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Tornell, Aaron

Overview
Works: 76 works in 495 publications in 1 language and 2,982 library holdings
Roles: Author, 956, Honoree
Classifications: HB1, 332.091724
Publication Timeline
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Publications about Aaron Tornell
Publications by Aaron Tornell
Most widely held works by Aaron Tornell
Boom-bust cycles and financial liberalization by Aaron Tornell( Book )
9 editions published in 2005 in English and held by 305 libraries worldwide
"The authors also characterize key macroeconomic regularities observed across MICs, showing that credit markets play a key role not only in boom-bust episodes but in the strong "credit channel" observed during tranquil times. A theoretical framework is then presented that explains how credit market imperfections can account for these empirical patterns. Finally, Tornell and Westermann provide microeconomic evidence on the credit market imperfections that drive the results of the theoretical framework, finding that asymmetries between tradables and nontradables are key to understanding the patterns in MIC data."--Jacket
Voracity and growth by Aaron Tornell( Book )
21 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 105 libraries worldwide
We analyze an economy that lacks a strong legal-political institutional infrastructure an dis populated by multiple powerful groups. Powerful groups dynamically interact via fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock. In equilibrium, this leads to slow economic growth and a voracity effect, ' by which a shock, such as a terms of trade windfall, perversely generates a more than proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth. We also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less procyclical response to shocks
Financial crises in emerging markets : the lessons from 1995 by Jeffrey Sachs( Book )
18 editions published between 1996 and 1997 in English and held by 82 libraries worldwide
In this paper we examine closely the financial events following the Mexican peso devaluation to uncover new lessons about the nature of financial crises. We explore the question of why, during 1995, some emerging markets were hit by financial crises while others were not. To this end, we ask whether there are some fundamentals that help explain the variation in financial crises across countries or whether the variation just reflects contagion. We present a simple model identifying three factors that determine whether a country is more vulnerable to suffer a financial crisis: a high real exchange rate appreciation, a recent lending boom, and low reserves. We find that for a set of 20 emerging markets, differences in these fundamentals go far in explaining why during 1995 some emerging markets were hit by financial crises while others were not. We also find that alternative hypotheses that have been put forth to explain such crises often do not seem to be supported by the data, such as high current account deficits, excessive capital inflows and loose fiscal policies
Why aren't savings rates in Latin America procyclical? by Philip R Lane( Book )
15 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 70 libraries worldwide
Abstract: We document a striking empirical regularity: Latin American savings rates are as a rule substantially less procyclical than for OECD countries and in some cases are actually countercyclical. We build a non-representative agent intertemporal macroeconomic model that rationalizes this phenomenon as the equilibrium outcome of interaction between multiple groups that have common access to aggregate income. We conclude by suggesting that institutional reform may hold the key to improving the cyclical behavior of savings in Latin America
The collapse of the Mexican peso : what have we learned? by Jeffrey Sachs( Book )
19 editions published in 1995 in English and held by 69 libraries worldwide
In the first quarter of 1995 Mexico found itself in the grip of an intense financial panic. Foreign investors fled Mexico despite very high interest rates on Mexican securities, an undervalued currency, and financial indicators that pointed to long-term solvency. The fundamental conditions of the Mexican economy cannot account for the entire crisis. The crisis was due to unexpected shocks that occurred in 1994, and the inadequate policy response to those shocks. In the aftermath of the March assassination the exchange rate experienced a nominal devaluation of around 10 percent and interest rates increased by around 7 percentage points. However, the capital outflow continued. The policy response to this was to maintain the exchange rate rule, and to prevent further increases in interest rates by expanding domestic credit and by converting short-term peso- denominated government liabilities (Cetes) falling due into dollar- denominated bonds (Tesobonos). A fall in international reserves and an increase in short-term dollar-denominated debt resulted. The government simply ended up illiquid, and therefore financially vulnerable. Illiquidity exposed Mexico to a self-fulfilling panic
Reform from within by Aaron Tornell( Book )
13 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 68 libraries worldwide
