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Vermeule, Adrian 1968-

Overview
Works: 67 works in 173 publications in 1 language and 3,646 library holdings
Genres: Trials, litigation, etc 
Classifications: KF5060, 342.730412
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about Adrian Vermeule
Publications by Adrian Vermeule
Most widely held works about Adrian Vermeule
 
Most widely held works by Adrian Vermeule
Terror in the balance security, liberty, and the courts by Eric A Posner( file )
20 editions published between 2006 and 2007 in English and held by 1,350 libraries worldwide
Introduction. Part I: Constitutional Law and Theory. 1. Emergencies, Tradeoffs, and Deference. 2. The Panic Theory. 3. The Democratic Failure Theory. 4. The Ratchet Theory and Other Long-Run Effects. Part II: Applications. 5. Institutional Alternatives to Judicial Deference. 6. Coercive Interrogation. 7. Speech, Due Process, and Political Trials. 8. Military Force. Conclusion: Emergency Powers and Lawyers' Expertise. Notes. Index
The executive unbound : after the Madisonian republic by Eric A Posner( Book )
14 editions published between 2010 and 2013 in English and held by 603 libraries worldwide
The authors chart the rise of executive authority, noting that among strong presidents only Nixon has come in for severe criticism, leading to legislation which was designed to limit the presidency, yet which failed to do so. Political, cultural and social restraints, they argue, have been more effective in preventing dictatorship than any law. The executive-centered state tends to generate political checks that substitute for the legal checks of the Madisonian constitution."--pub. desc
Judging under uncertainty : an institutional theory of legal interpretation by Adrian Vermeule( Book )
11 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 475 libraries worldwide
Mechanisms of democracy : institutional design writ small by Adrian Vermeule( Book )
17 editions published between 2007 and 2009 in English and held by 390 libraries worldwide
In established constitutional polities, Vermeule argues, law can and should - and to some extent already does - provide mechanisms of democracy: small-scale institutional devices and innovations that can have surprisingly large effects, promoting democratic values of impartial, accountable and deliberative government
Law and the limits of reason by Adrian Vermeule( Book )
24 editions published between 2008 and 2012 in English and held by 339 libraries worldwide
Vermeule denies the view that the limits of reason counsel in favour of judges making 'living' constitutional law in the style of the common law. Instead, he proposes and defends a 'codified constitution' - a regime in which legislatures have the primary authority to develop constitutional law over time
The system of the constitution by Adrian Vermeule( Book )
18 editions published between 2011 and 2012 in English and held by 309 libraries worldwide
"A constitutional order is a system of systems. It is an aggregate of interacting institutions, which are themselves aggregates of interacting individuals. In The System of the Constitution, Adrian Vermeule analyzes constitutionalism through the lens of systems theory, originally developed in biology, computer science, political science and other disciplines. Systems theory illuminates both the structural constitution and constitutional judging, and reveals that standard views and claims about constitutional theory commit fallacies of aggregation and are thus invalid. By contrast, Vermeule explains and illustrates an approach to constitutionalism that considers the systemic interactions of legal and political institutions and of the individuals who act within them"--Provided by publisher
Three strategies of interpretation by Adrian Vermeule( Book )
4 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 58 libraries worldwide
"We may distinguish three styles or strategies of decisionmaking. Under a maximizing approach, the decisionmaker chooses the action whose consequences are best for the case at hand (defining "best" according to some value the decisionmaker holds). Where decisionmakers choose the action that is best relative to constraints, accounting for the direct costs and opportunity costs of decisionmaking, we may call the approach optimizing rather than maximizing. Whereas the maximizer focuses only on the case at hand, the optimizer acts so as to maximize value over an array of cases. In contrast to both approaches, satisficing permits any decision whose results in the case at hand are good enough - although satisficing, like optimizing, may itself represent an indirect strategy of maximization. In this brief essay, I apply these distinctions to legal interpretation. Many approaches to the interpretation of statutes and the Constitution are maximizing approaches that attempt to produce as much as possible of some value the interpreter holds - for example, fidelity to legislative intent or original understandings. Optimizing approaches to interpretation condemn maximizing interpretation as a simpleminded approach that neglects the costs of decisionmaking and the costs of interpretive error. An alternative to both maximizing and optimizing approaches is a satisficing style of interpretation, in which interpreters eschew the search for the very best interpretation (even within constraints), instead selecting an interpretation that is good enough, in light of whatever value theory the interpreter holds. I criticize the maximizing style of interpretation and praise its two competitors. Both the optimizing and satisficing perspectives help to justify some controversial principles of statutory and constitutional interpretation, such as the rule barring resort to legislative history where statutes have a plain meaning, and clause-bound (as opposed to broadly holistic or "intratextualist") interpretation of statutes and the Constitution. Although maximizing interpretation is untenable, neither the optimizing approach nor the satisficing approach is globally best; each is an attractive decision-procedure in some contexts. Where the interpretive stakes are either very low or very high, satisficing is reasonable (whether or not rational in some stronger sense), while optimizing is best suited to medium-stakes decisions."
