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Levin, Jonathan D. (Jonathan David) 1972-

Overview
Works: 43 works in 129 publications in 1 language and 633 library holdings
Roles: Author
Classifications: HB1, 330.072
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about Jonathan D Levin
Publications by Jonathan D Levin
Most widely held works by Jonathan D Levin
Information and competition in U.S. Forest Service timber auctions by Susan Athey( Book )
17 editions published between 1999 and 2000 in English and held by 69 libraries worldwide
This paper studies the bidding behavior of firms in U.S. Forest Service timber auctions in 1976--1990. When conducting timber auctions, the Forest Service publicly announces its estimates of the tract characteristics before the auction, and each bidder additionally has an opportunity to inspect the tract and form its own private estimates. We build a model that incorporates both differential information and the fact that bids placed in timber auctions are multidimensional. The theory predicts that bidders will strategically distort their bids based on their private information, a practice known as 'skewed bidding.' Using a dataset that includes both the public ex ante Forest Service estimates and the ex post realizations of the tract characteristics, we test our model and provide evidence that bidders do possess private information. Our results suggest that private information affects Forest Service revenue and creates allocational inefficiency. Finally, we establish that risk aversion plays an important role in bidding behavior
Estimating dynamic models of imperfect competition by Patrick L Bajari( Book )
11 editions published between 2004 and 2007 in English and held by 43 libraries worldwide
We describe a two-step algorithm for estimating dynamic games under the assumption that behavior is consistent with Markov Perfect Equilibrium. In the first step, the policy functions and the law of motion for the state variables are estimated. In the second step, the remaining structural parameters are estimated using the optimality conditions for equilibrium. The second step estimator is a simple simulated minimum distance estimator. The algorithm applies to a broad class of models, including I.O. models with both discrete and continuous controls such as the Ericson and Pakes (1995) model. We test the algorithm on a class of dynamic discrete choice models with normally distributed errors, and a class of dynamic oligopoly models similar to that of Pakes and McGuire (1994)
Matching and price competition by Jeremy Bulow( Book )
10 editions published between 2003 and 2005 in English and held by 34 libraries worldwide
"We develop a model in which firms set impersonal salary levels before matching with workers. Salaries fall relative to any competitive equilibrium while profits rise by almost as much, implyinglittle inefficiency. Furthermore, the best firms gain the most from the system while wages becomecompressed. We discuss the performance of alternative institutions and the recent antitrust caseagainst the National Residency Matching Program in light of our results"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Liquidity constraints and imperfect information in subprime lending by William Adams( Book )
8 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 26 libraries worldwide
We present new evidence on consumer liquidity constraints and the credit market conditions that might give rise to them. Our analysis is based on unique data from a large auto sales company that serves the subprime market. We first document the role of short-term liquidity in driving purchasing behavior, including sharp increases in demand during tax rebate season and a high sensitivity to minimum down payment requirements. We then explore the informational problems facing subprime lenders. We find that default rates rise significantly with loan size, providing a rationale for lenders to impose loan caps because of moral hazard. We also find that borrowers at the highest risk of default demand the largest loans, but the degree of adverse selection is mitigated substantially by effective risk-based pricing
Contracting for government services : theory and evidence from U.S. cities by Jonathan D Levin( Book )
10 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 23 libraries worldwide
Local governments can provide services with their own employees or by contracting with private or public sector providers. We develop a model of this "make-or-buy" choice that highlights the trade-off between productive efficiency and the costs of contract administration. We construct a dataset of service provision choices by U.S. cities and identify a range of service and city characteristics as significant determinants of contracting decisions. Our analysis suggests an important role for economic efficiency concerns, as well as politics, in contracting for government services
Beyond testing : empirical models of insurance markets by Liran Einav( Book )
8 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 16 libraries worldwide
We describe recent advances in the empirical analysis of insurance markets. This new research proposes ways to estimate individual demand for insurance and the relationship between prices and insurer costs in the presence of adverse and advantageous selection. We discuss how these models permit the measurement of welfare distortions arising from asymmetric information and the welfare consequences of potential government policy responses. We also discuss some challenges in modeling imperfect competition between insurers, and outline a series of open research questions
Comparing open and sealed bid auctions : evidence from timber auctions by Susan Athey( Book )
11 editions published between 2004 and 2008 in English and held by 14 libraries worldwide
We study entry and bidding patterns in sealed bid and open auctions with heterogeneous bidders. Using data from U.S. Forest Service timber auctions, we document a set of systematic effects of auction format: sealed bid auctions attract more small bidders, shift the allocation towards these bidders, and can also generate higher revenue. We show that a private value auction model with endogenous participation can account for these qualitative effects of auction format. We estimate the model's parameters and show that it can explain the quantitative effects as well. Finally, we use the model to provide an assessment of bidder competitiveness, which has important consequences for auction choice
Winning play in spectrum auctions by Jeremy Bulow( Book )
8 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 12 libraries worldwide
We describe factors that make bidding in large spectrum auctions complex -- including exposure and budget problems, the role of timing within an ascending auction, and the possibilities for price forecasting -- and how economic and game-theoretic analysis can assist bidders in overcoming these problems. We illustrate with the case of the FCC's Advanced Wireless Service auction, in which a new entrant, SpectrumCo, faced all these problems yet managed to purchase nationwide coverage at a discount of roughly a third relative to the prices paid by its incumbent competitors in the same auction, saving more than a billion dollars
