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Vermeule, Adrian 1968-

Overview
Works: 70 works in 185 publications in 3 languages and 4,880 library holdings
Genres: Trials, litigation, etc  Handbooks, manuals, etc 
Roles: Author
Classifications: KF5060, 342.7306
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about Adrian Vermeule
Publications by Adrian Vermeule
Most widely held works about Adrian Vermeule
 
Most widely held works by Adrian Vermeule
Terror in the balance security, liberty, and the courts by Eric A Posner( file )
19 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 1,511 libraries worldwide
Introduction. Part I: Constitutional Law and Theory. 1. Emergencies, Tradeoffs, and Deference. 2. The Panic Theory. 3. The Democratic Failure Theory. 4. The Ratchet Theory and Other Long-Run Effects. Part II: Applications. 5. Institutional Alternatives to Judicial Deference. 6. Coercive Interrogation. 7. Speech, Due Process, and Political Trials. 8. Military Force. Conclusion: Emergency Powers and Lawyers' Expertise. Notes. Index
The executive unbound after the Madisonian republic by Eric A Posner( file )
14 editions published between 2010 and 2013 in English and held by 1,476 libraries worldwide
The authors chart the rise of executive authority, noting that among strong presidents only Nixon has come in for severe criticism, leading to legislation which was designed to limit the presidency, yet which failed to do so. Political, cultural and social restraints, they argue, have been more effective in preventing dictatorship than any law. The executive-centered state tends to generate political checks that substitute for the legal checks of the Madisonian constitution."--Pub. desc
Judging under uncertainty : an institutional theory of legal interpretation by Adrian Vermeule( Book )
11 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 476 libraries worldwide
Mechanisms of democracy : institutional design writ small by Adrian Vermeule( Book )
17 editions published between 2007 and 2009 in English and held by 392 libraries worldwide
In established constitutional polities, Vermeule argues, law can and should - and to some extent already does - provide mechanisms of democracy: small-scale institutional devices and innovations that can have surprisingly large effects, promoting democratic values of impartial, accountable and deliberative government
Law and the limits of reason by Adrian Vermeule( Book )
25 editions published between 2008 and 2012 in English and held by 342 libraries worldwide
Vermeule denies the view that the limits of reason counsel in favour of judges making 'living' constitutional law in the style of the common law. Instead, he proposes and defends a 'codified constitution' - a regime in which legislatures have the primary authority to develop constitutional law over time
The system of the constitution by Adrian Vermeule( Book )
20 editions published between 2011 and 2012 in English and held by 331 libraries worldwide
"A constitutional order is a system of systems. It is an aggregate of interacting institutions, which are themselves aggregates of interacting individuals. In The System of the Constitution, Adrian Vermeule analyzes constitutionalism through the lens of systems theory, originally developed in biology, computer science, political science and other disciplines. Systems theory illuminates both the structural constitution and constitutional judging, and reveals that standard views and claims about constitutional theory commit fallacies of aggregation and are thus invalid. By contrast, Vermeule explains and illustrates an approach to constitutionalism that considers the systemic interactions of legal and political institutions and of the individuals who act within them"--Provided by publisher
The constitution of risk by Adrian Vermeule( Book )
7 editions published between 2013 and 2014 in English and held by 190 libraries worldwide
"The Constitution of Risk is the first book to combine constitutional theory with the theory of risk regulation. The book argues that constitutional rulemaking is best understood as a means of managing political risks. Constitutional law structures and regulates the risks that arise in and from political life, such as an executive coup or military putsch, political abuse of ideological or ethnic minorities, or corrupt self-dealing by officials. The book claims that the best way to manage political risks is an approach it calls "optimizing constitutionalism" - in contrast to the worst-case thinking that underpins "precautionary constitutionalism," a mainstay of liberal constitutional theory. Drawing on a broad range of disciplines such as decision theory, game theory, welfare economics, political science, and psychology, this book advocates constitutional rulemaking undertaken in a spirit of welfare maximization, and offers a corrective to the pervasive and frequently irrational attitude of distrust of official power that is so prominent in American constitutional history and discourse"--
Three strategies of interpretation by Adrian Vermeule( Book )
4 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 58 libraries worldwide
"We may distinguish three styles or strategies of decisionmaking. Under a maximizing approach, the decisionmaker chooses the action whose consequences are best for the case at hand (defining "best" according to some value the decisionmaker holds). Where decisionmakers choose the action that is best relative to constraints, accounting for the direct costs and opportunity costs of decisionmaking, we may call the approach optimizing rather than maximizing. Whereas the maximizer focuses only on the case at hand, the optimizer acts so as to maximize value over an array of cases. In contrast to both approaches, satisficing permits any decision whose results in the case at hand are good enough - although satisficing, like optimizing, may itself represent an indirect strategy of maximization. In this brief essay, I apply these distinctions to legal interpretation. Many approaches to the interpretation of statutes and the Constitution are maximizing approaches that attempt to produce as much as possible of some value the interpreter holds - for example, fidelity to legislative intent or original understandings. Optimizing approaches to interpretation condemn maximizing interpretation as a simpleminded approach that neglects the costs of decisionmaking and the costs of interpretive error. An alternative to both maximizing and optimizing approaches is a satisficing style of interpretation, in which interpreters eschew the search for the very best interpretation (even within constraints), instead selecting an interpretation that is good enough, in light of whatever value theory the interpreter holds. I criticize the maximizing style of interpretation and praise its two competitors. Both the optimizing and satisficing perspectives help to justify some controversial principles of statutory and constitutional interpretation, such as the rule barring resort to legislative history where statutes have a plain meaning, and clause-bound (as opposed to broadly holistic or "intratextualist") interpretation of statutes and the Constitution. Although maximizing interpretation is untenable, neither the optimizing approach nor the satisficing approach is globally best; each is an attractive decision-procedure in some contexts. Where the interpretive stakes are either very low or very high, satisficing is reasonable (whether or not rational in some stronger sense), while optimizing is best suited to medium-stakes decisions."