Abstract: We present a model of endogenous institutional change that rationalizes reforms that have taken place in the context of economic crisis and drastic political change. Most of the reforms have been initiated by powerholders, even though they have ended worse off relative to the status quo. The first point we make is that reform is the tool used by some powerful groups to limit the power of their political opponents. The second point is that groups with common access' to the economy's resources find it individually rational to overappropriate resources. As a result the economy deteriorates. When the economy reaches a crisis conflict among groups erupts. Reform is the result of this conflict
The Mexican peso crisis : sudden death or death foretold? by Jeffrey Sachs( Book )
17 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 68 libraries worldwide
Abstract: We argue that allowing for the possibility of a self-fulfilling panic helps in understanding several features of the recent Mexican crisis. Self-fulfilling expectations became decisive in generating a panic only after the government ran down gross reserves and ran up short-term dollar debt. We present a simple model to explain how and why multiple equilibria can occur for some levels of reserves or debt, but not for others. Lastly, we argue that the imperfect credibility of Mexican exchange rate policy made it advisable to follow more contractionary fiscal and monetary policies in 1994. Our model formalizes the reasons why this is so
Common fundamentals in the tequila and Asian crises by Aaron Tornell( Book )
12 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 66 libraries worldwide
The cross-country variation in the severity of the crisis was largely determined by three fundamentals: the strength of the banking system, the real appreciation, and the international liquidity of the country. We also find that the rule that links fundamentals to the crisis severity has been the same in both the Tequila and Asian crises
Are windfalls a curse? : a non-representative agent model of the current account and fiscal policy by Aaron Tornell( Book )
14 editions published between 1994 and 1999 in English and held by 65 libraries worldwide
In several countries temporary terms of trade improvements have led to a deterioration of the current account. Furthermore, many of these countries failed to attain greater post-boom growth rates. The point we make is that the structure of the fiscal process is critical in determining outcomes. If fiscal control is unitary, then the consumption-smoothing effect is operative, and representative-agent models of the current account have predictive power. However, if control is divided among several fiscal claimants, a voracity effect appears which counteracts the consumption-smoothing effect, leading to a deterioration of the current account in response to a positive shock. We model the interaction among fiscal claimants as a dynamic game, and show that in equilibrium aggregate appropriation increases more than the windfall itself. This results in a deterioration of the current account. We also show that all the windfall is dissipated, with the country experiencing no increase in its growth rate. Lastly, we analyze the experiences of seven countries which have enjoyed large windfalls
The role of bank restructuring in recovering from crises : Mexico 1995-98 by Anne O Krueger( Book )
14 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 65 libraries worldwide
Abstract: In this paper we analyze the evolution of the Mexican economy between 1995 and 1998. The remarkable quick recovery seen in aggregate activity has not been uniform across the economy. The tradable sector has grown strongly, while the non-tradable sector has recuperated only sluggishly. This asymmetric response is intimately linked with the severe credit crunch that Mexico has experienced since 1995. Although fresh domestic bank lending dried up, tradable firms obtained financing in the international capital market. This was not the case in the non-tradable sector. A phenomenon that has gone hand in hand with the credit crunch is the steady increase in the share of non-performing loans. We analyze the reasons for this increase, the rationale for the partial bailout policy adopted in 1995, and we investigate why this policy stance did not solve the banking problem. An important lesson is that non-performing loans are unlikely to disappear on their own, even under a high GDP growth scenario. Furthermore, the existence of non-performing loans presents an obstacle for the banking system to adequately perform its functions. This raises the question of whether an alternative strategy under which all non-performing loans were recognized at once and the fiscal costs were all paid up-front would have been preferable
Fixed versus flexible exchange rates : which provides more fiscal discipline? by Aaron Tornell( Book )
16 editions published between 1994 and 1995 in English and held by 65 libraries worldwide
In recent years the conventional wisdom has held that fixed rates provide more fiscal discipline than do flexible rates. In this paper we show that this wisdom need not hold in a standard model in which fiscal policy is endogenously determined by a maximizing fiscal authority. The claim that fixed rates induce more discipline stresses that sustained adoption of lax fiscal policies must eventually lead to an exhaustion of reserves and thus to a politically costly collapse of the peg. Hence, under fixed rates bad behavior today leads to punishment tomorrow. Under flexible rates bad behavior has costs as well. The difference is in the intertemporal distribution of these costs: flexible rates allow the effects of unsound fiscal policies to manifest themselves immediately through movements in the exchange rate. Hence, bad behavior today leads to punishment today. If fiscal authorities are impatient, flexible rates - by forcing the costs to be paid up-front - provide more fiscal discipline and higher welfare for the representative private agent. The recent experience of Sub- Saharan countries supplies some preliminary evidence that matches the predictions of the model
