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Levin, Jonathan D. (Jonathan David) 1972-

Works: 33 works in 43 publications in 1 language and 536 library holdings
Genres: Interviews 
Roles: Author, Thesis advisor
Classifications: HB1, 330.072
Publication Timeline
Publications about Jonathan D Levin
Publications by Jonathan D Levin
Most widely held works by Jonathan D Levin
Information and competition in U.S. Forest Service timber auctions by Susan Athey( Book )
2 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 60 libraries worldwide
Abstract: This paper studies the bidding behavior of firms in U.S. Forest Service timber auctions in 1976--1990. When conducting timber auctions, the Forest Service publicly announces its estimates of the tract characteristics before the auction, and each bidder additionally has an opportunity to inspect the tract and form its own private estimates. We build a model that incorporates both differential information and the fact that bids placed in timber auctions are multidimensional. The theory predicts that bidders will strategically distort their bids based on their private information, a practice known as 'skewed bidding.' Using a dataset that includes both the public ex ante Forest Service estimates and the ex post realizations of the tract characteristics, we test our model and provide evidence that bidders do possess private information. Our results suggest that private information affects Forest Service revenue and creates allocational inefficiency. Finally, we establish that risk aversion plays an important role in bidding behavior
Empirical industrial organization a progress report by Liran Einav( file )
3 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 41 libraries worldwide
The field of Industrial Organization has made dramatic advances over the last few decades in developing empirical methods for analyzing imperfect competition and the organization of markets. We describe the motivation for these developments and some of the successes. We also discuss the relative emphasis that applied work in the field has placed on economic theory relative to statistical research design, and the possibility that a focus on methodological innovation has crowded out applications. We offer some suggestions about how the field may progress in coming years
Pricing and welfare in health plan choice by M. Kate Bundorf( file )
2 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 37 libraries worldwide
Prices in government and employer-sponsored health insurance markets only partially reflect insurers' expected costs of coverage for different enrollees. This can create inefficient distortions when consumers self-select into plans. We develop a simple model to study this problem and estimate it using new data on small employers. In the markets we observe, the welfare loss compared to the feasible efficient benchmark is around 2-11% of coverage costs. Three-quarters of this is due to restrictions on risk-rating employee contributions; the rest is due to inefficient contribution choices. Despite the inefficiency, we find substantial benefits from plan choice relative to single-insurer options
Beyond testing empirical models of insurance markets by Liran Einav( file )
2 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 37 libraries worldwide
We describe recent advances in the empirical analysis of insurance markets. This new research proposes ways to estimate individual demand for insurance and the relationship between prices and insurer costs in the presence of adverse and advantageous selection. We discuss how these models permit the measurement of welfare distortions arising from asymmetric information and the welfare consequences of potential government policy responses. We also discuss some challenges in modeling imperfect competition between insurers, and outline a series of open research questions
Set-asides and subsidies in auctions by Susan Athey( file )
2 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 36 libraries worldwide
Set-asides and subsidies are used extensively in government procurement and natural resource sales. We analyze these policies in an empirical model of U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. The model fits the data well both within the sample of unrestricted sales where we estimate the model, and when we predict (out of sample) bidder entry and prices for small business set-asides. Our estimates suggest that restricting entry to small businesses substantially reduces efficiency and revenue, although it does increase small business participation. An alternative policy of subsidizing small bidders would increase revenue and small bidder profit, while eliminating almost all of the efficiency loss of set-asides, and only slightly decreasing the profit of larger firms. We explain these findings by connecting to the theory of optimal auction design
Early admissions at selective colleges by Christopher Avery( file )
2 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 35 libraries worldwide
Early admissions is widely used by selective colleges and universities. We identify some basic facts about early admissions policies, including the admissions advantage enjoyed by early applicants and patterns in application behavior, and propose a game-theoretic model that matches these facts. The key feature of the model is that colleges want to admit students who are enthusiastic about attending, and early admissions programs give students an opportunity to signal this enthusiasm
The economics of Internet markets by Jonathan D Levin( file )
1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 33 libraries worldwide
