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Levin, Jonathan

Works: 33 works in 111 publications in 1 language and 705 library holdings
Roles: Author
Classifications: QA76.774.M33, 005.4465
Publication Timeline
Publications about Jonathan Levin
Publications by Jonathan Levin
Most widely held works by Jonathan Levin
Mac OS X and iOS internals to the Apple's core by Jonathan Levin( file )
12 editions published between 2011 and 2013 in English and held by 487 libraries worldwide
An in-depth look into Mac OS X and iOS kernels Powering Macs, iPhones, iPads and more, OS X and iOS are becoming ubiquitous. When it comes to documentation, however, much of them are shrouded in mystery. Cocoa and Carbon, the application frameworks, are neatly described, but system programmers find the rest lacking. This indispensable guide illuminates the darkest corners of those systems, starting with an architectural overview, then drilling all the way to the core. Provides you with a top down view of OS X and iOSWalks you through the phases of system startup-both Mac (EFi) and mobile (iBoot
Estimating dynamic models of imperfect competition by Patrick L Bajari( Book )
8 editions published between 2004 and 2007 in English and held by 45 libraries worldwide
We describe a two-step algorithm for estimating dynamic games under the assumption that behavior is consistent with Markov Perfect Equilibrium. In the first step, the policy functions and the law of motion for the state variables are estimated. In the second step, the remaining structural parameters are estimated using the optimality conditions for equilibrium. The second step estimator is a simple simulated minimum distance estimator. The algorithm applies to a broad class of models, including I.O. models with both discrete and continuous controls such as the Ericson and Pakes (1995) model. We test the algorithm on a class of dynamic discrete choice models with normally distributed errors, and a class of dynamic oligopoly models similar to that of Pakes and McGuire (1994)
Matching and price competition by Jeremy Bulow( Book )
7 editions published between 2003 and 2005 in English and held by 30 libraries worldwide
We develop a model in which firms set impersonal salary levels before matching with workers.<br>Salaries fall relative to any competitive equilibrium while profits rise by almost as much, implying<br>little inefficiency. Furthermore, the best firms gain the most from the system while wages become<br>compressed. We discuss the performance of alternative institutions and the recent antitrust case<br>against the National Residency Matching Program in light of our results
Information and competition in U.S. Forest Service timber auctions by Susan Athey( Book )
12 editions published between 1999 and 2000 in English and held by 24 libraries worldwide
This paper studies the bidding behavior of firms in U.S. Forest Service timber auctions in 1976--1990. When conducting timber auctions, the Forest Service publicly announces its estimates of the tract characteristics before the auction, and each bidder additionally has an opportunity to inspect the tract and form its own private estimates. We build a model that incorporates both differential information and the fact that bids placed in timber auctions are multidimensional. The theory predicts that bidders will strategically distort their bids based on their private information, a practice known as 'skewed bidding.' Using a dataset that includes both the public ex ante Forest Service estimates and the ex post realizations of the tract characteristics, we test our model and provide evidence that bidders do possess private information. Our results suggest that private information affects Forest Service revenue and creates allocational inefficiency. Finally, we establish that risk aversion plays an important role in bidding behavior
Liquidity constraints and imperfect information in subprime lending by William Adams( Book )
6 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 23 libraries worldwide
We present new evidence on consumer liquidity constraints and the credit market conditions that might give rise to them. Our analysis is based on unique data from a large auto sales company that serves the subprime market. We first document the role of short-term liquidity in driving purchasing behavior, including sharp increases in demand during tax rebate season and a high sensitivity to minimum down payment requirements. We then explore the informational problems facing subprime lenders. We find that default rates rise significantly with loan size, providing a rationale for lenders to impose loan caps because of moral hazard. We also find that borrowers at the highest risk of default demand the largest loans, but the degree of adverse selection is mitigated substantially by effective risk-based pricing
Contracting for government services theory and evidence from U.S. cities by Jonathan D Levin( Book )
7 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 22 libraries worldwide
Local governments can provide services with their own employees or by contracting with private or public sector providers. We develop a model of this "make-or-buy" choice that highlights the trade-off between productive efficiency and the costs of contract administration. We construct a dataset of service provision choices by U.S. cities and identify a range of service and city characteristics as significant determinants of contracting decisions. Our analysis suggests an important role for economic efficiency concerns, as well as politics, in contracting for government services
Comparing open and sealed bid auctions evidence from timber auctions by Susan Athey( Book )
6 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 10 libraries worldwide
We study entry and bidding patterns in sealed bid and open auctions with heterogeneous bidders. Using data from U.S. Forest Service timber auctions, we document a set of systematic effects of auction format: sealed bid auctions attract more small bidders, shift the allocation towards these bidders, and can also generate higher revenue. We show that a private value auction model with endogenous participation can account for these qualitative effects of auction format. We estimate the model's parameters and show that it can explain the quantitative effects as well. Finally, we use the model to provide an assessment of bidder competitiveness, which has important consequences for auction choice
Winning play in spectrum auctions by Jeremy Bulow( Book )
7 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 9 libraries worldwide
We describe factors that make bidding in large spectrum auctions complex -- including exposure and budget problems, the role of timing within an ascending auction, and the possibilities for price forecasting -- and how economic and game-theoretic analysis can assist bidders in overcoming these problems. We illustrate with the case of the FCC's Advanced Wireless Service auction, in which a new entrant, SpectrumCo, faced all these problems yet managed to purchase nationwide coverage at a discount of roughly a third relative to the prices paid by its incumbent competitors in the same auction, saving more than a billion dollars
Pricing and welfare in health plan choice by M. Kate Bundorf( Computer File )