Exchange rate dynamics and learning by Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas( Book )
12 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 64 libraries worldwide
Interest rate expectations are essential for exchange rate determination. Using a unique Survey data set on interest rate forecasts from 1986 to 1995 for G7 countries, we find that interest rate shocks were significantly more persistent in sample than expected by the market. This is consistent with ff3's finding that changes in the forward rate reflect changes in exchange rate expectations. We then present a model of nominal exchange rate determination that rationalizes the forward discount puzzle and exhibits the delayed overshooting pattern found by ee: following a monetary expansion that reduces the domestic interest rate, there is a gradual depreciation of the exchange rate followed by a gradual appreciation several months later. Delayed overshooting results from (a) the interaction of learning about the current state of affairs, and the intrinsic dynamic response of interest rates to monetary shocks and (b) the discrepancy between the actual distribution of shocks in sample and its expectation by market participants. This discrepancy is consistent with rational expectations if either (a) there is a small sample or Peso problem or (b) the true structure of the economy evolves over time and agents are learning with some delay
Privatizing the privatized by Aaron Tornell( Book )
12 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 61 libraries worldwide
In the first part of this paper we argue that three reforms must be implemented if privatization is to increase efficiency. First, establishing unitary control rights within the firm. Second, making privatized firms face hard budget constraints. Third, establishing a non-corruptible judicial system and transparent bankruptcy procedures. The question arises as to what course of action should be undertaken when these reforms have not been undertaken and privatizers have only a small window of opportunity? Either they privatize hastily today, or not at all. Should they go ahead with privatization and hope that the newly privatized firms will create the demand for good laws? In the case of behemoths, the answer is not clear cut. Privatization without prior implementation of the three reforms mentioned above will simply replace government bureaucrats with private mafias (i.e., private groups with the power to extract fiscal transfers). These private mafias might behave more voraciously than the bureaucrats they are replacing, reducing aggregate efficiency and further hindering the growth of the competitive private sector. In the second part we address the more traditional issues of auction design and of restructuring and regulation of monopolies with network externalities
The credit channel in middle income countries by Aaron Tornell( Book )
17 editions published between 2002 and 2003 in English and held by 61 libraries worldwide
With inflation under control in many in middle income countries (MICs), it is now swings in credit, investment and asset prices that affect these countries the most. In this paper we present a framework to analyze both theoretically and empirically how credit market shocks are propagated and amplified in MICs.The strength of the credit channel in our model derives from two key characteristics of MICs: (i)a sharp asymmetry across the tradables (T) sector and the more bank-dependent nontradables (N) sector; and (ii)a significant degree of currency mismatch in the N-sector. This makes movements in the real exchange rate the driving element in the amplification of shocks. The equilibrium imposes unambiguous contemporaneous linkages among key macroeconomic variables and allows us to derive structural VARs
Exchange rate dynamics, learning and misperception by Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas( Book )
17 editions published between 2002 and 2003 in English and held by 61 libraries worldwide
We propose a new explanation for the forward-premium and the delayed-overshooting puzzles. Both puzzles arise from a systematic under-reaction of short-term interest rate forecasts to current innovations. Accordingly, the forward premium is always a biased predictor of future depreciation; the bias can be so severe as to lead to negative coeffcients in the 'Fama' regression; delayed overshooting may or may not occur depending upon the persistence of interest rate innovations and the degree of under-reaction; lastly, for G-7 countries against the U.S., these puzzles can be rationalized for values of the model's parameters that match empirical estimates
Money-based versus exchange rate-based stabilization with endogenous fiscal policy by Aaron Tornell( Book )
12 editions published in 1995 in English and held by 60 libraries worldwide
Abstract: We present a standard intertemporal model in which fiscal policy is determined by an optimizing but non-benevolent fiscal authority. If the fiscal authority is impatient, a money-based stabilization provides more fiscal discipline and higher welfare for the representative agent than does an exchange rate-based stabilization. Data for Latin American stabilizations in the last quarter-century seem to confirm the notion that stabilizing by using money rather than the exchange rate helps induce politicians to reduce the fiscal deficit
