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Treisman, Daniel

Overview
Works: 45 works in 183 publications in 4 languages and 5,103 library holdings
Genres: History 
Roles: Author, Redactor
Classifications: HC340.12, 947.086
Publication Timeline
Key
Publications about Daniel Treisman
Publications by Daniel Treisman
Most widely held works by Daniel Treisman
The return : Russia's journey from Gorbachev to Medvedev by Daniel Treisman( Book )
18 editions published between 2010 and 2014 in English and Russian and held by 894 libraries worldwide
Drawing on two decades of research, Treisman analyzes the paradoxes in Russian politics and society, illuminating why the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. wasn't more violent, the repercussions of the Chechen wars, the "sacred place" vodka holds in the Russian imagination (and its pernicious effect on Russia's demographics), and how, 20 years after the fall of communism, relations between Russia and the U.S. remain so frosty. Yet as Treisman convincingly argues, most of the world's international problems--nuclear proliferation, Islamic terrorism, global warming--will be difficult to solve without Russia's help
Without a map : political tactics and economic reform in Russia by Andrei Shleifer( Book )
14 editions published between 1999 and 2001 in English and held by 563 libraries worldwide
"Renewing a strain of analysis that runs from Machiavelli to Hirschman, the authors reach conclusions about political strategies that have important implications for other reformers. They draw on their extensive knowledge of the country and recent experience as advisors to Russian policymakers. The book should appeal to economists, political scientists, policymakers, businesspeople, and all those interested in Russian politics or economics."--Jacket
After the deluge : regional crises and political consolidation in Russia by Daniel Treisman( Book )
9 editions published between 1999 and 2002 in English and held by 317 libraries worldwide
"Based on extensive statistical analysis of previously unpublished data as well as interviews with numerous central and regional policymakers, After the Deluge suggests an original and counterintuitive interpretation of this experience."--BOOK JACKET. "After the Deluge will appeal to a broad audience of scholars in political science, economics, history, geography, and policy studies."--Jacket
The architecture of government : rethinking political decentralization by Daniel Treisman( Book )
14 editions published in 2007 in English and held by 304 libraries worldwide
Since the days of Montesquieu and Jefferson, political decentralisation has been seen as a force for better government and economic performance. This text examines the most influential arguments about the consequences of political decentralisation
The economics and politics of transition to an open market economy : Russia by Andrei Shleifer( Book )
16 editions published between 1995 and 1998 in English and French and held by 244 libraries worldwide
Subnational budgeting in Russia : preempting a potential crisis by Lev M Freinkman( Book )
8 editions published in 1999 in English and held by 114 libraries worldwide
A normal country : Russia after communism by Andrei Shleifer( Book )
14 editions published in 2003 in English and held by 40 libraries worldwide
During the 1990s, Russia underwent an extraordinary transformation from a communist dictatorship to a multi-party democracy, from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, and from a belligerent adversary of the West to a cooperative partner. Yet a consensus in the US circa 2000 viewed Russia as a disastrous and threatening failure, and the 1990s as a decade of catastrophe for its citizens. Analyzing a variety of economic and political data, we demonstrate a large gap between this perception and the facts. In contrast to the common image, by the late 1990s Russia had become a typical middle-income capitalist democracy
Environnement économique et politique de transition vers l'économie de marché by Andrei Schleifer( Book )
6 editions published between 1989 and 1998 in French and held by 39 libraries worldwide
Public employment and redistributive politics : evidence from Russia's regions by Vladimir Gimpelson( Book )
4 editions published in 2000 in English and held by 7 libraries worldwide
Oil and democracy in Russia by Daniel Treisman( Book )
7 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 7 libraries worldwide
Russia is often considered a perfect example of the so-called "resource curse"--The argument that natural resource wealth tends to undermine democracy. Given high oil prices, some observers see the country as virtually condemned to authoritarian government for the foreseeable future. Reexamining various data, I show that such fears are exaggerated. Evidence from around the world suggests that for countries like Russia with an established oil industry, even large increases in the scale of mineral incomes have only a minor effect on the political regime. In addition, Russia-a country with an industrialized economy, a highly educated, urbanized population, and an oil sector that remains majority private-owned-is unlikely to be susceptible to most of the hypothesized pernicious effects of resource dependence
