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Wheelock, David C.

Overview
Works: 58 works in 145 publications in 1 language and 1,110 library holdings
Genres: History 
Classifications: HG2563, 332.497309042
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about David C Wheelock
Publications by David C Wheelock
Most widely held works about David C Wheelock
 
Most widely held works by David C Wheelock
The strategy and consistency of Federal Reserve monetary policy, 1924-1933 by David C Wheelock( Book )
10 editions published between 1991 and 2004 in English and held by 399 libraries worldwide
Aggregate price shocks and financial instability : an historical analysis by Michael D Bordo( Book )
12 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 98 libraries worldwide
This paper presents empirical evidence on the hypothesis that aggregate price disturbances cause or worsen financial instability. We construct two annual indexes of financial conditions for the United States covering 1790-1997, and estimate the effect of aggregate price shocks on each index using a dynamic ordered probit model. We find that price level shocks contributed to financial instability during 1790-1933, and that inflation rate shocks contributed to financial instability during 1980-97. Our research indicates that the size of the aggregate price shocks needed to substantially alter financial conditions depends on the institutional environment, but that a monetary policy focused on price stability would be conducive to financial stability
Was the Great Depression a watershed for American monetary policy? by Charles W Calomiris( Book )
10 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 83 libraries worldwide
The Great Depression changed the institutions governing monetary policy. These changes included the departure from the gold standard, an opening of a a new avenue for monetizing government debt, changes in the structure of the the Federal Reserve System, and new monetary powers of the Treasury. Ideo- logical changes accompanied institutional changes. We examine whether and how thes changes mattered for post-Depression monetary policy. With regard to the period 1935-1941, the tools of Fed policy, but not its goals or tactics, changed. But structural reforms weakened the Federal Reserve relative to the Treasury, and removed a key limit on the monetization of government debt. The increased power of the Treasury to determine the direction of policy, along with the departure from gold and the new ment debt produced a new (albeit small) inflationary bias in monetary policy that lasted until the Treasury-Fed Accord of 1951. The Fed regained some independence with the Accord of 1951. The Fed returned to its traditional pre-Depression) operating methods, and the procyclical bias in these procedures--along with pressures to monetize government debt--explains how the Fed stumbled into an inflationary policy in the 1960s. Depression-era changes--especially the departure from the gold standard in 1933 and the relaxation of an important constraint on deficit monetization in 1932--made this inflationary policy error possible, and contributed to the persistence of inflationary policy
Aggregate price shocks and financial stability : the United Kingdom 1796-1999 by Michael D Bordo( Book )
12 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 74 libraries worldwide
"This paper investigates the impact historically of aggregate price shocks on financial stability in the United Kingdom. We construct an annual index of U.K. financial conditions for 1790-1999 and use a dynamic probit model to estimate the effect of aggregate price shocks on the index. We find that price level shocks contributed significantly to financial instability during 1820-1931, and that inflation rate shocks contributed to instability during 1972-99. Both the nature of aggregate price shocks and their impact depend on the existing monetary and financial regime, but price shocks historically have been a source of financial instability."--FRB of St. Louis web site
Monetary policy and asset prices : a look back at past U.S. stock market booms by Michael D Bordo( Book )
5 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 63 libraries worldwide
"This paper examines the economic environments in which past U.S. stock market booms occurred as a first step toward understanding how asset price booms come about and whether monetary policy should be used to defuse booms. We identify several episodes of sustained rapid rise in equity prices in the 19th and 20th Centuries, and then assess the growth of real output, productivity, the price level, money and credit stocks during each episode. Two booms stand out in terms of their length and rate of increase in market prices -- the booms of 1923-29 and 1994-2000. In general, we find that booms occurred in periods of rapid real growth and productivity advance, suggesting that booms are driven at least partly by fundamentals. We find no consistent relationship between inflation and stock market booms, though booms have typically occurred when money and credit growth were above average"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Did doubling reserve requirements cause the recession of 1937-1938? a microeconomic approach by Charles W Calomiris( file )
5 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 39 libraries worldwide
In 1936-37, the Federal Reserve doubled the reserve requirements imposed on member banks. Ever since, the question of whether the doubling of reserve requirements increased reserve demand and produced a contraction of money and credit, and thereby helped to cause the recession of 1937-1938, has been a matter of controversy. Using microeconomic data to gauge the fundamental reserve demands of Fed member banks, we find that despite being doubled, reserve requirements were not binding on bank reserve demand in 1936 and 1937, and therefore could not have produced a significant contraction in the money multiplier. To the extent that increases in reserve demand occurred from 1935 to 1937, they reflected fundamental changes in the determinants of reserve demand and not changes in reserve requirements
Does the structure of banking markets affect economic growth? evidence from U.S. state banking markets by Kris James Mitchener( file )
5 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 38 libraries worldwide