The constitution of risk by Adrian Vermeule( Book )
1 edition published in 2014 in English and held by 51 libraries worldwide
"The Constitution of Risk is the first book to combine constitutional theory with the theory of risk regulation. The book argues that constitutional rulemaking is best understood as a means of managing political risks. Constitutional law structures and regulates the risks that arise in and from political life, such as an executive coup or military putsch, political abuse of ideological or ethnic minorities, or corrupt self-dealing by officials. The book claims that the best way to manage political risks is an approach it calls "optimizing constitutionalism" - in contrast to the worst-case thinking that underpins "precautionary constitutionalism," a mainstay of liberal constitutional theory. Drawing on a broad range of disciplines such as decision theory, game theory, welfare economics, political science, and psychology, this book advocates constitutional rulemaking undertaken in a spirit of welfare maximization, and offers a corrective to the pervasive and frequently irrational attitude of distrust of official power that is so prominent in American constitutional history and discourse"--
Interpretation and institutions by Cass R Sunstein( Computer File )
2 editions published between 2002 and 2006 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
"To evaluate theories of interpretation, it is necessary to focus on institutional considerations - to ask how actual judges would use any proposed approach, and to investigate the possibility that an otherwise appealing approach will have unfortunate dynamic effects on private and public institutions. Notwithstanding this point, blindness to institutional considerations is pervasive. It can be found in the work of early commentators on interpretation, including that of Jeremy Bentham; in the influential work of H.L.A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, and Henry Hart and Albert Sacks; and in much contemporary writing. This blindness to institutional considerations creates serious problems for the underlying theories. The problems are illustrated with discussions of many disputed issues, including the virtues and vices of formalism; the current debate over whether administrative agencies should have greater interpretive freedom than courts; and the roles of text, philosophy, translation, and tradition in constitutional law. In many cases, an understanding of institutional capacities and dynamic effects should enable diverse people, with different views about ideal legal interpretation, to agree on what actual legal interpretation should entail."
Administrative law and regulatory policy : problems, text, and cases ( Book )
1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
The University of Chicago Law review : Celebrating the centennial of the University of Chicago Law School by University of Chicago( Book )
1 edition published in 2003 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Is capital punishment morally required? the relevance of life-life tradeoffs by Cass R Sunstein( Computer File )
2 editions published between 2005 and 2006 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
"Recent evidence suggests that capital punishment may have a significant deterrent effect, preventing as many eighteen or more murders for each execution. This evidence greatly unsettles moral objections to the death penalty, because it suggests that a refusal to impose that penalty condemns numerous innocent people to death. Capital punishment thus presents a life-life tradeoff, and a serious commitment to the sanctity of human life may well compel, rather than forbid, that form of punishment. Moral objections to the death penalty frequently depend on a distinction between acts and omissions, but that distinction is misleading in this context, because government is a special kind of moral agent. The familiar problems with capital punishment - potential error, irreversibility, arbitrariness, and racial skew - do not argue in favor of abolition, because the world of homicide suffers from those same problems in even more acute form. The widespread failure to appreciate the life-life tradeoffs involved in capital punishment may depend on cognitive processes that fail to treat "statistical lives" with the seriousness that they deserve."
