skip to content

Burgess, Robin

Overview
Works: 19 works in 95 publications in 1 language and 478 library holdings
Roles: Author, Honoree
Classifications: HC411, 305.42
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about Robin Burgess
Publications by Robin Burgess
Most widely held works by Robin Burgess
Modernization and son preference in People's Republic of China by Robin Burgess( Book )
8 editions published between 2000 and 2002 in English and held by 96 libraries worldwide
The behaviour of state firms in eastern Europe, pre- privatisation by Philippe Aghion( Book )
11 editions published between 1993 and 1994 in English and held by 49 libraries worldwide
Toward a microeconomics of growth by Robin Burgess( file )
2 editions published in 2004 in Undetermined and English and held by 36 libraries worldwide
Toward a microeconomics of growth by Robin Burgess( Book )
10 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and held by 25 libraries worldwide
What drives growth at the microeconomic level? Burgess and Venables divide the factors that determine a location's growth performance into two groups, "1st advantage" and "2nd advantage." The term 1st advantage refers to the conditions that provide the environment in which new activities can be profitably developed, including most of the factors on which traditional theory has focused, such as access to inputs (labor and capital), access to markets, provision of basic infrastructure, and the institutional environment. The term 2nd advantage refers to factors that increase returns to scale and can lead to cumulative causation processes. They may be acquired by learning, through technological spillovers, or by the development of thick markets of suppliers and local skills. The authors' analysis suggests that empirical investigation of the drivers of growth must shift down to a more microeconomic level. Such an analysis has become more feasible as data at the subnational level have become more available. By viewing recent empirical evidence on drivers of growth through their analytical framework, the authors are able to begin to sketch out a microeconomic agenda for growth. They emphasize that it is the manner in which 1st and 2nd advantages interact that shapes the pattern of development. The authors then turn to the example of how policy has affected manufacturing growth performance in India. They analyze links between the direction of state-level labor regulation and growth in the organized manufacturing sector, how state-led expansion of bank branches into rural areas has affected unregistered or informal manufacturing, and how the pre-reform technological capability of industries affected their response to liberalization in 1991. The analysis suggests that policy choices at the local level affect growth. Both theory and empirics need to downshift to the microeconomic level if we are to make advances in identifying specific means of encouraging innovation and growth. This paper is a product of Partnerships, Capacity Building, Development Economics Senior Vice Presidency
Tax reform in India by Robin Burgess( Book )
5 editions published in 1993 in English and held by 24 libraries worldwide
The political economy of government responsiveness : theory and evidence from India by Timothy Besley( Book )
5 editions published between 2000 and 2001 in English and held by 24 libraries worldwide
Can labor regulation hinder economic performance? : evidence from India by Timothy Besley( Book )
7 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 23 libraries worldwide
Development economics
Taxation and development by Robin Burgess( Book )
4 editions published in 1992 in English and held by 20 libraries worldwide
Prediction and determination of household permanent income by Ramses H Abul Naga( Book )
8 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 18 libraries worldwide
The political economy of deforestation in the tropics by Robin Burgess( Book )
10 editions published between 2011 and 2012 in English and held by 12 libraries worldwide
Tropical deforestation accounts for almost one-fifth of greenhouse gas emissions worldwide and threatens the world's most diverse ecosystems. The prevalence of illegal forest extraction in the tropics suggests that understanding the incentives of local bureaucrats and politicians who enforce forest policy may be critical to combating tropical deforestation. We find support for this thesis using a novel satellite-based dataset that tracks annual changes in forest cover across eight years of institutional change in post-Soeharto Indonesia. Increases in the numbers of political jurisdictions are associated with increased deforestation and with lower prices in local wood markets, consistent with a model of Cournot competition between jurisdictions. We also show that illegal logging and rents from unevenly distributed oil and gas revenues are short run substitutes, but this effect disappears over time as political turnover occurs. The results illustrate how incentives faced by local government oØ cials affect deforestation, and provide an example of how standard economic theories can explain illegal behavior
Do rural banks matter? : evidence from the Indian social banking experiment by Robin Burgess( Book )
7 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and held by 11 libraries worldwide
Do rural banks matter? : evidence from the Indian social banking experiment by Robin Burgess( file )
1 edition published in 2003 in English and held by 8 libraries worldwide
Welfare analysis in rural China by Robin Burgess( Book )
4 editions published in 1997 in English and Undetermined and held by 5 libraries worldwide
The value of democracy : evidence from road building in Kenya by Robin Burgess( Book )
7 editions published in 2013 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Ethnic favoritism is seen as antithetical to development. This paper provides credible quantification of the extent of ethnic favoritism using data on road building in Kenyan districts across the 1963-2011 period. Guided by a model it then examines whether the transition in and out of democracy under the same president constrains or exacerbates ethnic favoritism. Across the 1963 to 2011 period, we find strong evidence of ethnic favoritism: districts that share the ethnicity of the president receive twice as much expenditure on roads and have four times the length of paved roads built. This favoritism disappears during periods of democracy
Benchmarking government provision of social safety nets by Timothy Besley( Book )
1 edition published in 2003 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Do rural banks matter? evidence from the indian social banking experiment by Robin Burgess( Article )
2 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Toward a microeconomics of growth by Robin Burgess( Sound Recording )
1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
The political economy of deforestation in the tropics by Robin Burgess( Archival Material )
1 edition published in 2010 in English and held by 0 libraries worldwide
Logging of tropical forests accounts for almost one-fifth of greenhouse gas emissions worldwide and threatens some of the worlds most diverse ecosystems. This paper demonstrates that local-level political economy substantially affects the rate of tropical deforestation in Indonesia. Using a novel MODIS satellite-based dataset that tracks annual changes in forest cover over an 8-year period, we find three main results. First, we show that increasing numbers of political jurisdictions leads to increased deforestation. This effect, particularly for illegal logging, is consistent with a model of Cournot competition between jurisdictions determining how much wood to extract from their forests. Second, we demonstrate the existence of political logging cycles," where illegal logging increases dramatically in the years leading up to local elections. Third, we show that, for local government o¢ cials, logging and other sources of rents are short-run substitutes, but that this affect disappears over time as the political equilibrium shifts. The results document how local political economy forces lead to substantial deviations from optimal logging practices and demonstrate how the economics of corruption can drive natural resource extraction
The political economy of deforestation in the tropics by Robin Burgess( Archival Material )
1 edition published in 2010 in English and held by 0 libraries worldwide
Logging of tropical forests accounts for almost one-fifth of greenhouse gas emissions worldwide and threatens some of the worlds most diverse ecosystems. This paper demonstrates that local-level political economy substantially affects the rate of tropical deforestation in Indonesia. Using a novel MODIS satellite-based dataset that tracks annual changes in forest cover over an 8-year period, we find three main results. First, we show that increasing numbers of political jurisdictions leads to increased deforestation. This effect, particularly for illegal logging, is consistent with a model of Cournot competition between jurisdictions determining how much wood to extract from their forests. Second, we demonstrate the existence of political logging cycles," where illegal logging increases dramatically in the years leading up to local elections. Third, we show that, for local government o¢ cials, logging and other sources of rents are short-run substitutes, but that this affect disappears over time as the political equilibrium shifts. The results document how local political economy forces lead to substantial deviations from optimal logging practices and demonstrate how the economics of corruption can drive natural resource extraction
 
moreShow More Titles
fewerShow Fewer Titles
Languages
English (93)
Close Window

Please sign in to WorldCat 

Don't have an account? You can easily create a free account.