This paper examines the relationship between the structure of banking markets and economic growth using a new dataset on manufacturing industry-level growth rates and banking market concentration for U.S. states during 1899-1929--a period when the manufacturing sector was expanding rapidly and restrictive branching laws segmented the U.S. banking system geographically. Unlike studies of modern developing and developed countries, we find that banking market concentration had a positive impact on manufacturing sector growth in the early twentieth century, with little variation across industries with different degrees of dependence on external financing or access to capital. However, because regulations affecting bank entry varied considerably across U.S. states and the industrial organization of the U.S. banking system differs markedly from those of other countries, we also examine the impact of other aspects of banking market structure and policy on growth. We continue to find that banking market concentration boosted industrial growth. In addition, we find evidence that a greater prevalence of branch banking and more banks per capita increased the growth of industries that rely relatively heavily on external financing or have greater access to external funding sources, while deposit insurance depressed growth in the manufacturing sector. Regulations on bank entry and other banking market characteristics thus appear to exert an independent influence on manufacturing growth in geographically fragmented banking markets
Inflation, monetary policy and stock market conditions by Michael D Bordo( file )
5 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 37 libraries worldwide
This paper examines the association between inflation, monetary policy and U.S. stock market conditions during the second half of the 20th century. We estimate a latent variable VAR to examine how macroeconomic and policy shocks affect the condition of the stock market. Further, we examine the contribution of various shocks to market conditions during particular episodes and find evidence that inflation and interest rate shocks had particularly strong impacts on market conditions in the postwar era. Disinflation shocks promoted market booms and inflation shocks contributed to busts. We conclude that central banks can contribute to financial market stability by minimizing unanticipated changes in inflation
The Great Inflation did the Shadow know better? by William Poole( file )
4 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 36 libraries worldwide
The Shadow Open Market Committee was formed in 1973 in response to rising inflation and the apparent unwillingness of U.S. policymakers to implement policies necessary to maintain price stability. This paper describes how the Committee's policy views differed from those of most Federal Reserve officials and many academic economists at the time. The Shadow argued that price stability should be the primary goal of monetary policy and favored gradual adjustment of monetary growth to a rate consistent with price stability. This paper evaluates the Shadow's policy rule in the context of the New Keynesian macroeconomic model of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999). Simulations of the model suggest that the gradual stabilization of monetary growth favored by the Shadow would have lowered inflation with less impact on output growth and less variability in inflation or output than a one-time reduction in monetary growth. We conclude that the Shadow articulated a policy that would have outperformed the policies actually implemented by the Federal Reserve during the Great Inflation era
The promise and performance of the Federal Reserve as lender of last resort 1914-1933 by Michael D Bordo( file )
5 editions published between 2010 and 2011 in English and Undetermined and held by 34 libraries worldwide
This paper examines the origins and early performance of the Federal Reserve as lender of last resort. The Fed was established to overcome the problems of the National Banking era, in particular an "inelastic" currency and the absence of an effective lender of last resort. As conceived by Paul Warburg and Nelson Aldrich at Jekyll Island in 1910, the Fed's discount window and bankers acceptance-purchase facilities were expected to solve the problems that had caused banking panics in the National Banking era. Banking panics returned with a vengeance in the 1930s, however, and we examine why the Fed failed to live up to the promise of its founders. Although many factors contributed to the Fed's shortcomings, we argue that the failure of the Federal Reserve Act to faithfully recreate the conditions that had enabled European central banks to perform effectively as lenders of last resort, or to reform the inherently unstable U.S. banking system, were crucial. The Fed's shotcomings led to numerous reforms in the mid-1930s, including expansion of the Fed's lending authority and changes in the System's structure, as well as changes that made the U.S. banking system less prone to banking panics. Finally, we consider lessons about the design of lender of last resort policies that might be drawn from the Fed's early history
Darryl Francis and the Making of Monetary Policy, 1966-1975 by R. W Hafer( Computer File )
2 editions published in 2003 in No Linguistic Content and English and held by 17 libraries worldwide
Darryl Francis was president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis from 1966 to 1975. Throughout those years he was a leading critic of United States monetary policy. Francis argued in policy meetings and public venues that monetary policy should focus on maintaining a stable price level. In contrast, most policymakers at the time believed it possible to exploit a trade-off between unemployment and inflation. Francis attributed inflation directly to excessive growth of the money stock while other policymakers blamed labor and product market failures, fiscal policy, and commodity price shocks. Francis argued that inflation could not be controlled except by limiting the growth of monetary aggregates whereas other policymakers promoted price controls or other schemes. Francis favored maintaining a stable money stock growth rate at a time when monetary policy was widely interpreted as involving the manipulation of interest rates. Reviewing the debates between Francis and his Federal Reserve colleagues improves our understanding of the reasons behind the Fed's monetary policy actions at the time and illuminates how policy views evolved toward accepting price level stability as the paramount, long-term objective for monetary policy.... Cf.: http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR01283
Rise and Fall of a Policy Rule Monetarism at the St. Louis Fed, 1968-1986 by R. W Hafer( Computer File )
2 editions published in 2001 in No Linguistic Content and English and held by 17 libraries worldwide
