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Acemoglu, Daron

Works: 368 works in 1,963 publications in 7 languages and 14,197 library holdings
Genres: Conference proceedings 
Roles: Author, Editor, Contributor, Creator
Classifications: HB74.P65, 330
Publication Timeline
Publications about Daron Acemoglu
Publications by Daron Acemoglu
Most widely held works by Daron Acemoglu
Why nations fail : the origins of power, prosperity, and poverty by Daron Acemoglu( Book )
44 editions published between 2012 and 2014 in 3 languages and held by 2,483 libraries worldwide
Why are some nations rich and others poor? Is it culture, the weather, geography? Perhaps ignorance of the right policies? Simply, no. None of these factors is either definitive or destiny. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson conclusively show that it is man-made political and economic institutions that underlie economic success (or lack of it). Based on fifteen years of original research, Acemoglu and Robinson marshall historical evidence from the Roman Empire to the Soviet Union, from Korea to Africa, to build a new theory of political economy with great relevance for the big questions of today, including: China has built an authoritarian growth machine. Will it continue to grow at such high speed and overwhelm the West? Is America moving from a virtuous circle, in which efforts by elites to aggrandize power are resisted, to a vicious one that enriches and empowers a small minority? What is the most effective way to help move billions of people from the rut of poverty to prosperity? This book will change the way you look at--and understand--the world.--From American publisher description
Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy by Daron Acemoglu( Book )
34 editions published between 2005 and 2009 in English and Chinese and held by 864 libraries worldwide
"This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentives to overthrow it. These processes depend on the strength of civil society, the structure of political institutions, the nature of political and economic crises, the level of economic inequality, the structure of the economy, and the form and extent of globalization."--Publisher description
Introduction to modern economic growth by Daron Acemoglu( Book )
16 editions published between 2008 and 2012 in English and held by 455 libraries worldwide
Daron Acemoglu gives graduate students not only the tools to analyze growth & related macroeconomic problems, but also the broad perspective necessary to apply those tools to the big-picture questions of growth & divergence. He also introduces the economic & mathematical foundations of modern growth theory & macroeconomics
Why nations fail the origins of power, prosperity and poverty by Daron Acemoglu( Sound Recording )
8 editions published in 2012 in English and held by 349 libraries worldwide
Why are some nations more prosperous than others? "Why Nations Fail" sets out to answer this question, with a compelling and elegantly argued new theory: that it is not down to climate, geography or culture, but because of institutions. Drawing from an extraordinary range of contemporary and historical examples, academics Acemoglu and Robinson argue that nations can only prosper if the people are allowed to keep the wealth that they earn
Advances in economics and econometrics by Econometric Society( Book )
17 editions published between 2012 and 2013 in English and held by 109 libraries worldwide
Contains edited papers and commentaries presented at invited symposium sessions of the Tenth World Congress of the Econometric Society, held in Shanghai in August 2010
Productivity differences by Daron Acemoglu( Book )
35 editions published between 1998 and 2009 in English and held by 105 libraries worldwide
We document substantial within-country (cross-municipality) differences in incomes for a large number of countries in the Americas. A significant fraction of the within-country differences cannot be explained by observed human capital. We conjecture that the sources of within-country and between-country differences are related. As a first step towards a united framework, we propose a simple model incorporating both differences in technological know-how across countries and differences in productive efficiency within countries
Waarom sommige landen rijk zijn en andere arm by Daron Acemoglu( Book )
18 editions published between 2012 and 2014 in 5 languages and held by 104 libraries worldwide
"¿Qué determina que un país sea rico o pobre? ¿Cómo se explica que, en condiciones similares, en algunos países haya hambrunas y en otros no? ¿Qué papel tiene la política en estas cuestiones? Que algunas naciones sean más prósperas que otras, ¿se debe a cuestiones culturales?, ¿a los efectos de la climatología?, ¿a su ubicación geográfica? No, en absoluto. Ninguna cuestión relativa a la prosperidad de un país está relacionada con estos factores, sino que proviene de otro mucho más tangible: la política económica que dictaminan sus dirigentes. Son los líderes de cada país, afirman los reconocidos profesores Daron Acemoglu y James A. Robinson en este libro, quienes determinan con sus políticas la prosperidad de su territorio, y así ha ocurrido en todos los períodos de la historia, como demuestran en este apasionante estudio."--P. [4] of cover
Changes in unemployment and wage inequality : an alternative theory and some evidence by Daron Acemoglu( Book )
26 editions published between 1996 and 1998 in English and held by 100 libraries worldwide
Abstract: This paper offers a model where firms decide what types of jobs to create and then search for suitable workers. When there are few skilled workers and the productivity gap between the skilled and the unskilled is small, firms create a single type of job and recruit all workers. An increase in the proportion of skilled workers or skill-biased technical change can create a qualitative change in the composition of jobs, increasing the demand for skills, wage inequality, and the unemployment rates for both groups. The paper provides some evidence that there has been a change in the composition of jobs in the U.S. during the past two decades
