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Moffatt, Peter G.

Works: 15 works in 22 publications in 1 language and 60 library holdings
Genres: Conference papers and proceedings 
Roles: Author
Classifications: HB139.M64, 330.0724
Publication Timeline
Publications about Peter G Moffatt
Publications by Peter G Moffatt
Most widely held works by Peter G Moffatt
Experimetrics : econometrics for experimental economics by Peter G Moffatt( Book )
7 editions published between 2012 and 2016 in English and held by 36 libraries worldwide
Estimation of the house money effect using hurdle models by Christoph Engel( Computer File )
2 editions published in 2012 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Evidence from an experiment investigating the "house money effect" in the context of a public goods game is reconsidered. Analysis is performed within the framework of the panel hurdle model, in which subjects are assumed to be one of two types: free-riders, and potential contributors. The effect of house money is seen to be significant in the first hurdle: specifically, house money makes a subject more likely to be a potential contributor. Hence we find that the effect of house money is more than just an effect on behaviour; it has the effect of changing a subject from one type to another. This result is potentially important in the external validity debate. -- Public Good Experiment ; Hurdle Model ; double hurdle model ; Tobit ; panel data
A test of the rational expectations hypothesis using data from a natural experiment ( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2009 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Data on contestants' choices in Italian Game Show Affari Tuoi are analysed in a way that separates the effect of risk attitude (preferences) from that of beliefs concerning the amount of money that will be offered to contestants in future rounds. The most important issue addressed in the paper is what belief function is actually being used by contestants. The parameters of this function are estimated freely along with the parameters of a choice model. Separate identification of the belief function and preferences is possible by virtue of the fact that at a certain stage of the game, beliefs are not relevant, and risk attitude is the sole determinant of choice. The rational expectations hypothesis is tested by comparing the estimated belief function with the "true" offer function which is estimated using data on offers actually made to contestants. We find that there is a significant difference between these two functions, and hence we reject the rational expectations hypothesis. However, when a simpler "rule-of-thumb" structure is as- sumed for the belief function, we find a correspondence to the function obtained from data on actual offers. Our overall conclusion is that contestants are rational to the extent that they make use of all available relevant information, but are not fully rational because they are not processing the information in an optimal way. The importance of belief-formation is confirmed by the estimation of a mixture model which establishes that the vast majority of contestants are forward-looking as opposed to myopic. -- Beliefs ; Discrete choice models ; Method of simulated likelihood ; Natural Experiments ; rational expectations ; risky choice
Giving in dictator games : experimenter demand effect or preference over the rules of the game? by Nadine Chlaß( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2012 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Traditionally, giving in dictator games was assumed to signal preferences over others' payoffs. To date, several studies find that dictator game giving breaks down under conditions designed to increase dictators' anonymity or if an option to take money obscures the purpose of the task. Giving is therefore argued to result from an experimenter demand effect. Here, we put this new interpretation to a stress test and find evidence that dictators mean to compensate the recipient for her vulnerable position in the game. Our results explain why giving decreases under specific conditions designed to increase anonymity and why the same individual may signal very different other-regarding preferences across different rules and/or roles of a game (Blanco et al. 2011). -- altruism ; dictator games ; moral preferences ; experimenter demand effect
The econometric modeling of social preferences by Anna Del Conte( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2010 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
Experimental data on social preferences present a number of features that need to be incorporated in econometric modelling. We explore a variety of econometric modelling approaches to the analysis of such data. The approaches under consideration are: the random utility approach (in which it is assumed that each possible action yields a utility with a deterministic and a stochastic component, and that the individual selects the action yielding the highest utility); the random behavioural approach (which assumes that the individual computes the maximum of a deterministic utility function, and that computational error causes their observed behaviour to depart stochastically from this optimum); and the random preference approach (in which all variation in behaviour is attributed to stochastic variation in the parameters of the deterministic component of utility). These approaches are applied in various ways to an experiment on fairness conducted by Cappelen et al. (2007). At least two of the models that we estimate succeed in capturing the key features of the data set. -- Econometric modelling and estimation ; model evaluation ; individual behaviour ; fairness
Summary record of the ANIK-B Users Meeting, Ottawa, Ontario, June 5, 1980 by ANIK-B Users Meeting( Book )
1 edition published in 1980 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
An econometric analysis of voluntary contributions : the Random effects two-limit p-Tobit model ( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2003 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