From the 1960s to the 1980s, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis played an important and highly visible role in the development and advocacy of stabilization policy based on the targeting of monetary aggregates. Research conducted at the St. Louis Bank extended earlier monetarist analysis that had focused on the role of money in explaining economic activity in the long run. Their success in finding apparently robust, stable relationships in both long- and short-run data led monetarists to apply long-run propositions to short-run policy questions, effectively competing with alternative views of the time. When the short-run correlation between money and economic activity went astray in the early 1970s, however, the efficacy of the monetarist rule and appeals for targeting monetary aggregates to achieve economic stabilization quickly lost credibility. This article traces the evolution of monetary policy research at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis as it moved from the identification of long-run relationships between money and economic activity toward short-run policy analysis. The authors show how monetarists were lulled into advocating a short-run stabilization policy and argue that this experience counsels against overconfidence in our ability to identify infallible rules for conducting short-run stabilization policy in general.... Cf.: http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR01235
Monetary Policy and Asset Prices A Look at Past U.S. Stock Market Booms by Michael D Bordo( Computer File )
2 editions published in 2005 in No Linguistic Content and English and held by 16 libraries worldwide
This article examines the economic environments in which past U.S. stock market booms occurred as a first step toward understanding how asset price booms come about and whether monetary policy should be used to defuse booms. The authors identify several episodes of sustained rapid rises in equity prices in the 19th and 20th centuries, and then assess the growth of real output, productivity, the price level, and money and credit stocks during each episode. Two booms stand out in terms of their length and rate of increase in market prices -- the booms of 1923-1929 and 1994-2000. In general, the authors find that booms occurred in periods of rapid real growth and productivity advancement, suggesting that booms are driven at least partly by fundamentals. They find no consistent relationship between inflation and stock market booms, though booms have typically occurred when money and credit growth were above average
Price Stability and Financial Stability The Historical Record by Michael D Bordo( Computer File )
2 editions published in 1999 in No Linguistic Content and English and held by 16 libraries worldwide
Many countries mandate inflation control as the paramount objective for monetary policy. Critics argue, however, that such a narrow focus compromises monetary authorities' responsibility to preserve stability of the financial system and that a more limited focus on inflation control could increase financial instability. The authors examine the economic histories of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, and determine that most episodes of severe financial instability occurred during disinflationary periods that followed sustained inflation. They conclude that the evidence appears to support the claims of those who argue that control of inflation could enhance, rather than detract from, the stability of a financial system
History of the Asymmetric Policy Directive by Daniel L Thornton( Computer File )
2 editions published in 2000 in No Linguistic Content and English and held by 16 libraries worldwide
From 1983 through 1999, policy directives issued by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) contained a statement pertaining to possible future policy actions, which was known as the "symmetry," "tilt," or "bias" of the directive. In May 1999, the FOMC began to announce publicly the symmetry of its current directive. This resulted in much speculation about the meaning of asymmetric directives, which the FOMC had never officially defined. In this article, the authors. investigate three suggested interpretations: (1) Asymmetry was intended to convey likely changes in policy either between FOMC meetings or at the next meeting, (2) Asymmetry increased the chairman's authority to change policy in the direction indicated by the specified asymmetry, and (3) Asymmetric language was used primarily to build consensus among voting FOMC members. The authors find strong support in the implementation of monetary policy only for the consensus-building hypothesis
Why Does Bank Performance Vary Across States? by Michelle Clark Neely( Computer File )
2 editions published in 1998 in No Linguistic Content and English and held by 16 libraries worldwide
One purpose of this research is to suggest how the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 might alter the future structure of the United States banking industry by illustrating how branching restrictions have affected banking markets and performance in the past. The research also examines whether loan loss provisions taken by money center banks and other large banks in the 1980s contributed to the increased dispersion of state-level bank earnings in those years
Monetary Policy and Financial Market Expectations What Did They Know and When Did They Know It? by Michael R Pakko( Computer File )
2 editions published in 1998 in No Linguistic Content and English and held by 16 libraries worldwide
The data attempt to demystify the relationship between Federal Reserve monetary policy actions and interest rate behavior
Measuring Commercial Bank Profitability Proceed With Caution ( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 15 libraries worldwide
The federal tax code creates challenges for comparing the profit rates of different banks on a consistent basis. The earnings of banks that elect to operate under subchapter S of the federal tax code are not subject to federal corporate income tax, but shareholders of these "S-banks" are taxed on their pro rata share of the entire earnings of the bank. The number of banks electing subchapter S tax treatment has increased rapidly, especially among small banks. The authors use estimates of the federal corporate income tax that S-banks would pay if they were subject to the tax to show that the difference in the tax treatment of S-banks and other banks has a large impact on measures of United States banking system profitability. Further, the article shows that adjustment of S-bank earnings by estimates of federal income taxes to make them comparable with the earnings of other banks can markedly affect conclusions of studies that use net income as a measure of performance. Finally, the article shows that S-banks (even after their earnings are reduced by estimated federal taxes) tend to out-earn their peers. S-banks also tend to have higher earnings rates than their peers in the year before they elect S-bank status.... Cf.: http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR21301
The strategy and consistency of Federal Reserve monetary policy, 1919-1933 by David C Wheelock( Book )
2 editions published in 1987 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Explaining bank failures : deposit insurance, regulation, and efficiency by David C Wheelock( Book )
2 editions published in 1993 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
 
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Alternative Names
Wheelock, David
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English (86)
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