"Loans for shares" revisited by Daniel Treisman( Book )
7 editions published between 2010 and 2011 in English and held by 5 libraries worldwide
The "loans for shares" scheme of 1995-6--in which a handful of well-connected businessmen bought stakes in major Russian companies--is widely considered a scandal that slowed subsequent Russian economic growth. Fifteen years later, I reexamine the details of the program. In light of evidence available today, I concur with the critics that the scheme's execution appeared corrupt. However, in most other regards the conventional wisdom was wrong. The stakes involved represented a small fraction of the market; the pricing in most cases was in line with international practice; and the scheme can only explain a small part of Russia's increasing wealth inequality. The biggest beneficiaries were not the so-called "oligarchs," but Soviet era industrial managers. After the oligarchs consolidated control, their firms performed far better than comparable state enterprises and companies sold to incumbent managers, and helped fuel Russia's rapid growth after 1999
Subnational budgeting in Russia : preempting a national crisis by Lev M Freinkman( Book )
1 edition published in 1999 in English and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Causes of corruption : a cross-national study by Daniel Treisman( Book )
4 editions published between 1999 and 2000 in English and Swedish and held by 4 libraries worldwide
Did government decentralization cause China's economic miracle? by Hongbin Cai( file )
1 edition published in 2006 in English and held by 3 libraries worldwide
"Many scholars attribute China's market reforms and the remarkable economic performance they have fostered in part to the country's political and fiscal decentralization. Political decentralization is said to have stimulated local policy experiments and restrained predatory central interventions. Fiscal decentralization is thought to have motivated local officials to promote development and harden enterprises' budget constraints. The locally diversified structure of the prereform economy is said to have facilitated liberalization. Reexamining these arguments, the authors find that none establishes a convincing link between political or fiscal decentralization and China's successes. They suggest an alternative view of the reform process in which growth-enhancing policies emerged from competition between promarket and conservative factions in Beijing."--Editor
Income, Democracy, and the Cunning of Reason by Daniel Treisman( Book )
6 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
A long-standing debate pits those who think economic development leads to democratization against those who argue that both result from distant historical causes. Using the most comprehensive estimates of national income available, I show that development is associated with more democratic government--but in the medium run (10 to 20 years). The reason is that, for the most part, higher income only prompts a breakthrough to more democratic politics after the incumbent leader falls from power. And in the short run, faster economic growth increases the leader's odds of survival. This logic--for which I provide evidence at the levels of individual countries and the world--helps explain why democracy advances in waves followed by periods of stasis and why dictators, concerned only to entrench themselves in power, end up preparing their countries to leap to a higher level of democracy when they are eventually overthrown
Embezzlement versus bribery by C. Simon Fan( Book )
5 editions published in 2010 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Abstract: Corrupt officials can use their positions to enrich themselves in two ways. They can steal from the state budgetembezzling or misspending fundsor they can demand extra payments from citizens in return for servicesbribery. In many circumstances, embezzlement is less distortionary than bribery. We analyze the tradeoff for governments in deciding how strictly to monitor and punish these two kinds of bureaucratic misbehavior. When bribery is more costly to economic development, governments may tolerate some embezzlement in order to reduce the extent of briberyeven though embezzlement is generally easier to detect. Embezzlement serves as a parallel to the efficiency wage." This logic appears to hold in China, where misappropriation of public funds by officials appears to be ubiquitous
How modern dictators survive : cooptation, censorship, propaganda, and repression by S. M Guriev( Book )
3 editions published in 2015 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
