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Edlin, Aaron S.

Works: 50 works in 230 publications in 1 language and 2,717 library holdings
Genres: History  Trials, litigation, etc  Casebooks  Case studies 
Roles: Author, Editor, Contributor
Classifications: KF1648, 330.90511
Publication Timeline
Publications about Aaron S Edlin
Publications by Aaron S Edlin
Most widely held works by Aaron S Edlin
The economists' voice : top economists take on today's problems by Joseph E Stiglitz( Book )
18 editions published between 2007 and 2015 in English and held by 842 libraries worldwide
From the Publisher: In this valuable resource, more than thirty of the world's top economists offer innovative policy ideas and insightful commentary on our most pressing economic issues, such as global warming, the global economy, government spending, Social Security, tax reform, real estate, and political and social policy, including an extensive look at the economics of capital punishment, welfare reform, and the recent presidential elections. Contributors are Nobel Prize winners, former presidential advisers, well-respected columnists, academics, and practitioners from across the political spectrum. Joseph E. Stiglitz takes a hard look at the high cost of the Iraq War; Nobel Laureates Kenneth Arrow, Thomas Schelling, and Stiglitz provide insight and advice on global warming; Paul Krugman demystifies Social Security; Bradford DeLong presents divergent views on the coming dollar crisis; Diana Farrell reconsiders the impact of U.S. offshoring; Michael J. Boskin distinguishes what is "sense" and what is "nonsense" in discussions of federal deficits and debt; and Ronald I. McKinnon points out the consequences of the deindustrialization of America. Additional essays question whether welfare reform was successful and explore the economic consequences of global warming and the rebuilding of New Orleans. They describe how a simple switch in auto insurance policy could benefit the environment; unravel the dangers of an unchecked housing bubble; and investigate the mishandling of the lending institutions Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Balancing empirical data with economic theory, The Economists' Voice proves that the unique perspective of the economist is a vital one for understanding today's world
The economists' voice 2.0 : the financial crisis, health care reform, and more by Aaron S Edlin( Book )
10 editions published between 2012 and 2015 in English and held by 323 libraries worldwide
"This book contains thirty-two essays written by academics, economists, presidential advisors, legal specialists, researchers, consultants, and policy makers. They tackle the plain economics and architecture of health care reform, its implications for society and the future of the health insurance industry, and the value of the health insurance subsidies and exchanges built into the law. They consider the effects of financial regulatory reform, the possibilities for ratings reform, and the issue of limiting bankers' pay. An objective examination of the financial crisis and bank bailouts results in two indispensable essays on investment banking regulation after Bear Stearns and the positives and negatives of the Paulson/Bernanke bailout. Contributors weigh the merits of future rescues and suggest alternative strategies for addressing the next financial crisis. A final section examines a unique array of topics: the stability of pension security bonds; the value of a carbon tax, especially in fostering economic and environmental sustainability; the counterintuitive perils of net neutrality; the unforeseen consequences of government debt; the meaning of the Google book search settlement; and the unexploited possibilities for profit in NFL overtime games"--Provided by publisher
Antitrust analysis : problems, text, cases by Phillip Areeda( Book )
14 editions published between 2003 and 2013 in English and held by 188 libraries worldwide
The entire casebook has been updated to reflect legal changes and developments: updated chapter on Mergers now discusses current merger practice, emphasizes agency enforcement standards, presents compelling examples, and considers the range of negotiated remedies and the importance of international law - older Supreme Court cases are converted to note form or omitted - recent lower court decisions, such as FTC v. Staples, give students an understanding of modern litigation -streamlined chapter on Vertical Restraints includes recent cases and new text to provide a more coherent framework for this complicated area in major revisions to the chapter on monopolization include the Microsoft - and American Airlines cases
Per-mile premiums for auto insurance by Aaron S Edlin( Book )
21 editions published between 1998 and 2002 in English and held by 81 libraries worldwide
