skip to content

Vermeule, Adrian 1968-

Works: 81 works in 210 publications in 3 languages and 5,883 library holdings
Genres: Trials, litigation, etc  Casebooks 
Roles: Author, Editor
Classifications: KF5060, 342.7306
Publication Timeline
Publications about Adrian Vermeule
Publications by Adrian Vermeule
Most widely held works about Adrian Vermeule
Most widely held works by Adrian Vermeule
Terror in the balance : security, liberty, and the courts by Eric A Posner( Book )
20 editions published in 2007 in English and Undetermined and held by 661 libraries worldwide
In the wake of 9/11, the United States government has relied on a number of aggressive security measures to protect the nation. From domestic wiretapping without warrants to the surveillance of Muslim and Arab Americans and the coercive interrogation of suspected terrorists, the Bush administration's policies have attracted much controversy and been decried as outrageous violations of domestic and international law. In Terror in the Balance, Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule argue that the legal and institutional basis of this critique is wrong. When governments strive to increase national security they should be given wide latitude to adjust policy and liberties in the time of emergency and war. Deference to the executive during emergencies, Posner and Vermeule contend, is necessary and powers must be made available to the executive when the increase in security justifies the corresponding losses from the decrease in liberty. Further, when the executive is compelled to implement controversial methods of protecting its citizens such as discrimination against aliens or censorship of hate speech, the judiciary should not interfere on constitutional grounds except in unusual circumstances. Courts and legislators are institutionally incapable of second guessing security policy, and trying to enforce ordinary law during times of emergency shackles government when it most needs flexibility. American constitutional law and international law do not provide reasons for courts or legislators to depart from their historical posture of deference to the executive during national emergencies. - Publisher
The executive unbound : after the Madisonian republic by Eric A Posner( Book )
16 editions published between 2010 and 2013 in English and held by 571 libraries worldwide
The authors chart the rise of executive authority, noting that among strong presidents only Nixon has come in for severe criticism, leading to legislation which was designed to limit the presidency, yet which failed to do so. Political, cultural and social restraints, they argue, have been more effective in preventing dictatorship than any law. The executive-centered state tends to generate political checks that substitute for the legal checks of the Madisonian constitution."--Pub. desc
Judging under uncertainty : an institutional theory of legal interpretation by Adrian Vermeule( Book )
11 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 484 libraries worldwide
Mechanisms of democracy : institutional design writ small by Adrian Vermeule( Book )
19 editions published between 2007 and 2009 in English and held by 332 libraries worldwide
In established constitutional polities, Vermeule argues, law can and should - and to some extent already does - provide mechanisms of democracy: small-scale institutional devices and innovations that can have surprisingly large effects, promoting democratic values of impartial, accountable and deliberative government
Law and the limits of reason by Adrian Vermeule( Book )
25 editions published between 2008 and 2012 in English and held by 281 libraries worldwide
The limits of reason in legal theory -- Many-minds arguments -- The constitutional common law : information aggregation -- The constitutional common law : evolution -- Justices and company -- Unintended consequences and constitutional amendments
The system of the constitution by Adrian Vermeule( Book )
19 editions published between 2011 and 2012 in English and held by 248 libraries worldwide
"A constitutional order is a system of systems. It is an aggregate of interacting institutions, which are themselves aggregates of interacting individuals. In The System of the Constitution, Adrian Vermeule analyzes constitutionalism through the lens of systems theory, originally developed in biology, computer science, political science and other disciplines. Systems theory illuminates both the structural constitution and constitutional judging, and reveals that standard views and claims about constitutional theory commit fallacies of aggregation and are thus invalid. By contrast, Vermeule explains and illustrates an approach to constitutionalism that considers the systemic interactions of legal and political institutions and of the individuals who act within them"--Provided by publisher