Executive Unbound, The After the Madisonian Republic ( file )
1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 29 libraries worldwide
Ever since Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. used "imperial presidency" as a book title, the term has become central to the debate about the balance of power in the U.S. government. Since the presidency of George W. Bush, when advocates of executive power such as Dick Cheney gained ascendancy, the argument has blazed hotter than ever. Many argue the Constitution itself is in grave danger. What is to be done? The answer, according to legal scholars Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, is nothing. In The Executive Unbound, they provide a bracing challenge to conventional wisdom, arguing that a strong presidency is inevitable in the modern world. Most scholars, they note, object to today's level of executive power because it varies so dramatically from the vision of the framers of the Constitution. But Posner and Vermeule find fault with James Madison's premises. Like an ideal market, they write, Madison's separation of powers has no central director, but it lacks the price system which gives an economy its structure; there is nothing in checks and balances that intrinsically generates order or promotes positive arrangements. In fact, the greater complexity of the modern world produces a concentration of power, particularly in the White House. The authors chart the rise of executive authority, noting that among strong presidents only Nixon has come in for severe criticism, leading to legislation which was designed to limit the presidency, yet which failed to do so. Political, cultural and social restraints, they argue, have been more effective in preventing dictatorship than any law. The executive-centered state tends to generate political checks that substitute for the legal checks of the Madisonian constitution. Piety toward the founders and a historic fear of tyranny have been powerful forces in American political thinking. Posner and Vermeule confront them both in this startlingly original contribution
Administrative law and regulatory policy by Stephen G Breyer( Book )
1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Interpretation and institutions by Cass R Sunstein( file )
2 editions published between 2002 and 2006 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
"To evaluate theories of interpretation, it is necessary to focus on institutional considerations - to ask how actual judges would use any proposed approach, and to investigate the possibility that an otherwise appealing approach will have unfortunate dynamic effects on private and public institutions. Notwithstanding this point, blindness to institutional considerations is pervasive. It can be found in the work of early commentators on interpretation, including that of Jeremy Bentham; in the influential work of H.L.A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, and Henry Hart and Albert Sacks; and in much contemporary writing. This blindness to institutional considerations creates serious problems for the underlying theories. The problems are illustrated with discussions of many disputed issues, including the virtues and vices of formalism; the current debate over whether administrative agencies should have greater interpretive freedom than courts; and the roles of text, philosophy, translation, and tradition in constitutional law. In many cases, an understanding of institutional capacities and dynamic effects should enable diverse people, with different views about ideal legal interpretation, to agree on what actual legal interpretation should entail."
The University of Chicago Law review : Celebrating the centennial of the University of Chicago Law School by University of Chicago( Book )
1 edition published in 2003 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Administrative law and regulatory policy : problems, text, and cases ; 2009 - 2010 supplement ( Book )
2 editions published between 2006 and 2009 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Is capital punishment morally required? : the relevance of life-life tradeoffs by Cass R Sunstein( Book )
2 editions published between 2005 and 2006 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
"Recent evidence suggests that capital punishment may have a significant deterrent effect, preventing as many eighteen or more murders for each execution. This evidence greatly unsettles moral objections to the death penalty, because it suggests that a refusal to impose that penalty condemns numerous innocent people to death. Capital punishment thus presents a life-life tradeoff, and a serious commitment to the sanctity of human life may well compel, rather than forbid, that form of punishment. Moral objections to the death penalty frequently depend on a distinction between acts and omissions, but that distinction is misleading in this context, because government is a special kind of moral agent. The familiar problems with capital punishment - potential error, irreversibility, arbitrariness, and racial skew - do not argue in favor of abolition, because the world of homicide suffers from those same problems in even more acute form. The widespread failure to appreciate the life-life tradeoffs involved in capital punishment may depend on cognitive processes that fail to treat "statistical lives" with the seriousness that they deserve."
