar political preferences. As these conditions are quite stringent, we offer little support for the hypothesis that the principle of reciprocity can deliver an efficient multi- lateral trade agreement in the presence of preferential agreements. Instead, our results offer support for the view that preferential agreements pose a threat to the existing multilateral system
Regionalism and multilateral tariff cooperation by Kyle Bagwell( Book )
13 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and held by 103 libraries worldwide
We consider a 3 country world in which each country's import market is served by competing exporters from its 2 trading partners. We assume that weak multilateral enforcement mechanisms prevent governments from implementing efficient trade policies through a multilateral agreement requiring tariffs to conform to the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle. We then ask whether ex- ceptions from MFN for the purpose of forming preferential agreements can lead to lower external tariffs, and thereby to a more efficient tariff structure under the multilateral agreement. We identify 3 opposing effects of prefer- ential agreements on the multilateral tariff structure in this setting. The tariff complementarity effect works to reduce the desired external tariffs of countries that join together in a preferential agreement. Two additional effects of preferential agreements arise only when enforcement issues at the multilateral level are considered. One of these, the punishment effect, weakens the ability of the member countries of a preferential agreement to punish deviations from the multilateral agreement thereby interfering with the ability of countries to sustain low tariffs under the multilateral agreement. The tariff discrimination effect lets countries to discriminate against those who would external tariffs of countries that join together in a preferential agreement. The relative strengths of these 3 effects determine the impact of a prefer- ential agreement on the tariff structure under the multilateral agreement. Our findings suggest that preferential agreements can have their most desirable effects on the multilateral system when the degree of multilateral cooperation is low
Strategic trade, competitive industries and agricultural trade disputes by Kyle Bagwell( Book )
17 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 102 libraries worldwide
The primary predictions of strategic-trade theory are not restricted to imperfectly-competitive markets. Indeed, these predictions emerge in a natural three-country extension of the traditional theory of trade policy in competitive markets, once the theory is augmented to allow for politically-motivated governments, so that the sign of export policy may be converted from tax to subsidy. This suggest that the ongoing agricultural trade disputes may be best interpreted from the perspective of strategic-trade theory. In fact, these disputes may offer the most important example yet of strategic-trade theory
Collusion over the business cycle by Kyle Bagwell( Book )
16 editions published in 1995 in English and held by 102 libraries worldwide
We present a theory of collusive pricing in markets subject to business cycle fluctuations. In the business cycle model that we adopt, market demand alternates stochastically between fast-growth (boom) and slow-growth (recession) phases. We provide a complete characterization of the most-collusive prices and show that: (1) the most-collusive prices may be procyclical (countercyclical) when demand growth rates are positively (negatively) correlated through time, and (2) the amplitude of the collusive pricing cycle is larger when the expected duration of boom phases decreases and when the expected duration of recession phases increases. We also offer a generalization of Rotemberg and Saloner's (1986) model, and interpret their findings in terms of transitory demand shocks that occur within broader business cycle phases
The case for tradable remedies in wto dispute settlement by Kyle Bagwell( file )
9 editions published between 2004 and 2013 in English and Undetermined and held by 101 libraries worldwide
In response to concerns over the efficacy of the WTO dispute settlement system, especially in regard to its use by developing countries, Mexico has tabled a proposal to introduce tradable remedies within the Dispute Settlement Understanding. The idea is that a country that has won cause before the WTO, and who is facing non-implementation by the author of the illegal act but feels that its own capacity to exercise its right to impose countermeasures is unlikely to lead to compliance, can auction off that right. The attractiveness of this idea is that it offers an additional possibility to injured WTO members to get something from the dispute settlement mechanism without putting into question the legal nature of the existing contract, that is, the predominantly decentralized system of enforcement in the WTO. Examining all disputes brought to the WTO since its inception, the authors find some support for Mexico's perception that developing countries face a practical problem when they attempt to carry through with effective retaliation within the WTO system. And based on the formal results of Bagwell, Mavroidis, and Staiger (2003), they describe arguments that lend some support to the efficacy of Mexico's proposed solution from the perspective of formal economic theory
Domestic policies, national sovereignty and international economic institutions by Kyle Bagwell( Book )
13 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 97 libraries worldwide
To what extent must nations cede control over their economic and social policies if global efficiency is to be achieved in an interdependent world? This question is at the center of the debate over the future role of GATT (and its successor, the WTO) in the realm of labor and environmental standards. Current GATT rules reflect the primacy of market access concerns in GATT practice, and this orientation is seen increasingly as unfriendly to labor and environmental causes. Fundamental changes to GATT are being considered as a result, changes that would expand the scope of GATT negotiations to include labor and environmental policies, and would lead to a significant loss of sovereignty for national governments. In this paper we establish that there is no need for the WTO to expand the scope of its negotiations in this way. We show instead that the market access focus of current GATT rules is well-equipped to handle the problems associated with choices over labor and environmental standards, and that with relatively modest changes that grant governments more sovereignty, not less, these rules can in principle deliver globally efficient outcomes
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Alternative Names
Bagwell, K. 1961-
Bagwell, Kyle
Bagwell, Kyle W.
Bagwell, Kyle W., 1961-
English (268)
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