The constitution of risk by Adrian Vermeule( Book )
12 editions published between 2013 and 2014 in English and held by 208 libraries worldwide
"The Constitution of Risk is the first book to combine constitutional theory with the theory of risk regulation. The book argues that constitutional rulemaking is best understood as a means of managing political risks. Constitutional law structures and regulates the risks that arise in and from political life, such as an executive coup or military putsch, political abuse of ideological or ethnic minorities, or corrupt self-dealing by officials. The book claims that the best way to manage political risks is an approach it calls "optimizing constitutionalism"--In contrast to the worst-case thinking that underpins "precautionary constitutionalism," a mainstay of liberal constitutional theory. Drawing on a broad range of disciplines such as decision theory, game theory, welfare economics, political science, and psychology, this book advocates constitutional rulemaking undertaken in a spirit of welfare maximization, and offers a corrective to the pervasive and frequently irrational attitude of distrust of official power that is so prominent in American constitutional history and discourse"--
Law's abnegation : from law's empire to the administrative state by Adrian Vermeule( Book )
4 editions published in 2016 in English and held by 76 libraries worldwide
"Ronald Dworkin once imagined law as an empire and judges as its princes. But over time, the arc of law has bent steadily toward deference to the administrative state. Adrian Vermeule argues that law has freely abandoned its imperial pretensions, and has done so for internal legal reasons. In area after area, judges and lawyers, working out the logical implications of legal principles, have come to believe that administrators should be granted broad leeway to set policy, determine facts, interpret ambiguous statutes, and even define the boundaries of their own jurisdiction. Agencies have greater democratic legitimacy and technical competence to confront many issues than lawyers and judges do. And as the questions confronting the state involving climate change, terrorism, and biotechnology (to name a few) have become ever more complex, legal logic increasingly indicates that abnegation is the wisest course of action"--
Three strategies of interpretation by Adrian Vermeule( Book )
4 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 55 libraries worldwide
"We may distinguish three styles or strategies of decisionmaking. Under a maximizing approach, the decisionmaker chooses the action whose consequences are best for the case at hand (defining "best" according to some value the decisionmaker holds). Where decisionmakers choose the action that is best relative to constraints, accounting for the direct costs and opportunity costs of decisionmaking, we may call the approach optimizing rather than maximizing. Whereas the maximizer focuses only on the case at hand, the optimizer acts so as to maximize value over an array of cases. In contrast to both approaches, satisficing permits any decision whose results in the case at hand are good enough - although satisficing, like optimizing, may itself represent an indirect strategy of maximization. In this brief essay, I apply these distinctions to legal interpretation. Many approaches to the interpretation of statutes and the Constitution are maximizing approaches that attempt to produce as much as possible of some value the interpreter holds - for example, fidelity to legislative intent or original understandings. Optimizing approaches to interpretation condemn maximizing interpretation as a simpleminded approach that neglects the costs of decisionmaking and the costs of interpretive error. An alternative to both maximizing and optimizing approaches is a satisficing style of interpretation, in which interpreters eschew the search for the very best interpretation (even within constraints), instead selecting an interpretation that is good enough, in light of whatever value theory the interpreter holds. I criticize the maximizing style of interpretation and praise its two competitors. Both the optimizing and satisficing perspectives help to justify some controversial principles of statutory and constitutional interpretation, such as the rule barring resort to legislative history where statutes have a plain meaning, and clause-bound (as opposed to broadly holistic or "intratextualist") interpretation of statutes and the Constitution. Although maximizing interpretation is untenable, neither the optimizing approach nor the satisficing approach is globally best; each is an attractive decision-procedure in some contexts. Where the interpretive stakes are either very low or very high, satisficing is reasonable (whether or not rational in some stronger sense), while optimizing is best suited to medium-stakes decisions."
