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Cabral, Luís M. B.

Overview
Works: 44 works in 150 publications in 4 languages and 896 library holdings
Roles: Editor
Classifications: HD2326, 338.6
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about Luís M. B Cabral
Publications by Luís M. B Cabral
Most widely held works by Luís M. B Cabral
Introduction to industrial organization by Luís M. B Cabral( Book )
10 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 400 libraries worldwide
Over the past 20 years, the study of industrial organization -the analysis of imperfectly competitive markets - has grown from a niche area of microeconomics to a key component of economics and of related disciplines such as finance, strategy and marketing. This book provides an issue-driven introduction to industrial organization. It includes a vast array of examples, from both within and outside the United States. While formal in its approach, the book is written in a way that requires only basic mathematical training. Supplemental materials posted on the Web make more extensive use of algebra and calculus
Readings in industrial organization ( Book )
8 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 187 libraries worldwide
In this work, Luis Cabral has compiled and placed into context the most important contributions to the literature of industrial economics (IO) since the 1980s
Economía industrial by Luís M. B Cabral( Book )
11 editions published between 1994 and 2002 in Spanish and Portuguese and held by 32 libraries worldwide
Economia industriale by Luís M. B Cabral( Book )
6 editions published between 2002 and 2007 in Italian and held by 22 libraries worldwide
The dynamics of seller reputation : theory and evidence from eBay by Luís Cabral( Book )
6 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 20 libraries worldwide
"We propose a basic theoretical model of eBay's reputation mechanism, derive a series of implications and empirically test their validity. Our theoretical model features both adverse selection and moral hazard. We show that when a seller receives a negative rating for the first time his reputation decreases and so does his effort level. This implies a decline in sales and price; and an increase in the rate of arrival of subsequent negative feedback. Our model also suggests that sellers with worse records are more likely to exit (and possibly re-enter under a new identity), whereas better sellers have more to gain from buying a reputation' by building up a record of favorable feedback through purchases rather than sales. Our empirical evidence, based on a panel data set of seller feedback histories and cross-sectional data on transaction prices collected from eBay is broadly consistent with all of these predictions. An important conclusion of our results is that eBay's reputation system gives way to strategic responses from both buyers and sellers"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
On the evolution of the firm size distribution : facts and theory by Luís M. B Cabral( Book )
5 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 18 libraries worldwide
Entry mistakes by Luís M. B Cabral( Book )
5 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 18 libraries worldwide
Competitors, complementors, parents and places explaining regional agglomeration in the U.S. auto industry by Luís M. B Cabral( file )
4 editions published in 2013 in English and held by 17 libraries worldwide
Taking the early U.S. automobile industry as an example, we evaluate four competing hypotheses on regional industry agglomeration: intra-industry local externalities, inter-industry local externalities, employee spinouts, and location fixed-effects. Our findings suggest that inter-industry spillovers, particularly the development of the carriage and wagon industry, play an important role. Spinouts play a secondary role and only contribute to agglomeration at later stages of industry evolution. The presence of other firms in the same industry has a negligible (or maybe even negative) effect on agglomeration. Finally, location fixed-effects account for some agglomeration, though to a lesser extent than inter-industry spillovers and spinouts
Go for broke or play it safe? : dynamic competition with choice of variance by Axel Anderson( Book )
5 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 17 libraries worldwide
An equilibrium approach to international merger policy by Luís M. B Cabral( Book )
6 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 16 libraries worldwide
Procuring innovation by Luís M. B Cabral( Book )
6 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 15 libraries worldwide
R & D alliances as non-cooperative supergames by Luís M. B Cabral( Book )
2 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 14 libraries worldwide
Are sunk costs a barrier to entry? by Luís M. B Cabral( Book )
6 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 13 libraries worldwide
Dynamic price competition with network effects by Luís M. B Cabral( Book )
6 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 13 libraries worldwide
Switching costs and equilibrium prices by Luís M. B Cabral( Book )
5 editions published in 2012 in English and held by 11 libraries worldwide
In a competitive environment, switching costs have two effects. First, they increase the market power of a seller with locked-in customers. Second, they increase competition for new customers. I provide conditions under which switching costs decrease or increase equilibrium prices. Taken together, the suggest that, if markets are very competitive to begin with, then switching costs make them even more competitive; whereas if markets are not very competitive to begin with, then switching costs make them even less competitive. In the above statements, by "competitive" I mean a market that is close to a symmetric duopoly or one where the sellers' discount factor is very high
Aftermarket power and basic market competition by Luís M. B Cabral( Book )
5 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 11 libraries worldwide
R&D alliances as non-cooperative supergames by Luís M. B Cabral( Book )
8 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 9 libraries worldwide
Does Microsoft stifle innovation? : dominant firms, imitation and R & D incentives by Luís M. B Cabral( Book )
1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 9 libraries worldwide
We're number 1 : price wars for market share leadership by Luís M. B Cabral( file )
3 editions published in 2014 in English and held by 6 libraries worldwide
I examine the dynamics of oligopolies when firms derive subjective value from being the market leader. In equilibrium, prices alternate in tandem between high levels and occasional price wars, which take place when market shares are similar and market leadership is at stake. The stationary distribution of market shares is typically multi-modal, that is, much of the time there is a stable market leader. Even though shareholders do not value market leadership per se, a corporate culture that values market leadership may increase shareholder value. From a competition policy point of view, the paper implies that price regime change dynamics and parallel pricing are consistent with competitive behavior -- in fact, hyper-competitive behavior
Does Microsoft stifle innovation? dominant firms, imitation and R&D incentives by Luís M. B Cabral( Computer File )
4 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 6 libraries worldwide
 
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Alternative Names
Cabral, Luís
Cabral, Luís 1961-
Cabral, Luís Martins Barata
Cabral, Luís Martins-Barata 1961-
Languages
English (95)
Spanish (8)
Italian (6)
Portuguese (3)
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