We develop an informational theory of dictatorship. Dictators survive not because of their use of force or ideology but because they convince the public -- rightly or wrongly -- that they are competent. Citizens do not observe the dictator's type but infer it from signals inherent in their living standards, state propaganda, and messages sent by an informed elite via independent media. If citizens conclude the dictator is incompetent, they overthrow him in a revolution. The dictator can invest in making convincing state propaganda, censoring independent media, co-opting the elite, or equipping police to repress attempted uprisings -- but he must finance such spending with taxes that depress the public's living standards. We show that incompetent dictators can survive as long as economic shocks are not too large. Moreover, their reputations for competence may grow over time. Censorship and co-optation of the elite are substitutes, but both are complements of propaganda. Repression of protests is a substitute for all the other techniques. In some equilibria the ruler uses propaganda and co-opts the elite; in others, propaganda is combined with censorship. The multiplicity of equilibria emerges due to coordination failure among members of the elite. We show that repression is used against ordinary citizens only as a last resort when the opportunities to survive through co-optation, censorship, and propaganda are exhausted. In the equilibrium with censorship, difficult economic times prompt higher relative spending on censorship and propaganda. The results illuminate tradeoffs faced by various recent dictatorships
The Geography of Fear by Daniel Treisman( Book )
7 editions published in 2011 in English and held by 2 libraries worldwide
Whether the danger invoked is nuclear war or genetically modified foods, far more people in some countries than in others say they are afraid. Using data from six surveys, I show that the levels of reported fear of different dangers correlate strongly across both individuals and countries. I construct indexes of fearfulness for 15-25 countries and map the prevalence of fear in Western Europe. About one quarter of the crossnational variation within Europe can be explained by differences in pessimism--the degree to which respondents exaggerate the likelihood of disasters. Among the countries for which I have data, the most robust correlates of fearfulness relate to countries' religious traditions. Fear tends to be higher in countries where more people believe in Hell and where fewer believe in Heaven
How modern dictators survive : an informational theory of the new authoritarianism by S. M Guriev( file )
2 editions published in 2015 in English and held by 0 libraries worldwide
We develop an informational theory of dictatorship. Dictators survive not because of their use of force or ideology but because they convince the public -- rightly or wrongly -- that they are competent. Citizens do not observe the dictator's type but infer it from signals inherent in their living standards, state propaganda, and messages sent by an informed elite via independent media. If citizens conclude that the dictator is incompetent, they overthrow him in a revolution. The dictator can invest in making convincing state propaganda, censoring independent media, co-opting the elite, or equipping police to repress attempted uprisings -- but he must finance such spending at the expense of the public's living standards. We show that incompetent dictators can survive as long as economic shocks are not too large. Moreover, their reputations for competence may grow over time -- even if living standards fall. Censorship and co-optation of the elite are substitutes, but both are complements of propaganda. Due to coordination failure among members of the elite, multiple equilibria emerge. In some equilibria the ruler uses propaganda and co-opts the elite; in others, propaganda is combined with censorship. In the equilibrium with censorship, difficult economic times prompt higher relative spending on censorship and propaganda. The results illuminate tradeoffs faced by various recent dictatorships
Misperceiving inequality by Vladimir Gimpelson( file )
2 editions published in 2015 in English and held by 0 libraries worldwide
Since Aristotle, a vast literature has suggested that economic inequality has important political consequences. Higher inequality is thought to increase demand for government income redistribution in democracies and to discourage democratization and promote class conflict and revolution in dictatorships. Most such arguments crucially assume that ordinary people know how high inequality is, how it has been changing, and where they fit in the income distribution. Using a variety of large, cross-national surveys, we show that, in recent years, ordinary people have had little idea about such things. What they think they know is often wrong. Widespread ignorance and misperceptions of inequality emerge robustly, regardless of the data source, operationalization, and method of measurement. Moreover, we show that the perceived level of inequality -- and not the actual level -- correlates strongly with demand for redistribution and reported conflict between rich and poor. We suggest that most theories about political effects of inequality need to be either abandoned or reframed as theories about the effects of perceived inequality
 
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Alternative Names
Treisman, D. 1964-
Treisman, Dan 1964-
Treisman, Daniel
Treisman, Daniel S.
Treisman, Daniel S. 1964-
Treismann, Daniel 1964-
Trejsman, Dėniel 1964-
Trizman, Dènièl.
Trizman, Dènièl 1964-
Трейсман, Дэниел
Languages
English (139)
French (7)
Russian (1)
Swedish (1)
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