The internet has facilitated the creation of new markets characterized by large scale, increased customization, rapid innovation and the collection and use of detailed consumer and market data. I describe these changes and some of the economic theory that has been useful for thinking about online advertising markets, retail and business-to-business e-commerce, internet job matching and financial exchanges, and other internet platforms. I also discuss the empirical evidence on competition and consumer behavior in internet markets and some directions for future research
Winning play in spectrum auctions by Jeremy Bulow( file )
2 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 32 libraries worldwide
We describe factors that make bidding in large spectrum auctions complex -- including exposure and budget problems, the role of timing within an ascending auction, and the possibilities for price forecasting -- and how economic and game-theoretic analysis can assist bidders in overcoming these problems. We illustrate with the case of the FCC's Advanced Wireless Service auction, in which a new entrant, SpectrumCo, faced all these problems yet managed to purchase nationwide coverage at a discount of roughly a third relative to the prices paid by its incumbent competitors in the same auction, saving more than a billion dollars
Comparing open and sealed bid auctions evidence from timber auctions by Susan Athey( file )
1 edition published in 2008 in English and held by 31 libraries worldwide
We study entry and bidding patterns in sealed bid and open auctions with heterogeneous bidders. Using data from U.S. Forest Service timber auctions, we document a set of systematic effects of auction format: sealed bid auctions attract more small bidders, shift the allocation towards these bidders, and can also generate higher revenue. We show that a private value auction model with endogenous participation can account for these qualitative effects of auction format. We estimate the model's parameters and show that it can explain the quantitative effects as well. Finally, we use the model to provide an assessment of bidder competitiveness, which has important consequences for auction choice
Matching and price competition by Jeremy Bulow( file )
1 edition published in 2005 in English and held by 28 libraries worldwide
"We develop a model in which firms set impersonal salary levels before matching with workers. Salaries fall relative to any competitive equilibrium while profits rise by almost as much, implyinglittle inefficiency. Furthermore, the best firms gain the most from the system while wages becomecompressed. We discuss the performance of alternative institutions and the recent antitrust caseagainst the National Residency Matching Program in light of our results"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
The data revolution and economic analysis by Liran Einav( file )
1 edition published in 2013 in English and held by 28 libraries worldwide
Many believe that "big data" will transform business, government and other aspects of the economy. In this article we discuss how new data may impact economic policy and economic research. Large-scale administrative datasets and proprietary private sector data can greatly improve the way we measure, track and describe economic activity. They also can enable novel research designs that allow researchers to trace the consequences of different events or policies. We outline some of the challenges in accessing and making use of these data. We also consider whether the big data predictive modeling tools that have emerged in statistics and computer science may prove useful in economics
Liquidity constraints and imperfect information in subprime lending by William Adams( file )
1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 28 libraries worldwide
We present new evidence on consumer liquidity constraints and the credit market conditions that might give rise to them. Our analysis is based on unique data from a large auto sales company that serves the subprime market. We first document the role of short-term liquidity in driving purchasing behavior, including sharp increases in demand during tax rebate season and a high sensitivity to minimum down payment requirements. We then explore the informational problems facing subprime lenders. We find that default rates rise significantly with loan size, providing a rationale for lenders to impose loan caps because of moral hazard. We also find that borrowers at the highest risk of default demand the largest loans, but the degree of adverse selection is mitigated substantially by effective risk-based pricing
Contracting for government services theory and evidence from U.S. cities by Jonathan D Levin( file )
1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 27 libraries worldwide
Local governments can provide services with their own employees or by contracting with private or public sector providers. We develop a model of this "make-or-buy" choice that highlights the trade-off between productive efficiency and the costs of contract administration. We construct a dataset of service provision choices by U.S. cities and identify a range of service and city characteristics as significant determinants of contracting decisions. Our analysis suggests an important role for economic efficiency concerns, as well as politics, in contracting for government services
Estimating dynamic models of imperfect competition by Patrick L Bajari( file )
1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 22 libraries worldwide