Die entfesselte Exekutive. Die Krise des liberalen Legalismus. Aus dem Englischen übersetzt von Karl Heinz Siber. Mit einem Geleitwort von Christian Lammert und einer Einführung von Ellen Kennedy by Eric A Posner( Book )
4 editions published in 2014 in German and held by 24 libraries worldwide
Wer oder was schränkt im Verwaltungsstaat die enorme Macht der Exekutive ein? Im präsidentiellen Regierungssystem der USA ist dies in erster Linie das Verfassungsprinzip der 'checks and balances', welches dafür sorgt, dass die Verfassungsorgane sich gegenseitig kontrollieren und kein Arm der Gewaltenteilung zu viel Macht bündeln kann. Seit der Präsidentschaft von George W. Bush ist in den Vereinigten Staaten die Debatte wieder aufgeflammt, ob dieses System nicht mehr ausreichend greift und die Exekutive dadurch zu mächtig geworden ist. Viele Experten beklagen gar eine zunehmende Aushöhlung der Verfassung an sich. Nicht so die Autoren Eric A. Posner und Adrian Vermeule: Sie plädieren dafür, das politische Leben der Vereinigten Staaten nicht länger durch das Prisma der Madisonschen Gewaltenteilung zu betrachten und argumentieren, eine starke Exekutive in der heutigen Welt sei nicht nur wünschenswert, sondern insbesondere in Krisenzeiten geradezu unabdingbar. Die notwendige Kontrolle der Exekutive, so die Autoren weiter, finde heute auf anderem Wege statt: etwa durch die öffentliche Meinung, Wahlen oder die Medien. Das Buch 'Die entfesselte Exekutive' wird auch für die hiesige Debatte um eine schwelende Krise der Demokratie bzw. um Demokratiedefizite gegenwärtiger politischer Institutionen wichtige Denkanstöße liefern. (Quelle:
Administrative law and regulatory policy : problems, text, and cases by Stephen G Breyer( Book )
2 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
The University of Chicago Law review : Celebrating the centennial of the University of Chicago Law School by University of Chicago( Book )
1 edition published in 2003 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Judicial review and institutional choice by Adrian Vermeule( Article )
2 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Bu que ding zhuang tai xia de cai pan : fa lü jie shi de zhi du li lun =Judging under uncertainty :an institutional theory of legal interpretation by Adrian Vermeule( Book )
1 edition published in 2011 in Chinese and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Military tribunals : history, legality, policy ; civil rights and military tribunals, January 17, 2002 ( visu )
2 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Is capital punishment morally required? : the relevance of life-life tradeoffs by Cass R Sunstein( Book )
2 editions published between 2005 and 2006 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
"Recent evidence suggests that capital punishment may have a significant deterrent effect, preventing as many eighteen or more murders for each execution. This evidence greatly unsettles moral objections to the death penalty, because it suggests that a refusal to impose that penalty condemns numerous innocent people to death. Capital punishment thus presents a life-life tradeoff, and a serious commitment to the sanctity of human life may well compel, rather than forbid, that form of punishment. Moral objections to the death penalty frequently depend on a distinction between acts and omissions, but that distinction is misleading in this context, because government is a special kind of moral agent. The familiar problems with capital punishment - potential error, irreversibility, arbitrariness, and racial skew - do not argue in favor of abolition, because the world of homicide suffers from those same problems in even more acute form. The widespread failure to appreciate the life-life tradeoffs involved in capital punishment may depend on cognitive processes that fail to treat "statistical lives" with the seriousness that they deserve."
Should coercive interrogation be legal? by Eric A Posner( file )
1 edition published in 2006 in English and held by 0 libraries worldwide
"Most academics who have written on coercive interrogation believe that its use is justified in extreme or catastrophic scenarios but that nonetheless it should be illegal. They argue that formal illegality will not prevent justified use of coercive interrogation because government agents will be willing to risk criminal liability and are likely to be pardoned, acquitted, or otherwise forgiven if their behavior is morally justified. This outlaw and forgive approach to coercive interrogation is supposed to prevent coercive interrogation from being applied in inappropriate settings, to be symbolically important, and nonetheless to permit justified coercive interrogation. We argue that the outlaw and forgive approach rests on questionable premises. If coercive interrogation is ever justified, and the benefits outweigh the risks of error and unintended consequences, it should be legal, albeit strictly regulated. The standard institutional justifications for outlaw and forgive - rules/standards problems, slippery slopes, and symbolism - are unpersuasive."