Why do firms train? : theory and evidence by Daron Acemoglu( Book )
22 editions published in 1996 in English and held by 96 libraries worldwide
This paper offers and tests a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for general training they receive. The crucial ingredient in our model is that the current employer has superior information about the worker's ability relative to other firms. This informational advantage gives the employer an ex post monopsony power over the worker which encourages the firm to provide training. We show that the model can lead to multiple equilibria. In one equilibrium quits are endogenously high, and as a result employers have limited monopsony power and are willing to supply only little training, while in another equilibrium quits are low and training high. We also derive predictions from our model not shared by other explanations of firm sponsored training. Using microdata from Germany, we show that the predictions of the specific human capital model are rejected, while our model receives support from the data
The structure of wages and investment in general training by Daron Acemoglu( Book )
19 editions published between 1997 and 1998 in English and held by 95 libraries worldwide
In the standard model of human capital with perfect labor markets, workers pay for general training. When labor market frictions compress the structure of wages, firms may invest in the general skills of their employees. The reason is that the distortion in the wage structure turns "technologically" general skills into "specific" skills. Labor market frictions and institutions, such as minimum wages and union wage setting, are crucial in shaping the wage structure, and thus have an important impact on training. Our results suggest that the more frictional and regulated labor markets in Europe and Japan may generate more firm-sponsored general training than the U.S
Minimum wages and on-the-job training by Daron Acemoglu( Book )
22 editions published between 1999 and 2002 in English and held by 94 libraries worldwide
Becker's theory of human capital predicts that minimum wages should reduce training investments for affected workers, because they prevent these workers from taking wage cuts necessary to finance training. We show that when the assumption of perfectly competitive labor markets underlying this theory is relaxed, minimum wages can increase training of affected workers, by inducing firms to train their unskilled employees. More generally, a minimum wage increases training for constrained workers, while reducing it for those taking wage cuts to finance their training. We provide new estimates on the impact of the state and federal increases in the minimum wage between 1987 and 1992 of the training of low wage workers. We find no evidence that minimum wages reduce training. These results are consistent with our model, but difficult to reconcile with the standard theory of human capital
Consequences of employment protection? : the case of the Americans with Disabilities Act by Daron Acemoglu( Book )
13 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 83 libraries worldwide
The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) requires employers to accommodate disabled workers and outlaws discrimination against the disabled in hiring, firing, and pay. Although the ADA was meant to increase employment of the disabled, it also increases costs for employers. The net theoretical impact turns on which provisions of the ADA are most important and how responsive firm entry and exit is to profits. Empirical results using the CPS suggest that the ADA had a negative effect on the employment of disabled men of all working ages and disabled women under age 40. The effects appear to be larger in medium size firms, possibly because small firms were exempt from the ADA. The effects are also larger in states where there have been more ADA-related discrimination charges. Estimates of effects on hiring and firing suggest the ADA reduced hiring of the disabled but did not affect separations. This weighs against a pure firing-costs interpretation of the ADA. Finally, there is little evidence of an impact on the nondisabled, suggesting that the adverse employment consequences of the ADA have been limited to the protected group
Efficient unemployment insurance by Daron Acemoglu( Book )
14 editions published between 1997 and 1998 in English and held by 80 libraries worldwide
This paper constructs a tractable general equilibrium model of search with risk-aversion. An increase in risk-aversion reduces wages, unemployment, and investment. Unemployment insurance (UI) has the reverse effect due to market generated moral hazard: insured workers seek high wage jobs with high unemployment risk. An economy with risk-neutral workers achieves maximal output without any UI. In contrast, in an economy with risk-averse workers, a positive level of UI maximizes output. Therefore, moderate UI not only improves risk-sharing, but also increases output
How large are the social returns to education? : evidence from compulsory schooling laws by Daron Acemoglu( Book )
20 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 75 libraries worldwide
Abstract: Average schooling in US states is highly correlated with state wage levels, even after controlling for the direct effect of schooling on individual wages. We use an instrumental variables strategy to determine whether this relationship is driven by social returns to education. The instrumentals for average schooling are derived from information on the child labor laws and compulsory attendance laws that affected men in our Census samples, while quarter of birth is used as an instrument for individual schooling. This results in precisely estimated private returns to education of about seven percent, and small social returns, typically less than one percent, that are not significantly different from zero