"We describe a two-step algorithm for estimating dynamic games under the assumption that behavior is consistent with Markov Perfect Equilibrium. In the first step, the policy functions and the law of motion for the state variables are estimated. In the second step, the remaining structural parameters are estimated using the optimality conditions for equilibrium. The second step estimator is a simple simulated minimum distance estimator. The algorithm applies to a broad class of models, including I.O. models with both discrete and continuous controls such as the Ericson and Pakes (1995) model. We test the algorithm on a class of dynamic discrete choice models with normally distributed errors, and a class of dynamic oligopoly models similar to that of Pakes and McGuire (1994)"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Vertical integration and market structure by Timothy F Bresnahan( file )
2 editions published in 2012 in English and held by 21 libraries worldwide
Contractual theories of vertical integration derive firm boundaries as an efficient response to market transaction costs. These theories predict a relationship between underlying features of transactions and observed integration decisions. There has been some progress in testing these predictions, but less progress in quantifying their importance. One difficulty is that empirical applications often must consider firm structure together with industry structure. Research in industrial organization frequently has adopted this perspective, emphasizing how scale and scope economies, and strategic considerations, influence patterns of industry integration. But this research has paid less attention to contractual or organizational details, so that these two major lines of research on vertical integration have proceeded in parallel with only rare intersection. We discuss the value of combining different viewpoints from organizational economics and industrial organization
Reinventing the way we do business by Edward E Whitacre( visu )
1 edition published in 2013 in English and held by 10 libraries worldwide
After a long and distinguished career leading what has been called by Fortune magazine "the most admired telecommunications company in America," Ed Whitacre was called out of retirement to save GM and the potentially millions of jobs dependent on its survival. In this session, Jon Levin, Stanford University Professor and Economics Department Chair, leads an insightful interview in which Ed Whitacre shares, vividly, leadership lessons learned and the core management principles that catapulted him to 17 years as chairman and CEO of AT&T and, temporarily lured out of retirement, as chairman and CEO of General Motors Co
Consumer price search and platform design in internet commerce by Michael Dinerstein( file )
1 edition published in 2014 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Search frictions can explain why the "law of one price" fails in retail markets and why even firms selling commodity products have pricing power. In online commerce, physical search costs are low, yet price dispersion is common. We use browsing data from eBay to estimate a model of consumer search and price competition when retailers offer homogeneous goods. We find that retail margins are on the order of 10%, and use the model to analyze the design of search rankings. Our model explains most of the effects of a major re-design of eBay's product search, and allows us to identify conditions where narrowing consumer choice sets can be pro-competitive. Finally, we examine a subsequent A/B experiment run by eBay that illustrates the greater difficulties in designing search algorithms for differentiated products, where price is only one of the relevant product attributes
Are dynamic Vickrey auctions practical? : Properties of the combinatorial clock auction by Jonathan D Levin( file )
1 edition published in 2014 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
The combinatorial clock auction is becoming increasingly popular for large-scale spectrum awards and other uses, replacing more traditional ascending or clock auctions. We describe some surprising properties of the auction, including a wide range of ex post equilibria with demand expansion, demand reduction and predation. These outcomes arise because of the way the auction separates allocation and pricing, so that bidders are asked to make decisions that cannot possibly affect their own auction outcome. Our results obtain in a standard homogenous good setting where bidders have well-behaved linear demand curves, and suggest some practical difficulties with dynamic implementations of the Vickrey auction
The value of information in monotone decixion problems by Susan Athey( Book )
2 editions published between 1998 and 2000 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Essays in applied microeconometrics by Dominic Coey( file )
1 edition published in 2013 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
This subject of this dissertation is applied microeconometrics. Chapter 1 estimates the effect of physician incentives on treatment choices in heart attack management. Our results suggest that if physicians received bundled payments instead of fee-for-service incentives, heart attack management would become considerably more conservative, and about 20 percent of patients would receive different treatments. Chapter 2 studies the effect of Medicaid on health expenditures. At age 19, some enrollees lose Medicaid eligibility. We find that this quasi-experimental loss of coverage causes substantial changes to the level and composition of health care use. Average health expenditure falls by around 60 percent. Chapter 3 compares set-asides and subsidies in government procurement auctions. Restricting entry appears to substantially reduces efficiency and revenue, although it increases participation of favored bidders
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Alternative Names
Levin, Jonathan David 1972-
English (30)
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