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Fisman, Raymond

Works: 82 works in 332 publications in 4 languages and 3,901 library holdings
Roles: Author
Classifications: HV6768, 364.1323
Publication Timeline
Publications about Raymond Fisman
Publications by Raymond Fisman
Most widely held works by Raymond Fisman
Economic gangsters : corruption, violence, and the poverty of nations by Raymond Fisman( Book )
28 editions published between 2008 and 2012 in 3 languages and held by 1,352 libraries worldwide
"Meet the economic gangster. He's the United Nations diplomat who double-parks his Mercedes on New York City streets at rush hour because the cops can't touch him - he has diplomatic immunity. He's the Chinese smuggler who dodges tariffs by magically transforming frozen chickens into frozen turkeys. The dictator, the warlord, the unscrupulous bureaucrat who bilks the developing world of billions in aid. The calculating crook who views stealing and murder as just another part of his business strategy. And, in the wrong set of circumstances, he might just be you." "In Economic Gangsters, Raymond Fisman and Edward Miguel take readers into the secretive, chaotic, and brutal worlds inhabited by these lawless and violent thugs. Join these two sleuthing economists as they follow the foreign aid money trail into the grasping hands of corrupt governments and shady underworld characters. Spend time with ingenious black marketeers as they game the international system. Follow the steep rise and fall of stock prices of companies with unseemly connections to Indonesia's former dictator. See for yourself what rainfall has to do with witch killings in Tanzania - and more."--BOOK JACKET
The org : the underlying logic of office life by Raymond Fisman( Book )
11 editions published between 2013 and 2014 in English and German and held by 647 libraries worldwide
Describes how the everyday dysfunction inherent in all organizations is actually a necessary part of the organization and uses case studies from McDonald's, Google, and even al Qaeda to prove that red tape, meetings, and management all serve a purpose
Trade credit, financial intermediary development and industry growth by Raymond Fisman( Book )
18 editions published between 2001 and 2002 in English and held by 129 libraries worldwide
Where do firms turn for financing in countries with poorly developed financial markets? One source is trade credit. And where formal financial intermediaries are deficient, industries that rely more on this source of financing grow faster
Financial development and growth in the short and long run by Raymond Fisman( Book )
11 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 122 libraries worldwide
"We analyze the relationship between financial development and inter-industry resource allocation in the short- and long-run. We suggest that in the long-run, economies with high rates of financial development will devote relatively more resources to industries with a 'natural' reliance on outside finance due to a comparative advantage in these industries. By contrast, in the short-run we argue that financial development facilitates the reallocation of resources to industries with good growth opportunities, regardless of their reliance on outside finance. To test these predictions, we use a measure of industry-level 'technological' financial dependence based on the earlier work of Rajan and Zingales (1998), and develop new proxies for shocks to (short run) industry growth opportunities. We find differential effects of these measures on industry growth and composition in countries with different levels of financial development. We obtain results that are consistent with financially developed economies specializing in 'financially dependent' industries in the long-run, and allocating resources to industries with high growth opportunities in the short-run"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Tax rates and tax evasion : evidence from "missing imports" in China by Raymond Fisman( Book )
18 editions published in 2001 in English and held by 101 libraries worldwide
Abstract: Tax evasion, by its very nature, is difficult to observe. In this paper, we present a case study of tax evasion in China. The novel feature of our approach is that at a very disaggregated level of individual products, we can measure evasion relatively precisely, by comparing the values that China reports as imports from Hong Kong, with what Hong Kong reports as exports to China. We can match up this evasion gap' with the tariff (and VAT tax) schedule at the product level. The result is striking: using the data in 1998, we find that on average, a 1 percent increase in the tax rate results in a 3 percent increase in evasion; these results hold using data from 1998. The result is similar when a first-difference specification is used with data in 1997 and 1998. This relationship is nonlinear: the evasion elasticity is larger at high tax levels. Furthermore, the evasion gap is negatively correlated with the tax rates on closely related products, suggesting that part of the evasion takes place by mis-reporting the type of imports, in addition to under-reporting the value of imports. This effect is even more pronounced when the evasion gap is measured using quantities rather than values
Decentralization and corruption : evidence across countries by Raymond Fisman( Book )
8 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 92 libraries worldwide
Empirical estimates suggest that fiscal decentralization in government spending is associated with lower government corruption
Outsourcing tariff evasion a new explanation for entrepot trade by Raymond Fisman( file )
19 editions published between 2005 and 2007 in English and held by 90 libraries worldwide
"Traditional explanations for indirect trade through an entrepot have focused on savings in transport costs and on the role of specialized agents in processing and distribution. We provide an alternative perspective based on the possibility that entrepots may facilitate tariff evasion. Using data on direct exports to mainland China and indirect exports via Hong Kong SAR, we find that the indirect export rate rises with the Chinese tariff rate, even though there is no legal tax advantage to sending goods via Hong Kong SAR. We undertake a number of extensions to rule out plausible alternative hypotheses based on existing explanations for entrepot trade"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Are politicians really paid like bureaucrats? by Rafael Di Tella( Book )