Set-asides and subsidies in auctions by Susan Athey( Book )
7 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 8 libraries worldwide
Set-asides and subsidies are used extensively in government procurement and natural resource sales. We analyze these policies in an empirical model of U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. The model fits the data well both within the sample of unrestricted sales where we estimate the model, and when we predict (out of sample) bidder entry and prices for small business set-asides. Our estimates suggest that restricting entry to small businesses substantially reduces efficiency and revenue, although it does increase small business participation. An alternative policy of subsidizing small bidders would increase revenue and small bidder profit, while eliminating almost all of the efficiency loss of set-asides, and only slightly decreasing the profit of larger firms. We explain these findings by connecting to the theory of optimal auction design
Vertical integration and market structure by Timothy F Bresnahan( Book )
2 editions published in 2012 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Contractual theories of vertical integration derive firm boundaries as an efficient response to market transaction costs. These theories predict a relationship between underlying features of transactions and observed integration decisions. There has been some progress in testing these predictions, but less progress in quantifying their importance. One difficulty is that empirical applications often must consider firm structure together with industry structure. Research in industrial organization frequently has adopted this perspective, emphasizing how scale and scope economies, and strategic considerations, influence patterns of industry integration. But this research has paid less attention to contractual or organizational details, so that these two major lines of research on vertical integration have proceeded in parallel with only rare intersection. We discuss the value of combining different viewpoints from organizational economics and industrial organization
Consumer price search and platform design in internet commerce by Michael Dinerstein( file )
2 editions published in 2014 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Search frictions can explain why the "law of one price" fails in retail markets and why even firms selling commodity products have pricing power. In online commerce, physical search costs are low, yet price dispersion is common. We use browsing data from eBay to estimate a model of consumer search and price competition when retailers offer homogeneous goods. We find that retail margins are on the order of 10%, and use the model to analyze the design of search rankings. Our model explains most of the effects of a major re-design of eBay's product search, and allows us to identify conditions where narrowing consumer choice sets can be pro-competitive. Finally, we examine a subsequent A/B experiment run by eBay that illustrates the greater difficulties in designing search algorithms for differentiated products, where price is only one of the relevant product attributes
Winning play in spectrum auctions by Jeremy Bulow( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2009 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
A theory of partnerships ( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2002 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Set-asides and subsidies in auctions by Susan Athey( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
"Set-asides and subsidies are used extensively in government procurement and natural resource sales. We analyze these policies in an empirical model of U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. The model fits the data well both within the sample of unrestricted sales where we estimate the model, and when we predict (out of sample) bidder entry and prices for small business set-asides. Our estimates suggest that restricting entry to small businesses substantially reduces efficiency and revenue, although it does increase small business participation. An alternative policy of subsidizing small bidders would increase revenue and small bidder profit, while eliminating almost all of the efficiency loss of set-asides, and only slightly decreasing the profit of larger firms. We explain these findings by connecting to the theory of optimal auction design"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Profit sharing and the role of professional partnerships ( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Vertical Integration and Market Structure by by Timothy F Bresnahan( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2012 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Comparing open and sealed bid auctions : evidence from timber auctions ( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2008 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Measuring the role of subnational governments by Jonathan Levin( file )
1 edition published in 1991 in English and held by 0 libraries worldwide
To measure subnational governments, only external money flows are counted, excluding intra-level transactions in measuring a level of government and all intergovernmental transactions in measuring general government. Control, finance, and administration should be distinguished in measuring centralization and each levels share of general government, administered expenditures being net of grants given to other governments and financed expenditures net of grants received. Disparate decentralization of finance, control, and administration brings vertical imbalance, measured by the portion of a governments expenditures not covered by its own resources and by the ratio of intergovernmental grants to total government expenditures
Valuation and treatment of depletable resources in the national accounts by Jonathan Levin( file )
1 edition published in 1991 in English and held by 0 libraries worldwide
To assess the feasibility of the national accounts treating as assets depletable resources extracted for sale, the paper examines three issues: 1. whether treating natural resources as assets when they are used requires symmetrical accounting when they enter economic reserves; 2. at what stage between existence in nature and extraction entry to reserves could be counted; and 3. how the value of the in-ground natural resource component could be determined. It suggests treating natural resources entering reserves as imports from the environmental account added to the capital account, registering additions to reserves at a stage involved in economic activities, and valuing reserves by procedures related to market price
An Analytical framework of environmental issues by Jonathan Levin( file )
1 edition published in 1993 in English and held by 0 libraries worldwide
Annotation
 
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Alternative Names
Jonathan Levin Amerikaans econoom
Jonathan Levin amerikansk ekonom
Jonathan Levin amerikansk økonom
Jonathan Levin économiste américain
Jonathan Levin US-amerikanischer Ökonom
Jonathan Levin yhdysvaltalainen taloustieteilijä
Levin, J. D.
Levin, Jonathan D.
Levin, Jonathan David
جاناتان لوین اقتصاددان آمریکایی
乔纳森·莱文
Languages
English (103)
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