Executive Unbound, The : After the Madisonian Republic ( file )
1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 0 libraries worldwide
Ever since Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. used "imperial presidency" as a book title, the term has become central to the debate about the balance of power in the U.S. government. Since the presidency of George W. Bush, when advocates of executive power such as Dick Cheney gained ascendancy, the argument has blazed hotter than ever. Many argue the Constitution itself is in grave danger. What is to be done? The answer, according to legal scholars Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, is nothing. In The Executive Unbound, they provide a bracing challenge to conventional wisdom, arguing that a strong presidency is inevitable in the modern world. Most scholars, they note, object to today's level of executive power because it varies so dramatically from the vision of the framers of the Constitution. But Posner and Vermeule find fault with James Madison's premises. Like an ideal market, they write, Madison's separation of powers has no central director, but it lacks the price system which gives an economy its structure; there is nothing in checks and balances that intrinsically generates order or promotes positive arrangements. In fact, the greater complexity of the modern world produces a concentration of power, particularly in the White House. The authors chart the rise of executive authority, noting that among strong presidents only Nixon has come in for severe criticism, leading to legislation which was designed to limit the presidency, yet which failed to do so. Political, cultural and social restraints, they argue, have been more effective in preventing dictatorship than any law. The executive-centered state tends to generate political checks that substitute for the legal checks of the Madisonian constitution. Piety toward the founders and a historic fear of tyranny have been powerful forces in American political thinking. Posner and Vermeule confront them both in this startlingly original contribution
The judiciary is a they not an it : two fallacies of interpretive theory by Adrian Vermeule( file )
1 edition published in 2006 in English and held by 0 libraries worldwide
"Beneficial effects on legislative behavior that will result if "judges" or "courts" adopt a particular approach to interpretation. In this paper I claim that such arguments are conceptually confused, and thus do not count as valid arguments at all. Dynamic arguments commit the fundamental mistake of overlooking the collective character of judicial institutions - of overlooking that the judiciary, like Congress, is a "they," not an "it." That mistake produces the critical, and erroneous, assumption that coordinated judicial adoption of some particular approach to legal interpretation is both feasible and desirable. That assumption commits two logical fallacies simultaneously. The fallacy of division arises when a claim that is true of, or justified for, a whole set is taken to apply to any particular member of the set. The fallacy of composition arises when a claim that is true of, or justified for, any particular member of a set is taken to apply to the whole set. Both fallacies infect dynamic interpretive arguments. First, the claim that a given approach would be best for the whole court or judiciary does not entail that it would be best for any given judge taken alone. The inference from the group-level claim to the individual-level claim fails if judicial coordination on a particular approach is infeasible or unlikely. Second, the claim that a particular approach is best for any given judge need not entail that it would be best for the whole court (or judiciary). If a diversity of approaches is desirable for systemic and institutional reasons, then it would be an affirmative bad for all judges to coordinate on a particular approach. To overlook the first point is to commit the division fallacy; to overlook the second is to commit the composition fallacy. The same reasoning applies from the standpoint of every judge in the system."
Interpretation and institutions by Cass R Sunstein( file )
2 editions published between 2002 and 2006 in English and held by 0 libraries worldwide
"To evaluate theories of interpretation, it is necessary to focus on institutional considerations - to ask how actual judges would use any proposed approach, and to investigate the possibility that an otherwise appealing approach will have unfortunate dynamic effects on private and public institutions. Notwithstanding this point, blindness to institutional considerations is pervasive. It can be found in the work of early commentators on interpretation, including that of Jeremy Bentham; in the influential work of H.L.A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, and Henry Hart and Albert Sacks; and in much contemporary writing. This blindness to institutional considerations creates serious problems for the underlying theories. The problems are illustrated with discussions of many disputed issues, including the virtues and vices of formalism; the current debate over whether administrative agencies should have greater interpretive freedom than courts; and the roles of text, philosophy, translation, and tradition in constitutional law. In many cases, an understanding of institutional capacities and dynamic effects should enable diverse people, with different views about ideal legal interpretation, to agree on what actual legal interpretation should entail."
moreShow More Titles
fewerShow Fewer Titles
Alternative Names
Adrian Vermeule American legal scholar
Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian Comstock 1968-
אדריאן ורמולה
English (144)
German (4)
Chinese (1)
Close Window

Please sign in to WorldCat 

Don't have an account? You can easily create a free account.