Military tribunals history, legality, policy ; civil rights and military tribunals, January 17, 2002 ( visu )
2 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Bu que ding zhuang tai xia de cai pan : fa lü jie shi de zhi du li lun =Judging under uncertainty :an institutional theory of legal interpretation by Adrian Vermeule( Book )
1 edition published in 2011 in Chinese and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Divide and conquer by Eric A Posner( Computer File )
2 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
"The maxim 'divide and conquer' (divide et impera) is frequently invoked in legal theory and the social sciences. However, no single theoretical construct can capture the ideas underlying divide and conquer. Instead, the maxim is a placeholder for a complex of ideas related by a family resemblance, but differing in their details, mechanisms and implications. Economists typically interpret divide and conquer in terms of a specific class of theoretical models whose main feature, roughly speaking, is that a single actor exploits coordination problems among a group by making discriminatory offers or discriminatory threats. Political scientists, historians and lawyers, however, sometimes use the term in the economists' sense, sometimes in other senses. We will attempt to synthesize this messy domain by offering an analytic taxonomy of divide and conquer mechanisms, by eliciting the normative implications of those mechanisms for legal policy, and by exploring applications in law, history and politics. Section I clarifies some conceptual issues. Section II models several divide and conquer mechanisms in the settings of a Stag Hunt Game and an indefinitely-repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, and discusses their main implications for social welfare. We also contrast divide and conquer with a mirror-image tactic - 'combine and conquer' - and identify the welfare implications of this tactic as well. Section III applies the models to a diverse set of cases, including labor law, bankruptcy, constitutional design and the separation of powers, imperialism and race relations, international law, litigation and settlement, and antitrust law. We explore the conditions under which divide and conquer reduces or enhances welfare, and the techniques that law can use to combat divide and conquer tactics where it is beneficial to do so."
The judiciary is a they not an it two fallacies of interpretive theory by Adrian Vermeule( file )
1 edition published in 2006 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
"Beneficial effects on legislative behavior that will result if "judges" or "courts" adopt a particular approach to interpretation. In this paper I claim that such arguments are conceptually confused, and thus do not count as valid arguments at all. Dynamic arguments commit the fundamental mistake of overlooking the collective character of judicial institutions - of overlooking that the judiciary, like Congress, is a "they," not an "it." That mistake produces the critical, and erroneous, assumption that coordinated judicial adoption of some particular approach to legal interpretation is both feasible and desirable. That assumption commits two logical fallacies simultaneously. The fallacy of division arises when a claim that is true of, or justified for, a whole set is taken to apply to any particular member of the set. The fallacy of composition arises when a claim that is true of, or justified for, any particular member of a set is taken to apply to the whole set. Both fallacies infect dynamic interpretive arguments. First, the claim that a given approach would be best for the whole court or judiciary does not entail that it would be best for any given judge taken alone. The inference from the group-level claim to the individual-level claim fails if judicial coordination on a particular approach is infeasible or unlikely. Second, the claim that a particular approach is best for any given judge need not entail that it would be best for the whole court (or judiciary). If a diversity of approaches is desirable for systemic and institutional reasons, then it would be an affirmative bad for all judges to coordinate on a particular approach. To overlook the first point is to commit the division fallacy; to overlook the second is to commit the composition fallacy. The same reasoning applies from the standpoint of every judge in the system."
Should coercive interrogation be legal? by Eric A Posner( file )
1 edition published in 2006 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
"Most academics who have written on coercive interrogation believe that its use is justified in extreme or catastrophic scenarios but that nonetheless it should be illegal. They argue that formal illegality will not prevent justified use of coercive interrogation because government agents will be willing to risk criminal liability and are likely to be pardoned, acquitted, or otherwise forgiven if their behavior is morally justified. This outlaw and forgive approach to coercive interrogation is supposed to prevent coercive interrogation from being applied in inappropriate settings, to be symbolically important, and nonetheless to permit justified coercive interrogation. We argue that the outlaw and forgive approach rests on questionable premises. If coercive interrogation is ever justified, and the benefits outweigh the risks of error and unintended consequences, it should be legal, albeit strictly regulated. The standard institutional justifications for outlaw and forgive - rules/standards problems, slippery slopes, and symbolism - are unpersuasive."
˜Dieœ entfesselte Exekutive die Krise des liberalen Legalismus by Eric A Posner( Book )
2 editions published in 2014 in German and held by 2 libraries worldwide
 
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Alternative Names
Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian Comstock 1968-
Languages
English (133)
German (2)
Chinese (1)
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