Abstract: Americans drive 2,360,000,000,000 miles each year, far outstripping other nations. Every time a driver takes to the road, and with each mile she drives, she exposes herself and others to the risk of accident. Insurance premiums are only weakly linked to mileage, however, and have largely lump-sum characteristics. The result is too much driving and too many accidents. This paper begins by developing a model of the relationship between driving and accidents that formalizes Vickrey's [1968] central insights about the accident externalities of driving. We use this model to estimate the driving, accident, and congestion reductions that could be expected from switching to other insurance pricing systems. Under a competitive system of per-mile premiums, in which insurance companies quote risk-classified per-mile rates, we estimate that the reduction in insured accident costs net of lost driving benefits would be $9.8 -$12.7 billion nationally, or $58 -$75 per insured vehicle. When uninsured accident cost savings and congestion reductions are considered, the net benefits rise to $25 -$29 billion, exclusive of monitoring costs. The total benefits of uniform per-gallon insurance charge could be $1.3 -$2.3 billion less due to heterogeneity in fuel efficiency. The total benefits of optimal' per-mile premiums in which premiums are taxed to account for accident externalities would be $32 -$43 billion, or $187 - $254 per vehicle, exclusive of monitoring costs. One reason that insurance companies may have not switched to per-mile premiums on their own is that most of the benefits are external and the transaction costs to the company and its customers of checking odometers could exceed the $31 per vehicle of gains that a single company could temporarily realize on its existing base of customers
The implicit taxes from college financial aid by Andrew W Dick( Book )
11 editions published in 1995 in English and held by 75 libraries worldwide
Abstract: Families who heed the 'experts'' advice and save for their children's college education typically receive less financial aid. The variation in the net price of college functions as a large tax on savings. College financial aid also functions as an income tax. This paper estimates the size and determinants of these income and asset taxes. We find that the marginal income tax typically ranges from 2% to 16% and the marginal asset levy from somewhat under 10% to as high as 25%. If a typical family chooses to accumulate $100,000 in assets rather than consuming these resources, it loses financial aid worth $10,000-$20,000
Contract renegotiation in agency problems by Aaron S Edlin( Book )
12 editions published in 1997 in English and held by 64 libraries worldwide
Abstract: This paper studies the ability of an agent and a principal to achieve the first-best outcome when the agent invests in an asset that has greater value if owned by the principal than by the agent. When contracts can be renegotiated, a well-known danger is that the principal can hold up the agent, undermining the agent's investment incentives. We begin by identifying a countervailing effect: Investment by the agent can increase his value for the asset, thus improving his bargaining position in renegotiation. We show that option contracts will achieve the first best whenever this threat-point effect dominates the holdup effect. Otherwise, achieving the first best is difficult and, in many cases, impossible. In such cases, we show that if parties have an appropriate signal available, then the first best is still attainable for a wide class of bargaining procedures. A noisy signal, however, means that the optimal contract will involve terms that courts might view as punitive and so refuse to enforce
Cadillac contracts and up-front payments : efficient investment under expectation damages by Aaron S Edlin( Book )
14 editions published between 1994 and 1995 in English and held by 62 libraries worldwide
This paper shows that up-front payments can play a crucial role in providing efficient investment incentives when contracts are incomplete. They can eliminate the overinvestment effect identified by Rogerson [1984] and Shavell [1980] when courts use an expectation damage remedy. This method extends to complex contracting situations if parties combine up-front payments with what we call 'Cadillac' contracts (contracts for a very high quality or quantity). This combination provides efficient investment incentives in complex contracting problems when an expectation damage remedy is accompanied by a broad duty to mitigate damages. This indicates that an expectation remedy is well-suited to multidimensional, but one-sided, investment problems, in contrast to specific performance, which Edlin and Reichelstein [1993] showed is well-suited to two-sided, but unidimensional, investment problems
Holdups, standard breach remedies, and optimal investment by Aaron S Edlin( Book )
14 editions published between 1995 and 1997 in English and held by 54 libraries worldwide
We consider a bilateral trading problem in which one or both parties makes relationship-specific investments before trade. Without adequate contractual protection, the prospect of later holdups discourages investment. We postulate that the parties can sign noncontingent contracts prior to investing, and can freely renegotiate them after uncertainty about the desirability of trade is resolved. We find that such contracts can induce one party to invest efficiently when either a breach remedy of specific performance or expectation damages is applied. Specific performance can also induce both parties to invest efficiently, provided a separability condition holds. In contrast, expectation damages is poorly suited to solve bilateral investment problems
Discouraging rivals : managerial rent seeking and economic insufficiencies by Joseph E Stiglitz( Book )
17 editions published between 1992 and 1997 in English and held by 44 libraries worldwide
We argue here for a broader view of the biases in managers' decisions: In general, managerial rent-seeking affects not only the level of investment, but also the form. Our basic hypothesis is simple: given the now well-established scope for managerial discretion, managers have an incentive to exercise that discretion to enhance their income. Any managerial contract is subject to renegotiation, and a manager's pay is the outcome of an often bewildering bargaining process between management, the board of directors, and rival management teams or takeover artists