The political economy of Mexico's entry to NAFTA by Aaron Tornell( Book )
12 editions published between 1995 and 1996 in English and held by 59 libraries worldwide
Abstract: In this paper, we derive three lessons from Mexico's experience. First, deep reforms like trade liberalization are not likely to happen by government decree. Instead, they usually come about when the unanimous blocking of reform by powerful elites breaks down. In the case of Mexico, this happened during a fiscal crisis, when some groups tried to displace other groups in order to capture a greater share of fiscal revenue. Second, in the presence of entrenched elites, the sustainability of reform depends on the existence of new groups that benefit from the new status quo and have enough power to defend it. Thus, the speed of successful reform is determined by the speed with which new groups are consolidated. Initially, Mexico limited radical liberalization to the manufacturing sector. The government has only recently begun to undertake serious liberalization in the services and agriculture sectors. The third lesson we take from Mexico is that the importance of formal agreements like NAFTA lies not so much in the ability of these agreements to reduce average import tariffs among their parties and improve their terms of trade vis vis the rest of the world, as claimed by the optimal tariff literature, but in that they serve as commitment devices to force reforms to continue
Boom-bust cycles in middle income countries : facts and explanation by Aaron Tornell( Book )
14 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 58 libraries worldwide
In this paper we characterize empirically the comovements of macro variables typically observed in middle income countries, as well as the 'boom-bust cycle' that has been observed during the last two decades. We find that many countries that have liberalized their financial markets, have witnessed the development of lending booms. Most of the time the boom gradually decelerates. But sometimes the boom ends in twin currency and banking crises, and is followed by a protracted credit crunch that outlives a short-lived recession. We also find that during lending booms there is a real appreciation and the nontradables (N) sector grows faster than the tradables (T) sector. Meanwhile, the opposite is true in the aftermath of crisis. We argue that these comovements are generated by the interaction of two characteristics of financing typical of middle income countries: risky currency mismatch and asymmetric financing opportunities across the N- and T-sectors
Credit market imperfections in middle income countries by Aaron Tornell( Book )
14 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 56 libraries worldwide
In this paper we document three credit market imperfections prevalent in middle income countries that can help to explain boom-bust cycles, as well as other macroeconomic patterns observed at higher frequencies across these countries. These imperfections are: the existence of financing constraints that affect mainly the nontradables sector, currency mismatch and guarantees that cover lenders against systemic crises. In MICs T-sector firms have access to international capital markets, while most N-firms are bank-dependent and are financially constrained. Systemic guarantees generate incentives for borrowers to take on insolvency risk by denominating debt in foreign currency. This currency mismatch makes movements in the real exchange rate -the relative price between N and T goods- the driving element in the amplification of shocks
The positive link between financial liberalization growth and crises by Aaron Tornell( Book )
14 editions published in 2004 in English and held by 53 libraries worldwide
There is no agreement regarding the growth-enhancing effects of financial liberalization, mainly because it is associated with risky international bank flows, lending booms, and crises. In this paper we make the case for liberalization despite the occurrence of crises. We show that in developing countries trade liberalization has typically been followed by financial liberalization, which has indeed led to financial fragility and a greater incidence of crises. However, financial liberalization also has led to higher GDP growth. In fact, the fastestgrowing countries are typically those that have experienced boom-bust cycles. That is, there is a positive link between GDP growth and the bumpiness of credit, which is captured by the negative skewness - not by the variance - of credit growth. To substantiate our interpretation of the data we present a model that shows why in countries with severe credit market imperfections, liberalization leads to higher growth and, as a byproduct, to financial fragility. Thus, occasional crises need not forestall growth and may even be a necessary component of a developing country's growth experience. Finally, our analysis indicates that foreign direct investment does not obviate the need for risky international bank flows, as the latter are the only source of financing for most firms in the nontradables sector
 
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Alternative Names
Frymerman Aaron Tornell
Tornell, A.
Tornell, Aarón
Tornell Frymerman Aaron
Languages
English (292)
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