The use of risk-based discrete choice experiments to capture preferences over health states by Angela Robinson( file )
1 edition published in 2012 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Discrete choice experiments (DCEs) allow a number of characteristics to be traded-off against one another. An overriding methodological challenge faced is how best to apply DCEs to questions involving those attributes commonly used in value elicitation exercises such as risk, time (Bansback et al. 2012) and numbers treated (Robinson et al, 2010). Flynn (2010) concluded that in developing the methods, it was important to understand more fully the preferences of individual respondents. The study reported here sets out to provide such insights by enhancing a DCE design with additional questions that allow utility values to be derived at the individual level also. The DCE presented respondents with eight pairwise risky choices to estimate aggregate utility values for three EQ-5D health states, ranging from mild to severe. The design allowed the elicitation of utility values for worse-than-dead states. Risk was represented using the stimulus used by EuroVaQ ( Three main devices were used to collect additional individual level data. Firstly we included six additional DCE questions that were not used to estimate the aggregate DCE model but allowed the utility value of one health state to be estimated at the level of the individual. These six questions provided more extensive tests of the internal consistency of the pairwise choices undertaken in the DCE. Secondly, respondents were asked three questions where the risk in one of the two treatments was fixed, and they set the risk of the other treatment (a modified SG question). These questions then allowed us to estimate utility values for all three health states. Finally, we collected respondents risk attitudes using Kuilen and Wakker's 2011 measure. We collected data on a convenient sample of 59 students studying Economics or Geography at the University of London and Exeter in 2011/12. Preliminary results show that 22 of the 59 respondents gave a series of DCE responses that were internally inconsistent. We report here the implications of the results for the inclusion of risk as an attribute in DCEs and for preference elicitation more broadly
On the demand for hyper-substitutes with satiation by Peter G Moffatt( Book )
1 edition published in 1996 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
House depressurization tolerance of draft-induced gas-fired appliances by P Moffatt( Book )
1 edition published in 1991 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
The unexpected spillage of combustion gases from induced draft furnaces has raised concern over the suitability of these appliances for tighter Canadian houses and for houses or furnace rooms where depressurization is a likely occurrence. This project surveyed a full range of induced draft gas appliances, including side vented and vertically vented furnaces, boilers, water heaters, and draft inducer kits; constructed a test facility in the lab and tested two different induced draft furnaces to quantify the combustion gas spillage under conditions of varying degrees of depressurization; visited CGA and four leading manufacturers of induced draft gas furnaces sold in Canada; used sophisticated software to model indoor air quality during a variety of spillage scenarios; and evaluated the severity of air quality problems created by combustion gas spillage
On the timing of household purchases by Peter G Moffat( Book )
1 edition published in 1995 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
The experimetrics of public goods : inferring motivations from contributions ( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2005 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Mixture models of choice under risk ( Computer File )
1 edition published in 2007 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
An econometric analysis of voluntary contributions by Nicholas Bardsley( file )
1 edition published in 2000 in English and held by 1 library worldwide
Contributions to public goods simulated in economists' laboratoryexperiments have two peculiarities from the perspective ofstatistical modelling. There is a variety of contributor behaviours(Ledyard, 1995), suggestive perhaps of separate classes ofindividuals, and contributions are doubly censored. We present aneconometric model of contributions in sequential play, which takesinto account the censoring, admits variation both within and betweenindividuals, and allows for the existence of a distinct class offree-riders. The model synthesises the 2-limit tobit analysis ofNelson (1976), the extension of tobit to panel techniques by Kim andMaddala (1992) and the "p-tobit" hurdle model of Deaton and Irish(1984). We estimate it for panel data from a public good experimentreported in Bardsley (2000). It reveals pronounced inter- and intra-individual variation, and shows significant effects for subjects'order in a sequential game, others' contributions and the position ofthe choice task within the experiment. These effects are plausiblyattributable to egoism, reciprocity and learning respectively. Inaddition, the existence of a distinct class of free-riders, whoconform to a game theoretic prediction of unconditional non-contribution, is confirmed. The model is estimated for tasks inwhich "others' behaviour" was controlled by the experimenter (butwithout using deception). We compare its predictions for actual play(in which others' behaviour is not controlled) with behaviour in areal game task. The predictions are consistent with the data
An econometric analysis of voluntary contributions : the random effects two-limit p-tobit model by Nick Bardsley( Book )
1 edition published in 2000 in English and held by 0 libraries worldwide
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Alternative Names
Moffat, Peter G.
Moffatt, P.
Moffatt, Peter
English (22)
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