10 editions published between 2001 and 2002 in English and held by 84 libraries worldwide
Abstract: We provide the first empirical analysis of gubernatorial pay. Using US data for 1950-90 we document, contrary to widespread assumptions, substantial variation in the wages of politicians, both across states and over time. Gubernatorial wages respond to changes in state income per capita and taxes, after controlling for state and time fixed effects. The economic effects seem large: governors receive a 1 percent pay cut for each ten percent increase in per capita tax payments and a 4.5 percent increase in pay for each ten percent increase in income per capita in their states. There is strong evidence that the tax elasticity reflects a form of reward-for-performanc.' The evidence on the income elasticity of pay is less conclusive, but is suggestive of rent extraction' motives. Lastly, we find that democratic institutions seem to play an important role in shaping pay. For example, voter-initiatives and the presence of significant political opposition lead to large reductions in the income elasticity of pay, and to large increases (at least double) in the tax elasticities of pay, relative to the elasticities that are observed when these democratic institutions are weaker
Patterns of industrial development revisited by Raymond Fisman( file )
7 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 80 libraries worldwide
Financial dependence and growth revisited by Raymond Fisman( Book )
9 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 70 libraries worldwide
Abstract: In this note, we revisit an earlier, highly influential paper on Financial Dependence and Growth by Rajan and Zingales (1998), by re-examining their assumptions, and the robustness of their results to alternative theories and interpretations. We first show that they may be implicitly testing whether financial intermediaries allow firms to better respond to global shocks to growth opportunities, rather than the extent that financial intermediaries allow firms to grow in industries with an inherent (technological) financial dependence. Furthermore, if this is the case, we claim that there exists a more direct measure of growth opportunities. In particular, if U.S. capital markets are perfect, then actual growth in the U.S. is a good proxy for global growth opportunities. We test this directly, by including U.S. industry growth in Rajan and Zingales' original specification, and find that our direct growth measure outperforms their financial dependence measure and, moreover, is less vulnerable to controlling for outliers and level of development. This still suggests an important role for finance in the allocation of resources, but shifts the emphasis from 'financial dependence' to 'global growth opportunities.'
The org : how the office really works by Raymond Fisman( Book )
2 editions published in 2014 in English and held by 67 libraries worldwide
Does competition encourage credit provision? : evidence from African trade credit relationships by Raymond Fisman( Book )
9 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 66 libraries worldwide
Abstract: Previous work has claimed that monopoly power facilitates the provision of credit, since monopolists are better able to enforce payment. Here, we argue that if relationship-specific investments are required by borrowers to establish creditworthiness, monopoly power may reduce credit provision because hold up problems ex post will deter borrowers from investing in establishing creditworthiness. Empirically, we examine the relationship between monopoly power and credit provision, using data on the supply relationships of firms in five African countries. Consistent with the upfront investment story, we find that monopoly power is negatively associated with credit provision, and that this correlation is stronger in older supplier relationships. Because the data include several observations per firm, we are able to utilize firm fixed-effects, thus netting out unobserved firm characteristics that may have been driving results in earlier studies
Financial development and the composition of industrial growth by Raymond Fisman( Book )
8 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 63 libraries worldwide
Abstract: We re-examine the role of financial market development in the intersectoral allocation of resources. Specifically, we propose the use of a new methodology that looks at the co-movement in growth rates across pairs of countries to examine the role of financial development in allowing firms to take advantage of growth opportunities. Our model begins with the assumption that there exist common global shocks to growth opportunities, and we hypothesize that countries should therefore have correlated patterns of growth if they are able to take advantage of these shocks. We find that countries have more highly correlated growth rates across sectors when both countries have well-developed financial markets; this is consistent with financial markets playing an important role in allowing firms to take advantage of global growth opportunities. We further observe that growth opportunities will be more similar for countries that are at similar levels of economic development. This allows for a further refinement of our initial test: the impact of financial development on country-pair co-movement is much stronger between country pairs at similar levels of economic development. Finally, we note that our results imply that private banking appears to play a particularly important role in resource allocation, as our results are particularly strong when financial development takes into account both the level and composition of financial market institutions
Do stronger intellectual property rights increase international technology transfer? empirical evidence from U.S. firm-level data by Lee Branstetter( file )
8 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 63 libraries worldwide