Beyond Becker : training in imperfect labor markets by Daron Acemoglu( Book )
16 editions published in 1998 in English and held by 74 libraries worldwide
In this paper, we survey non-competitive theories of training. With competitive labor markets, firms never pay for investments in general training, whereas when labor markets are imperfect, firm-sponsored training arises as an equilibrium phenomenon. We discuss a variety of evidence which support the predictions of non-competitive theories, and we draw some tentative policy conclusions from these models
The world income distribution by Daron Acemoglu( Book )
21 editions published between 2000 and 2001 in English and held by 71 libraries worldwide
We show that even in the absence of diminishing returns in production and technological spillovers, international trade leads to a stable world income distribution. This is because specialization and trade introduce de facto diminishing returns: Countries that accumulate capital faster than average experience declining export prices, depressing the rate of return to capital and discouraging further accumulation. Because of constant returns to capital accumulation at the country level, the cross-sectional behavior of the world economy is similar to that of existing exogenous growth models: Cross-country variation in economic policies, savings, and technology translate into cross-country variation in incomes, and country dynamics exhibit conditional convergence as in the Solow-Ramsey model. The dispersion of the world income distribution is determined by the forces that shape the strength of the terms of trade-effects--the degree of openness to international trade and the extent of specialization. Finally, we provide evidence that those countries accumulating faster experience a worsening in their terms of trade. Our estimates imply that, all else equal, a 1 percentage point faster growth is associated with approximately a 0.7 percentage point deline in the terms of trade. Keywords: Cross-Country Income Differences; Endogenous Growth; International Trade;Specialization; Terms of Trade Effects
Productivity gains from unemployment insurance by Daron Acemoglu( Book )
13 editions published between 1999 and 2001 in English and held by 69 libraries worldwide
This paper argues that unemployment insurance increases labor productivity by encouraging workers to seek higher productivity jobs, and by encouraging firms to create those jobs. We use a quantitative general equilibrium model to investigate whether this effect is comparable in magnitude to the standard moral hazard effects of unemployment insurance. Our model economy captures the behavior of the U.S. labor market for high school graduates quite well. When unemployment insurance becomes more generous starting from the current U.S. levels, there is an increase in unemployment similar in magnitude to the micro-estimates, but because the composition of jobs also changes, total output and welfare increase as well
Distance to frontier, selection, and economic growth by Daron Acemoglu( Book )
19 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 68 libraries worldwide
We analyze an economy where managers engage both in the adoption of technologies from the world frontier and in innovation activities. The selection of high-skill managers is more important for innovation activities. As the economy approaches the technology frontier, selection becomes more important. As a result, countries at early stages of development pursue an investment-based strategy, with long-term relationships, high average size and age of firms, large average investments, but little selection. Closer to the world technology frontier, there is a switch to an innovation-based strategy with short-term relationships, younger firms, less investment and better selection of managers. We show that relatively backward economies may switch out of the investment-based strategy too soon, so certain economic institutions and policies, such as limits on product market competition or investment subsidies, that encourage the investment-based strategy may be beneficial. However, societies that cannot switch out of the investment based strategy fail to converge to the world technology frontier. Non-convergence traps are more likely when policies and institutions are endogenized, enabling beneficiaries of existing policies to bribe politicians to maintain these policies. Keywords: appropriate institutions, convergence, economic growth, innovation, imitation, political economy of growth, selection, technical change, traps. JEL Classifications: O31, O33, O38, O40, L16
Vertical integration and distance to frontier by Daron Acemoglu( Book )
19 editions published in 2002 in English and held by 64 libraries worldwide
We construct a model where the equilibrium organization of firms changes as an economy approaches the world technology frontier. In vertically integrated firms, owners (managers) have to spend time both on production and innovation activities, and this creates managerial overload, and discourages innovation. Outsourcing of some production activities mitigates the managerial overload, but creates a holdup problem, causing some of the rents of the owners to be dissipated to the supplier. Far from the technology frontier, imitation activities are more important, and vertical integration is preferred. Closer to the frontier, the value of innovation increases, encouraging outsourcing
NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2006 ( Book )
5 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
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Alternative Names
Acemoglu, D. 1967-
Acemoğlu, Daron 1967-
Acemoglu, K. Daron.
Acemoglu, K. Daron 1967-
Acemoglu, Kamer Daron.
Acemoglu, Kamer Daron 1967-
Daron Acemoğlu turecko-amerykański ekonomista
Daron Acemoğlu US-amerikanischer Ökonom
Daron Əcəmoğlu
Дарон Аджемоглу
Дарон Асемоглу
Տարոն Աճեմօղլու
다론 아제모을루 터키 태생의 경제학자
アセモグル, ダロン
English (381)
Spanish (9)
Chinese (4)
Italian (3)
Dutch (2)
Turkish (1)
Polish (1)
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