Military tribunals history, legality, policy ; civil rights and military tribunals, January 17, 2002 ( visu )
2 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Should coercive interrogation be legal? by Eric A Posner( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2006 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
"Most academics who have written on coercive interrogation believe that its use is justified in extreme or catastrophic scenarios but that nonetheless it should be illegal. They argue that formal illegality will not prevent justified use of coercive interrogation because government agents will be willing to risk criminal liability and are likely to be pardoned, acquitted, or otherwise forgiven if their behavior is morally justified. This outlaw and forgive approach to coercive interrogation is supposed to prevent coercive interrogation from being applied in inappropriate settings, to be symbolically important, and nonetheless to permit justified coercive interrogation. We argue that the outlaw and forgive approach rests on questionable premises. If coercive interrogation is ever justified, and the benefits outweigh the risks of error and unintended consequences, it should be legal, albeit strictly regulated. The standard institutional justifications for outlaw and forgive - rules/standards problems, slippery slopes, and symbolism - are unpersuasive."
The judiciary is a they not an it two fallacies of interpretive theory by Adrian Vermeule( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2006 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
"Beneficial effects on legislative behavior that will result if "judges" or "courts" adopt a particular approach to interpretation. In this paper I claim that such arguments are conceptually confused, and thus do not count as valid arguments at all. Dynamic arguments commit the fundamental mistake of overlooking the collective character of judicial institutions - of overlooking that the judiciary, like Congress, is a "they," not an "it." That mistake produces the critical, and erroneous, assumption that coordinated judicial adoption of some particular approach to legal interpretation is both feasible and desirable. That assumption commits two logical fallacies simultaneously. The fallacy of division arises when a claim that is true of, or justified for, a whole set is taken to apply to any particular member of the set. The fallacy of composition arises when a claim that is true of, or justified for, any particular member of a set is taken to apply to the whole set. Both fallacies infect dynamic interpretive arguments. First, the claim that a given approach would be best for the whole court or judiciary does not entail that it would be best for any given judge taken alone. The inference from the group-level claim to the individual-level claim fails if judicial coordination on a particular approach is infeasible or unlikely. Second, the claim that a particular approach is best for any given judge need not entail that it would be best for the whole court (or judiciary). If a diversity of approaches is desirable for systemic and institutional reasons, then it would be an affirmative bad for all judges to coordinate on a particular approach. To overlook the first point is to commit the division fallacy; to overlook the second is to commit the composition fallacy. The same reasoning applies from the standpoint of every judge in the system."
Emergencies and Democratic Failure by Eric A Posner( Computer File )
2 editions published in 2006 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
"Critics of emergency measures such as the U.S. government's response to 9/11 invoke the Carolene Products framework, which directs courts to apply strict scrutiny to laws and executive actions that target political or ethnic minorities. The critics suggest that such laws and actions are usually the product of democratic failure, and are especially likely to be so during emergencies. However, the application of the Carolene Products framework to emergencies is questionable. Democratic failure is no more likely during emergencies than during normal times, and courts are in a worse position to correct democratic failures during emergencies than during normal times. The related arguments that during emergencies courts should protect aliens, and should be more skeptical of unilateral executive actions than of actions that are authorized by statutes, are also of doubtful validity."
Transitional justice as ordinary justice by Eric A Posner( Computer File )
2 editions published between 2004 and 2006 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
"Theorists of transitional justice study the transition measures used, or eschewed, by new democracies that succeed communist or authoritarian regimes - measures including trials, purges, lustration, reparations, and truth commissions. The theorists tend to oppose transitional measures, portraying them as illiberal and as a distraction from the task of consolidating new democracies. In this Article we argue against that view. The critics of transitional justice have gone wrong by overlooking that transitional measures are common in consolidated legal systems, which themselves constantly undergo political and economic shocks resulting in transitions of greater or lesser degree. Ordinary justice has developed a range of pragmatic tools for managing transitions. Consolidated democracies use trials, purges and reparations to accomplish valuable forward-looking goals without allowing illiberal repression; new democracies can and should use those tools also. Because transitional justice is continuous with ordinary justice, there is no reason to treat transitional-justice measures as presumptively suspect, on either moral or institutional grounds."
System effects and the constitution by Adrian Vermeule( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2009 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
The constitutional Law of congressional Procedure by Adrian Vermeule( Article )
1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Originalism and Emergencies : a Reply to Lawson by Eric A Posner( Article )
1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
 
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Alternative Names
Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian Comstock 1968-
Languages
English (127)
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