"This paper examines how technology transfer within U.S. multinational firms changes in response to a series of IPR reforms undertaken by 16 countries over the 1982-1999 period. Analysis of detailed firm-level data reveals that royalty payments for technology transferred to affiliates increase at the time of reforms, as do affiliate R & D expenditures and total levels of foreign patent applications. Increases in royalty payments and R & D expenditures are concentrated among affiliates of parent companies that use U.S. patents extensively prior to reform and are therefore expected to value IPR reform most. For this set of affiliates, increases in royalty payments exceed 30 percent. Our results collectively imply that U.S. multinationals respond to changes in IPR regimes abroad by significantly increasing technology transfer to reforming countries"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Regulation of entry and the distortion of industrial organization by Raymond Fisman( file )
9 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 62 libraries worldwide
"We study the distortions to industrial organization caused by entry regulation. We take advantage of heterogeneity across industries in their natural barriers and growth opportunities to examine whether some industries are differentially affected by country-level entry regulation. In industries with high natural entry barriers, entry regulation has little impact on the quantity and average size of firms in an industry. By contrast, in industries with low natural entry barriers, countries with high entry regulation have relatively few, large firms. We find no relation between natural entry barriers and overall industry share of manufacturing, as a function of entry regulation. Utilizing firm-level data, we show that operating margins are relatively high in low barrier industries in high entry regulation countries. Finally, we analyze the ability of industries to take advantage of shocks to growth opportunities. In countries with high entry regulation, industries respond to growth opportunities through the expansion of existing firms, while in countries with low entry regulation, the response is through the creation of new firms; the total sectoral response is invariant to the level of regulation. Our results suggest that regulation distorts the structure of industry, promoting industry concentration, but does not have measurable effects on intersectoral allocations"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Do stronger intellectual property rights increase international technology transfer? : empirical evidence from U.S. firm-level panel data by Lee Branstetter( file )
7 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 54 libraries worldwide
Economic gangsters : Korruption und Kriminalität in der Weltwirtschaft by Raymond Fisman( Book )
5 editions published in 2009 in German and Undetermined and held by 50 libraries worldwide
HauptbeschreibungBegeben Sie sich auf die Spur der Economic Gangsters? im Containerhafen von Hongkong, in entlegenen afrikanischen Dörfern oder auf den Straßen Manhattans. Was sie alle verbindet, ist die Korruption: Sie ist global und hat katastrophale Folgen. Raymond Fisman und Edward Miguel führen den Leser zu gerissenen Schwarzmarkthändlern, die das internationale Wirtschaftssystem austricksen. Sie folgen Hilfsgeldern auf ihrem Weg in die Hände gieriger Regierungen und dubioser Unterweltgrößen. Auf der Basis von Insiderstudien zeigen die Autoren, dass hinter dem kriminellen Treiben kalte w
Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? : firm level evidence by Raymond Fisman( Book )
9 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 50 libraries worldwide
Evidence from Uganda confirms that corruption retards development even more than taxation does
Cultures of corruption evidence from diplomatic parking tickets by Raymond Fisman( file )
8 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 49 libraries worldwide
"Corruption is believed to be a major factor impeding economic development, but the importance of legal enforcement versus cultural norms in controlling corruption is poorly understood. To disentangle these two factors, we exploit a natural experiment, the stationing of thousands of diplomats from around the world in New York City. Diplomatic immunity means there was essentially zero legal enforcement of diplomatic parking violations, allowing us to examine the role of cultural norms alone. This generates a revealed preference measure of government officials' corruption based on real-world behavior taking place in the same setting. We find strong persistence in corruption norms: diplomats from high corruption countries (based on existing survey-based indices) have significantly more parking violations, and these differences persist over time. In a second main result, officials from countries that survey evidence indicates have less favorable popular views of the United States commit significantly more parking violations, providing non-laboratory evidence on sentiment in economic decision-making. Taken together, factors other than legal enforcement appear to be important determinants of corruption"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
The smuggling of art, and the art of smuggling uncovering the illicit trade in cultural property and antiques by Raymond Fisman( file )
8 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 48 libraries worldwide
We empirically analyze the illicit trade in cultural property and antiques, taking advantage of different reporting incentives between source and destination countries. We thus generate a measure of illicit trafficking in these goods based on the difference between imports recorded in United States' customs data and the (purportedly identical) trade as recorded by customs authorities in exporting countries. We find that this reporting gap is highly correlated with the corruption level of the exporting country as measured by commonly used survey-based indicies, and that this correlation is stronger for artifact-rich countries. As a placebo test, we do not observe any such pattern for U.S. imports of toys from these same exporters. We report similar results for four other Western country markets. Our analysis provides a useful framework for studying trade in illicit goods. Further, our results provide empirical confirmation that survey-based corruption indicies are informative, as they are correlated with an objective measure of illicit activity
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Alternative Names
Fisman, R.
Fisman, Ray
Fisman, Ray 1971-
Fisman, Raymond J.
フィスマン, レイ
フィスマン, レイモンド
English (204)
German (5)
Turkish (1)
French (1)
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