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Ouattara, Bazoumana

Overview
Works: 13 works in 47 publications in 3 languages and 107 library holdings
Classifications: HC21, 338.91
Publication Timeline
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Publications about Bazoumana Ouattara
Publications by Bazoumana Ouattara
Most widely held works by Bazoumana Ouattara
Aid, debt burden and government fiscal behaviour a new model applied to Côte d'lvoire by Mark McGillivray( Book )
7 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 22 libraries worldwide
The composition of aid and the fiscal sector in an aid-recipient economy : a model by George Mavrotas( Book )
7 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 21 libraries worldwide
Aid disaggregation, endogenous aid and the public sector in aid-recipient economies : evidence from Côte d'Ivoire by George Mavrotas( Book )
6 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 21 libraries worldwide
Moral hazard and the composition of transfers theory with an application to foreign aid by J. Atsu Amegashie( Computer File )
8 editions published between 2007 and 2009 in English and German and held by 15 libraries worldwide
The paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of a donor's choice of the composition of unrestricted and in-kind/restricted transfers to a recipient and how this composition is adjusted in response to changes in the moral hazard behavior of the recipient. In-kind or restricted transfers may be used, among others, to control a recipient's moral hazard behavior but may be associated with deadweight losses. Within the context of foreign aid, we use a canonical political agency model to construct a simple signaling game between a possibly corrupt politician in a recipient country and a donor to illustrate the donor's optimal choice of tied (restricted) and untied foreign aid. We clarify the condition under which a reduction in the recipient's moral hazard behavior (i.e., improvement in the level of governance) leads to a fall in the proportion of tied aid. We test the predictions of our theoretical analysis using data on the composition of foreign aid by multilateral and bilateral donors
Aid, debt burden and government fiscal behaviour in Côte d'Ivoire by Mark McGillivray( Book )
6 editions published between 2003 and 2005 in English and held by 11 libraries worldwide
This paper examines the impact of foreign aid on public sector fiscal behaviour in Côte d'Ivoire. A special interest is the relationship between aid, debt servicing and debt, given that Côte d'Ivoire is a highly indebted country. The theoretical model employed differs from those of previous studies by highlighting the interaction between debt servicing and the other fiscal variables. This model is estimated using 1975-99 time series data. Key findings are that the bulk of aid is allocated to debt servicing and that aid is associated with increases in the level of public debt
An empirical inquiry into the nature of welfarism by J. Atsu Amegashie( Book )
6 editions published in 2011 in English and Undetermined and held by 11 libraries worldwide
Economists typically evaluate policies based on how such policies affect individuals' utilities. We follow this approach by taking a welfarist view of the USA's espoused policy of promoting liberty in other parts of the world. However, we take a nuanced view by investigating the type of welfare that the USA promotes. On one hand, we identify a direct value of liberty in the sense that basic human rights like freedom of speech, freedom to express one's religious beliefs, and freedom to form associations improve welfare. In this case, liberty is directly consumed. We argue that this improvement in welfare comes simply from giving people greater levels of freedom and is independent of the existence of other inputs. On the other hand, we identify an indirect value of liberty because liberty is indirectly consumed insofar as it is an input in an economy's production function and therefore affects welfare through its effect on an economy's capacity to produce goods and services. However, unlike the direct effect mentioned above, we argue that liberty alone cannot produce this indirect effect and therefore needs complementary inputs like investments in physical and human capital. We identify foreign aid as a source of information for investigating a donor's direct and indirect values of liberty. In our empirical work, our identification strategy exploits the aforementioned difference in the characteristics of the direct and indirect values of liberty to test whether the USA's foreign aid allocation is motivated by a direct value or and/or an indirect value for liberty. As a test of validity, we apply our methodology to the aid allocation of donors who, we believe, are different from the USA. These are Arab donors and Scandinavian countries (i.e., Sweden, Norway, and Denmark). We also include the UK
Modelling the long run determinants of private investment in Senegal by Bazoumana Ouattara( Book )
1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Foreign aid inflows and the real exchange rate in the CFA franc zone by Bazoumana Ouattara( Book )
1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
TFP growth and its determinants nonparametrics and model averaging by Michael Danquah( Book )
1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Productivity growth, human capital and distance to frontier in Sub-Saharan Africa by Michael Danquah( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2010 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
The impact of aid on growth : an aid disaggregation approach by Bazoumana Ouattara( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2008 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Moral Hazard and the Composition of Transfers: Theory with an Application to Foreign Aid by Bazoumana Ouattara( Archival Material )
1 edition published in 2009 in English and held by 0 libraries worldwide
The paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of a donor’s choice of the composition of unrestricted and in-kind/restricted transfers to a recipient and how this composition is adjusted in response to changes in the moral hazard behavior of the recipient. In-kind or restricted transfers may be used, among others, to control a recipient’s moral hazard behavior but may be associated with deadweight losses. Within the context of foreign aid, we use a canonical political agency model to construct a simple signaling game between a possibly corrupt politician in a recipient country and a donor to illustrate the donor’s optimal choice of tied (restricted) and untied foreign aid. We clarify the condition under which a reduction in the recipient’s moral hazard behavior (i.e., improvement in the level of governance) leads to a fall in the proportion of tied aid. We test the predictions of our theoretical analysis using data on the composition of foreign aid by multilateral and bilateral donors
 
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Alternative Names
Ouattara, B.
Ouattara, Osman
Languages
English (44)
German (1)
French (1)
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