5 editions published in 2008 in English and held by 8 libraries worldwide
Prices in government and employer-sponsored health insurance markets only partially reflect insurers' expected costs of coverage for different enrollees. This can create inefficient distortions when consumers self-select into plans. We develop a simple model to study this problem and estimate it using new data on small employers. In the markets we observe, the welfare loss compared to the feasible efficient benchmark is around 2-11% of coverage costs. Three-quarters of this is due to restrictions on risk-rating employee contributions; the rest is due to inefficient contribution choices. Despite the inefficiency, we find substantial benefits from plan choice relative to single-insurer options
Early admissions at selective colleges by Christopher Avery( Computer File )
5 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 7 libraries worldwide
Early admissions is widely used by selective colleges and universities. We identify some basic facts about early admissions policies, including the admissions advantage enjoyed by early applicants and patterns in application behavior, and propose a game-theoretic model that matches these facts. The key feature of the model is that colleges want to admit students who are enthusiastic about attending, and early admissions programs give students an opportunity to signal this enthusiasm
Beyond testing empirical models of insurance markets by Liran Einav( Computer File )
4 editions published in 2009 in English and held by 6 libraries worldwide
Abstract: We describe recent advances in the empirical analysis of insurance markets. This new research proposes ways to estimate individual demand for insurance and the relationship between prices and insurer costs in the presence of adverse and advantageous selection. We discuss how these models permit the measurement of welfare distortions arising from asymmetric information and the welfare consequences of potential government policy responses. We also discuss some challenges in modeling imperfect competition between insurers, and outline a series of open research questions
Set-asides and subsidies in auctions by Susan Athey( file )
5 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Set-asides and subsidies are used extensively in government procurement and natural resource sales. We analyze these policies in an empirical model of U.S. Forest Service timber auctions. The model fits the data well both within the sample of unrestricted sales where we estimate the model, and when we predict (out of sample) bidder entry and prices for small business set-asides. Our estimates suggest that restricting entry to small businesses substantially reduces efficiency and revenue, although it does increase small business participation. An alternative policy of subsidizing small bidders would increase revenue and small bidder profit, while eliminating almost all of the efficiency loss of set-asides, and only slightly decreasing the profit of larger firms. We explain these findings by connecting to the theory of optimal auction design
Vertical integration and market structure by Timothy F Bresnahan( Book )
5 editions published in 2012 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Contractual theories of vertical integration derive firm boundaries as an efficient response to market transaction costs. These theories predict a relationship between underlying features of transactions and observed integration decisions. There has been some progress in testing these predictions, but less progress in quantifying their importance. One difficulty is that empirical applications often must consider firm structure together with industry structure. Research in industrial organization frequently has adopted this perspective, emphasizing how scale and scope economies, and strategic considerations, influence patterns of industry integration. But this research has paid less attention to contractual or organizational details, so that these two major lines of research on vertical integration have proceeded in parallel with only rare intersection. We discuss the value of combining different viewpoints from organizational economics and industrial organization -- National Bureau of Economic Research web site
The data revolution and economic analysis by Liran Einav( Book )
3 editions published in 2013 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
Many believe that 'big data' will transform business, government and other aspects of the economy. In this article we discuss how new data may impact economic policy and economic research. Large-scale administrative datasets and proprietary private sector data can greatly improve the way we measure, track and describe economic activity. They also can enable novel research designs that allow researchers to trace the consequences of different events or policies. We outline some of the challenges in accessing and making use of these data. We also consider whether the big data predictive modeling tools that have emerged in statistics and computer science may prove useful in economics -- National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Learning from seller experiments in online markets ( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2011 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Profit sharing and the role of professional partnerships ( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Vertical Integration and Market Structure by by Timothy F Bresnahan( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2012 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Estimating dynamic models of imperfect competition ( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Comparing open and sealed bid auctions : theory and evidence from timber auctions by Susan Athey( Book )
1 edition published in 2004 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Sales taxes and internet commerce by Liran Einav( Book )
1 edition published in 2012 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
We estimate the sensitivity of Internet retail purchasing to sales taxes using data from the eBay marketplace. Our first approach exploits the fact that seller locations are revealed only after buyers have expressed interest in an item by clicking on its listing. We use millions of location "surprises" to estimate price elasticities with respect to the effective sales tax. We then use aggregated data to estimate cross-state substitution parameters, and substitution between offline and online purchases, relying on the variation in state and local sales taxes, and on changes in these rates over time. We find substantial sensitivity to sales taxes. Using our item-level approach, we find a price elasticity of around -2 for interested buyers. Using our aggregate approach, we find that a one percentage point increase in a state's sales tax increases online purchases by state residents by just under two percent, but decreases their online purchases from home-state retailers by 3-4 percent
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Alternative Names
Levin, J. D.
Levin, Jonathan D.
Levin, Jonathan D. 17.11.1972-
Levin, Jonathan David
Levin, Jonathan David 17.11.1972-
English (98)
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