Voting as a rational choice : why and how people vote to improve the well-being of others by Aaron S Edlin( Book )
9 editions published between 2007 and 2008 in English and held by 20 libraries worldwide
For voters with "social" preferences, the expected utility of voting is approximately independent of the size of the electorate, suggesting that rational voter turnouts can be substantial even in large elections. Less important elections are predicted to have lower turnout, but a feedback mechanism keeps turnout at a reasonable level under a wide range of conditions. The main contributions of this paper are: (1) to show how, for an individual with both selfish and social preferences, the social preferences will dominate and make it rational for a typical person to vote even in large elections;(2) to show that rational socially-motivated voting has a feedback mechanism that stabilizes turnout at reasonable levels (e.g., 50% of the electorate); (3) to link the rational social-utility model of voter turnout with survey findings on socially-motivated vote choice
What is the probability your vote will make a difference? by Andrew Gelman( Book )
8 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 12 libraries worldwide
One of the motivations for voting is that one vote can make a difference. In a presidential election, the probability that your vote is decisive is equal to the probability that your state is necessary for an electoral college win, times the probability the vote in your state is tied in that event. We computed these probabilities a week before the 2008 presidential election, using state-by-state election forecasts based on the latest polls. The states where a single vote was most likely to matter are New Mexico, Virginia, New Hampshire, and Colorado, where your vote had an approximate 1 in 10 million chance of determining the national election outcome. On average, a voter in America had a 1 in 60 million chance of being decisive in the presidential election
Rivalrous benefit taxation : the independent viability of separate agencies or firms by Aaron S Edlin( Book )
7 editions published in 1993 in English and held by 10 libraries worldwide
The critical ambiguity of due care : should courts be more lenient to plaintiffs under contributory negligence? by Aaron S Edlin( Book )
2 editions published in 1992 in English and held by 7 libraries worldwide
Surplus maximization and price discrimination in general equilibrium by Aaron S Edlin( Book )
6 editions published in 1994 in English and held by 6 libraries worldwide
Freedom to trade and the competitive process by Aaron S Edlin( Book )
7 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 6 libraries worldwide
Although antitrust courts sometimes stress the competitive process, they have not deeply explored what that process is. Inspired by the theory of the core, we explore the idea that the competitive process is the process of sellers and buyers forming improving coalitions. Much of antitrust can be seen as prohibiting firms' attempts to restrain improving trade between their rivals and customers. In this way, antitrust protects firms' and customers' freedom to trade to their mutual betterment
The accident externality from driving by Aaron S Edlin( Book )
5 editions published between 2003 and 2007 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Efficient standards of due care : should courts find more parties negligent under comparative negligence? by Aaron S Edlin( Book )
3 editions published in 1993 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
The American Airlines case : a chance to clarify predation policy by Aaron S Edlin( Book )
3 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Affirmative action and stereotypes in higher education admissions by Prasad Krishnamurthy( Book )
6 editions published in 2014 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
We analyze how admission policies affect stereotypes against students from disadvantaged groups. Many critics of affirmative action argue that lower admission standards cause such stereotypes and suggest group-blind admissions as a remedy. We show that when stereotypes result from social inequality, they can persist under group-blind admissions. In such cases, eliminating stereotypes perversely requires a higher admission standard for disadvantaged students. If a school seeks both to treat students equally and limit stereotypes, the optimal admission policy would still impose a higher standard on disadvantaged students. A third goal, such as equal representation, is required to justify group-blind admissions. Even when there is such a third goal, group-blind admissions are optimal only when the conflicting goals of equal representation and limiting stereotypes exactly balance. This is an implausible justification for group-blind admission because it implies that some schools desire higher standards for disadvantaged students. Schools that do not desire such higher standards will typically find some amount of affirmative action to be optimal
Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complements are unstable by Federico Echenique( Book )
3 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
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Alternative Names
Aaron Edlin Amerikaans econoom
Aaron Edlin Economist
Edlin, A. 1967-
Edlin, A. S. 1967-
Edlin, Aaron 1967-
에들린, 아론 S
English (190)
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