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Burgess, Robin

Overview
Works: 18 works in 78 publications in 1 language and 341 library holdings
Roles: Honoree
Classifications: HC411, 305.42
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about Robin Burgess
Publications by Robin Burgess
Most widely held works by Robin Burgess
Modernization and son preference in People's Republic of China by Robin Burgess( Book )
7 editions published between 2000 and 2002 in English and held by 101 libraries worldwide
Toward a microeconomics of growth by Robin Burgess( file )
9 editions published between 2003 and 2004 in English and held by 51 libraries worldwide
Do rural banks matter? : evidence from the Indian social banking experiment by Robin Burgess( Book )
9 editions published between 2003 and 2005 in English and held by 28 libraries worldwide
Can labour regulation hinder economic performance? : evidence from India by Timothy Besley( Book )
5 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 24 libraries worldwide
Development economics
The political economy of government responsiveness : theory and evidence from India by Timothy Besley( Book )
4 editions published between 2000 and 2001 in English and held by 23 libraries worldwide
Tax reform in India by Robin Burgess( Book )
5 editions published in 1993 in English and held by 22 libraries worldwide
Taxation and development by Robin Burgess( Book )
7 editions published between 1992 and 1993 in English and held by 21 libraries worldwide
The behaviour of state firms in eastern Europe, pre- privatisation by Philippe Aghion( Book )
6 editions published between 1993 and 1994 in English and held by 20 libraries worldwide
Prediction and determination of household permanent income by Ramses H Abul Naga( Book )
7 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 18 libraries worldwide
The political economy of deforestation in the tropics by Robin Burgess( Book )
8 editions published between 2011 and 2012 in English and held by 15 libraries worldwide
Tropical deforestation accounts for almost one-fifth of greenhouse gas emissions worldwide and threatens the world's most diverse ecosystems. The prevalence of illegal forest extraction in the tropics suggests that understanding the incentives of local bureaucrats and politicians who enforce forest policy may be critical to combating tropical deforestation. We find support for this thesis using a novel satellite-based dataset that tracks annual changes in forest cover across eight years of institutional change in post-Soeharto Indonesia. Increases in the numbers of political jurisdictions are associated with increased deforestation and with lower prices in local wood markets, consistent with a model of Cournot competition between jurisdictions. We also show that illegal logging and rents from unevenly distributed oil and gas revenues are short run substitutes, but this effect disappears over time as political turnover occurs. The results illustrate how incentives faced by local government oØ cials affect deforestation, and provide an example of how standard economic theories can explain illegal behavior
The unequal effects of liberalization evidence from dismantling the license raj in India ( Book )
3 editions published between 2006 and 2007 in English and held by 8 libraries worldwide
We study the effects of the progressive elimination of the system of industrial regulations on entry and production, known as the "license raj," on registered manufacturing output, employment, entry and investment across Indian states with different labor market regulations. The effects are found to be unequal depending on the institutional environment in which industries are embedded. In particular, following delicensing, industries located in states with pro-employer labor market institutions grew more quickly than those in pro-worker environments
Toward a Microeconomics of Growth by Robin Burgess( file )
1 edition published in 2004 in Undetermined and held by 3 libraries worldwide
The value of democracy evidence from road building in Kenya by Robin Burgess( Computer File )
2 editions published in 2013 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Ethnic favoritism is seen as antithetical to development. This paper provides credible quantification of the extent of ethnic favoritism using data on road building in Kenyan districts across the 1963-2011 period. Guided by a model it then examines whether the transition in and out of democracy under the same president constrains or exacerbates ethnic favoritism. Across the 1963 to 2011 period, we find strong evidence of ethnic favoritism: districts that share the ethnicity of the president receive twice as much expenditure on roads and have four times the length of paved roads built. This favoritism disappears during periods of democracy
Modernization and son preference in People''s Republic of China by Robin Burgess( Archival Material )
1 edition published in 2002 in Undetermined and held by 1 library worldwide
Toward a microeconomics of growth by Robin Burgess( Sound Recording )
1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
The political economy of deforestation in the tropics by Robin Burgess( Archival Material )
1 edition published in 2010 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Logging of tropical forests accounts for almost one-fifth of greenhouse gas emissions worldwide and threatens some of the worlds most diverse ecosystems. This paper demonstrates that local-level political economy substantially affects the rate of tropical deforestation in Indonesia. Using a novel MODIS satellite-based dataset that tracks annual changes in forest cover over an 8-year period, we find three main results. First, we show that increasing numbers of political jurisdictions leads to increased deforestation. This effect, particularly for illegal logging, is consistent with a model of Cournot competition between jurisdictions determining how much wood to extract from their forests. Second, we demonstrate the existence of political logging cycles," where illegal logging increases dramatically in the years leading up to local elections. Third, we show that, for local government o¢ cials, logging and other sources of rents are short-run substitutes, but that this affect disappears over time as the political equilibrium shifts. The results document how local political economy forces lead to substantial deviations from optimal logging practices and demonstrate how the economics of corruption can drive natural resource extraction
The political economy of deforestation in the tropics by Robin Burgess( Archival Material )
1 edition published in 2010 in Undetermined and held by 1 library worldwide
Logging of tropical forests accounts for almost one-fifth of greenhouse gas emissions worldwide and threatens some of the worlds most diverse ecosystems. This paper demonstrates that local-level political economy substantially affects the rate of tropical deforestation in Indonesia. Using a novel MODIS satellite-based dataset that tracks annual changes in forest cover over an 8-year period, we find three main results. First, we show that increasing numbers of political jurisdictions leads to increased deforestation. This effect, particularly for illegal logging, is consistent with a model of Cournot competition between jurisdictions determining how much wood to extract from their forests. Second, we demonstrate the existence of political logging cycles," where illegal logging increases dramatically in the years leading up to local elections. Third, we show that, for local government o¢ cials, logging and other sources of rents are short-run substitutes, but that this affect disappears over time as the political equilibrium shifts. The results document how local political economy forces lead to substantial deviations from optimal logging practices and demonstrate how the economics of corruption can drive natural resource extraction
Modernization and son preference in People''s Republic of China by Robin Burgess( Archival Material )
1 edition published in 2002 in Undetermined and held by 1 library worldwide
 
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Languages
English (74)
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